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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a case study of the economic effects of military expenditure in 
Greece and a comparison with two other similar countries. Portugal and Spain. 
Greece provides a particularly valuable focus for empirical investigation since tor 
many years it has been allocating a relatively high proportion of its national income 
to defence, much higher than other countries in NATO and EU. It is also situated in 
a complex geostrategic environment (the Balkans) and has many security concerns. 
in particular the confrontation with Turkey. At the same time. the Greek economy 
has gone through periods of high economic growth as well as periods of stagnation 
and has been the poorest member of the EU for the last two decades. Lick of a 
concensus on the economic effects of defence spending as well as the limited amount 
of research on the issue in newly industrialised economies intrigued the author and 
led to this research on whether high military expenditure has contributed to this poor 
economic performance. 
In this way the thesis contributes to an ongoing debate in the literature and provides a 
valuable additional case study. It provides a further contribution by comparinothe 
results of the analysis for Greece with two similar economies, Spain and Portugal, 
giving insights into the transferability of results across countries. In undertaking this 
analysis, a systematic empirical approach is taken which employs three different 
methodologies: a Granger causality analysis, a supply-side analysis and a demand 
and supply analysis, all enriched with advanced econometric techniques. 
Overall, the results for Greece suggest that the high military 
burden has been harmful 
to economic performance and 
has made a significant contribution to- the 
backwardness of the economy. While the results 
for Portugal and Spain show some 
differences, they do not contradict the overall conclusion 
for Greece. Portugal shows 
a clear negative effect of military 
burden awhile the results for Spain are much le 
clearcut. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The seminal study of Emile Benoit (1973,1978) and its "provocative findings" that 
defence spending stimulates economic growth in less developed countries (LDCs) 
was the starting point for a lot of research activity on the economic effects of defence 
spending. Despite the number of studies since then, no conclusion has been reached 
and the debate on the empirical question "does defence spending promote or hinder 
growth" is still on. Most of the studies deal with cross-section analyses of large 
groups of countries trying to find universal patterns for the defence-growth 
relationship applicable to all places and times which is likely to be disappointing. As 
Chan (1985) mentioned, "the claims to generality based on the results of such a 
search tend to entail substantial costs in empirical sensitivity and specificity", (Chan, 
1985, p. 433). Until now most research on the economic effects of military 
expenditure in individual countries has focused either on economies at the forefront 
of development or alternatively on less developed countries. So far, there has been 
almost absence of studies addressing the effect of military expenditure on economies 
that are at an intermediate level of development like for example, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
1 
These three Mediterranean countries are examples of semi-industrialised economies. 
that have followed a very similar pattern of development, have all emerged from 
dictatorships in the mid-1970s and are characterised as the "peripheral countries" of 
the European Union. Despite the economic similarities, though, their military 
spending have followed quite different patterns. Concentrating on the period 1960- 
1996, Greece has always spent more on defence than the two other countries, with 
Portugal being a high defence spender until 1974 (by which year the colonial wars as 
well as the dictatorship had ended) and Spain allocating a small share of its GDP on 
defence throughout this period. Among the three, only Greece - even after the end of 
the Cold War - continues to allocate a significant share of its GDP for defence (in 
1996 military burden for Greece was 4.5% compared to 2.8% for Portugal, 1.5% for 
Spain, and 2.9% for NATO for the same year). Furthermore, Greece faces important 
security considerations, the long-term hostility and turmoil with its neighbouring 
country Turkey, not to mention the unstable environment of the Balkans where it is 
situated. What makes the Greek security considerations even more complicated is 
the fact that both Greece and its adversary, Turkey, are members of the same alliance 
(NATO). Being the poorest member of the EU and struggling to improve its 
economic condition, high defence spending would seem irrational if it were not for 
these security considerations. 
But does high military spending in Greece contribute to the poor economic 
performance of the country? And is this also the case for Portugal and Spain, two 
countries that share many common characteristics with Greece? These questions 
form the basis of this thesis, which takes an empirical approach to investigating the 
economic effects of military expenditure in Greece and later considers a comparison 
with the two similar countries. 
Before providing the structure of the thesis it is important to consider three 
methodological issues. First, the use of a case study approach is considered as more 
appropriate than the cross-country comparative approach for examining the 
economic effects in a country like Greece that has features of both developed and 
underdeveloped countries. The case study allows to take into consideration all the 
specific information which is unique for the country. Incorporation of this 
information in an empirical model reduces possible misspecification and leads to a 
more insightful explanation of the results. Second, the empirical investigation of the 
defence-growth relationship in Greece does not rely on a single model but rather on 
three different types of models based on different theoretical grounds to provide a 
more coherent and completed analysis of the issue. Third, the application of the 
same models over the same period (1960-1996) on two countries that share many 
common characteristics with Greece provides a valuable comparison and a unique 
way of examining the economic effects of defence spending in similar economies, as 
differences in sample period, data and model specification that usually lead to 
diversity in results are overcome while at the same time misspecification is reduced 
by accounting for structural breaks. 
This thesis, therefore, makes an important contribution to understanding a very 
significant but under-researched topic not only in the Greek economy but in all three 
Mediterranean economies (Greece, Spain and Portugal). 
3 
As usual, prior to any empirical investigation a consideration of what economic 
theory and previous empirical studies have to say about the economics of militarism 
is necessary. Chapters 2 and 3 survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
topic while they discuss some methodological and military data issues. It becomes 
evident that in recent years there is a tendency for empirical studies to be based on a 
well-grounded theory and to rely on more advanced econometric techniques. Despite 
that, review of the empirical studies indicates that there is still no consensus on the 
defence-growth relationship mainly because of the differences in specification, in 
data used and time periods examined. Chapter 4 gives a background analysis of the 
Greek politics, economy and military spending, defence industries and security 
considerations. It is not difficult to realise that a country like Greece with poor 
economic performance and an underdeveloped defence industry continues to spend a 
lot on defence because of its security concerns - the general unstable environment of 
the Balkans where it is situated but basically the perceived threat from its Eastern 
neighbour country, Turkey. It becomes evident then that the evolution of military 
spending in Greece must be understood in conjunction with the perceived external 
threat from Turkey. So, prior to investigating the economic effects, it seems 
sensible to investigate the determinants of military expenditure in Greece. This is 
done in Chapter 5 which first discusses the most commonly used models for the 
determinants of military expenditure, and then employs an arms race model and a 
general model of aggregate demand. In the first case the existence of an arms race 
between Greece and its potential enemy Turkey is investigated to see if each 
country's spending is influenced by the other's. Application of the widely used 
but 
poorly performing Richardson model brings out its many 
deficiencies and possible 
ways to deal with them are suggested. Specifically, a 
Vector Error Correction Model 
4 
(VECM) representation of the Richardson model that uses the notion of cointegration 
is proposed and extensively analysed within the Johansen framework. In the second 
case -a general model of aggregate defence spending - the demand for military 
expenditure is modelled in the Neoclassical framework by defining a welfare 
function which is maximised subject to resource and security constraints. This is 
then estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
Once the demand for military expenditure is estimated, investigation of the defence 
spending-economic growth relationship follows in Chapters 6,7, and 8. Each of 
these chapters develops and estimates three different models to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the defence-growth relationship itself but also to show 
how different model specifications lead to different empirical results. Specifically, 
Chapter 6 starts off by the atheoretical Granger causality approach which aims to 
show the causation between the two variables (military burden and economic 
growth). This is analysed within a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework taking 
into consideration the existence of a long-run relation between the variables by 
testing for cointegration as well as possible structural breaks. Once the endogeneity 
or exogeneity of the variables in question is established the development and 
estimation of two structural models is considered. Chapter 7 specifies a widely 
employed supply-side model - the Feder-type model - which is based on a 
Neoclassical production function. Unlike most of the previous studies that employ a 
restrictive version of the model (i. e. the economy consisting only of two sectors, the 
civilian and the military), here four sectors are assumed (the civilian, military, 
government and export) after non-nested tests suggested that the less restrictive form 
is preferred to the more restrictive. Furthermore, this model identifies both the size 
ý 
(total) effect of each sector, as well as the externality effects and the relative 
productivity differences. The method of estimation is OLS. Chapter 8 specifies a 
demand and supply model consisting of four equations (growth, savings, trade 
balance and military expenditure). Each individual equation is estimated by OLS 
and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) initially. At a later stage all four equations 
form a system which is estimated by a system method, Three Stage Least Squares 
(3 SLS), to deal with problems of simultaneity and high covariances. 
Once the empirical estimation of the three models for Greece is completed, the 
impact of military spending on economic growth in Spain and Portugal is considered. 
Chapter 9 provides the necessary background analysis of the Portuguese and Spanish 
economies which brings out many similarities with the Greek economy but more 
importantly considers the unique features that need to be taken into account in the 
empirical models. The next stage is to apply the models developed for Greece on 
Portuguese and Spanish data taking into account specific structural breaks. This is 
done in Chapter 10 which provides empirical estimations for Portugal and Spain of 
the Granger causality approach, the Feder-Ram model and the demand and supply 
simultaneous equation model. In the same chapter a comparison with Greece based 
on each different model as well as overall takes place. Finally, Chapter 11 discusses 
the main conclusions as well as the limitations of the study and it makes some 
suggestions for future research on the issue. 
6 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMICS 
OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
2.1. Introduction 
Defence spending is considered to be a public good' and its main objective is to 
provide national security and to protect national interests. As a part of government 
expenditure, it constitutes a significant share of global resources but despite its 
significant size, its economic impact has only recently been an issue of analysis in 
economic theory. And although the determination of a country's defence budget is 
the result of political choices within certain economic constraints that the country 
faces, it is not uncommon for resource-constrained countries (like LDCs) to spend a 
large proportion of their national income on defence in the name of national security 
(the common justification that policy makers provide). Obviously then, the level of 
military expenditure is influenced apart from economic factors, also by the extent 
each country perceives external threat, as well as by moral issues, the aggressiveness, 
imperialistic views and the ideology of each nation. 
1 As a public good, defence is non-rival (there is no additional cost when extra members are added to 
the population) and non-excludable (it is either impossible or too costly to exclude any individual 
from the benefits or disbenefits of defence), Ridge & Smith (1991). 
7 
It then follows, that military expenditure is not a purely economic issue but rather a 
mixture of economic, political, strategic, psychological, cultural and even moral 
aspects and as a result its theoretical analysis becomes very difficult. Although 
economic theory doesn't have an explicit role for military spending as a separate 
economic activity, there are four basic theoretical approaches (the Keynesian, the 
Neoclassical, the Liberal and the Marxist) that explain military expenditure from 
different points of view2. 
2.2. The Keynesian School of Thought 
Keynesians consider the state as an institution that stands above classes and 
represents the general interest of the society and military expenditure as a form of 
public spending that increases aggregate demand, employment and other economic 
variables and, through various effects, leads to economic growth. So, in the 
Keynesian framework, the state appears as proactive and interventionist, using 
military expenditure to increase output through multiplier effects when aggregate 
demand is ineffective (Dunne, 1995). Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) also mention 
that if aggregate demand is low relative to potential supply, increases in military 
expenditure can lead to increased capacity utilisation, increased profits and hence, 
increased investment and economic growth. 
In the empirical literature, Keynesian demand-side models are widely used to explain 
the relationship between defence spending and economic growth. In such a model, 
2 See also, Smith (1977), Georgiou (1983), and Dunne (1990,1995). 
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actual output, Y, or potential (full employment) output, Q, is the sum of the 
component real demands for goods and services, i. e. 
Y=Q-W=C+I+M+B 
where W is the gap between actual and potential output, C is the consumption 
expenditure, I the investment expenditure, M the military expenditure and B the trade 
balance. Empirical work within this demand-concentrated framework tends to find a 
negative relationship between military expenditure and economic growth (through 
the crowding out of savings or investment). The basic disadvantage of this theory is 
that it focuses on demand-side issues and fails to consider supply-side issues 
(technology spin-offs and externalities). Smith and Smith (1980) were the first to 
include explicit production functions in order to overcome this problem of 
concentrating on the demand side only. Extensive analysis of Keynesian models is 
given in the next chapter. 
2.3. Neoclassical School of Thought 
Neoclassicals see defence spending as a pure public good supplied by the state, 
which recognises some well-defined national interest that 
it seeks to protect. So, in 
the Neoclassical framework the state can appear as a rational actor that tries to 
maximise national interest by balancing opportunity costs and security 
benefits of 
military expenditure. 
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In setting up a model, it is assumed that there is a well-defined social welfare 
function that the state wishes to maximise subject to a set of constraints. For 
Neoclassicals potential enemy (threat) is considered to be external to the state. In the 
empirical work, supply-side models of the defence-growth relationship within the 
neoclassical framework, derive from the aggregate production function. National 
output (Y) can be expressed as a function of inputs (labour, capital) and technology 
which is usually proxied by military expenditure, 
Y=f(L, K, T, ) 
A widely used supply-side model is the one developed by Feder (1982) and further 
elaborated by Ram (1986) and Biswas and Ram (1986)3 who considered military 
expenditure as an exogenous variable and estimated its dynamic real effects on 
output. 
Supply-side models usually tend to find a positive relationship between defence and 
growth as they allow for some positive effects through technological developments 
generated in the military sector, "unless the defence sector has a strong negative 
productivity effect compared with the other sectors ", (Sandler & Hartley, 1995). The 
advantage of this theory is that it allows the development of consistent formal 
models4. Smith argues that Neoclassical literature has very poor explanatory power 
because it fails to deal with the complexity and uncertainty of international relations 
An extensive analysis of this model is presented in the empirical literature review that follows. 
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and the conflicting interest of groups within society. Georgiou (1983) argued that in 
this way Neoclassicals ignore the militarism whose origin is internal to the socio- 
political system. 5 In addition, Dunne (1996) has criticised Neoclassical models for 
"being ahistoric, for placing unrealistic requirements of computation and 
information on the `rational actors'. for concentrating on the supply-side and for 
ignoring internal political and military factors" (Dunne, 1996, p. 445). 
2.4. The Liberal School of Thought 
The liberal or institutional approach regards the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) 
as the central point in explaining military expenditure. The MIC is a powerful 
interest group that benefits from defence spending and thus, has an incentive to 
exaggerate international conflicts and to hinder attempts to settle disputes by non- 
military means. According to Rosen (1973), the MIC justifies its existence by 
manipulating - not always consciously - the fear of an external threat and it arises 
because the superpowers devote a considerable proportion of GNP to military 
expenditure. 
Liberals consider peace as desirable and militarism (in the form of a war) or 
peacetime arms production as irrational and immoral with no significant economic 
4 Simple Neoclassical models have little role for inertia, which is exemplified in a random walk model, 
common in time series. At least part of this can be captured 
by developing models to take account of 
habit and durability. 
5 Some authors (Berthlemy, Herrera and Sen, 1995), introduced military expenditure 
into endogenous 
growth models. 
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role. They neglect the economic role of military expenditure by avoiding asking 
questions about the relation between military expenditure and standard economic 
variables; they regard military expenditure in terms of politics only (removal or 
political control of the MIC)7 . Among them only Melman (1985) and Dumas (1986) 
do not neglect the economic role of military expenditure and think of it as a burden8. 
Smith (1977), criticised the liberal explanation of military expenditure which 
concentrates on the concept of MIC, as being compatible with an explanation that 
sees wars as being an accident rather than as the outcome of inter-state rivalry9. To 
illustrate this he used the following example: 
"The Vietnam war can be explained by a liberal as being a `mistake' generated 
almost unintentionally by the MIC (politicians seeking re-election, generals seeking 
promotion, firms seeking profits) which distorted the 'true', class-free national 
interest" (Smith, 1977, p. 64). 
In the long-run, even if military expenditure is harmful for the economy as a whole, 
it still benefits vested interests (business and professionals with specialised skills in 
military production). These groups may exert influence on the formulation and 
execution of national policy. Melman (1971) stressed the harmful effects of military 
b Melman (1985) and Rosen (1973) argue that military expenditure is influenced by the MIC while 
Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974) argue that it is influenced by the bureaucratic process within the 
state. 
7See Fine (1993) for a critical review of the literature on the "Military Industrial Complex". 
8 Melman (1985) and Dumas (1986) attempted to show how military spending and the presence of a 
"Military Industrial Complex" can contribute to a country's declining productivity and international 
competitiveness. 
9 Hartley and McLean (1978) comment on Smith (1977) and test the hypothesis of rivals and allies for 
the UK, US and USSR without finding a strong association of UK or US defence spending with that of 
the USSR. They propose a policy model for the UK (paying particular attention to the political party 
being in power) where UK defence spending is determined by economic, political and strategic 
variables. Their results indicate that UK defence spending 
is positively affected by GNP per capita, 
political and strategic factors and negatively 
by unemployment and the balance of payments. 
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expenditure on the American economy which are loss of competitiveness, 
development of bureaucracies, reduction of productive investment and the 
appearance of the MIC. 
2.5. Marxist School of Thought 
Marxists consider militarism and military expenditure as a social phenomenon with a 
historical aspect and they focus on the socio-political and strategic aspects of military 
expenditure and not so much on the economic ones. They argue that defence 
spending stimulates economic growth by preventing crises or by acting as an 
informal industrial policy. The classical Marxist position' ° about military 
expenditure was developed by Lenin, Luxembourg and Kautsky. Marx himself had 
little to say about militarism. Engels was the one to provide some analysis of 
militarism - though not systematic - in his work Anti-. Duhring. He claimed that 
militarism is a social and political phenomenon which has economic consequences 
and that in the long-run military expenditure leads to economic growth through new 
methods of labour and organisation of production that are first developed in the 
army. In discussing the army and the navy, Engels (1977) says: 
10 Georgiou (1983) in analysing the different theoretical approaches on military expenditure, he 
considers that Marxist school of thought encompasses 
four approaches namely: (i) Marx and Engels. 
(ii) Rosa Luxembourg, (iii) Underconsumptionism and Permanent Arms Economy theory and (iv) 
recent non-underconsumptionists. 
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"Force, nowadays, is the army and navy and both as we all know to our cost are devilishly expensive. Force, however, cannot make any money... Force is 
conditioned by the economic order, which furnishes the resources for the equipment 
and maintenance of the instruction of force. Also, the army's and navy's armaments, 
composition organisation, tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage 
reached at the time in production and communications " (Engels, 1977, p. 187-88). 
Lenin (1916) in accordance with the Marxist position claimed that total wars and 
capitalist exploitation of the world stigmatised imperialism, which is the highest 
level of capitalism, and ruled-out any non-economic disarmament process without 
the advent of socialism. 
Rosa Luxembourg (1913) was the first Marxist to deal explicitly with the political 
economy of military expenditure. In her work, The Accumulation of Capital, she 
argued that military expenditure is very useful for the development of capitalist 
economies because it works as a catalyst of primitive accumulation, as an instrument 
of colonial domination and finally as a hegemonic factor of capitalist countries' 
struggle to divide up the world. She claimed that the economic effect of militarism 
or the way in which militarism affects capitalism depends on the form that military 
expenditure takes. 
She considered that military expenditure could take two forms: (i) salaries of the 
army personnel and state officials and (ii) production of weapons. Then she assumed 
that in both cases military expenditure is financed by indirect taxation paid by the 
working class. For the first case - where military expenditure takes the 
form of 
salaries for military personnel - she argued that there would 
be no change in the 
reproduction of social capital as a whole. The capitalist sector 
does not benefit by 
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this form of military expenditure because - according to her - the demand for goods 
produced by capitalists as well as the rate of profit remain the same. Rowthorn 
(1980) claimed that she must have explicitly assumed that the reduction in the 
consumption of the working class invoked by the indirect taxation, is exactly 
matched by the increase in consumption of state officials and army personnel. 
In the second case - where military expenditure takes the form of weapons 
production - she employed a numerical example using Marx's scheme of expanded 
reproduction, and she argued that the development of an arms sector creates a secure 
market for modern products and the rate of profits is increased. This happens 
because the indirect taxes paid by the working class can be thought of as a decrease 
in wages which leads to higher profits. 
With regard to the operation of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) and the 
pursuit of profit by individual firms, Marxists suggest that they are constrained by the 
"laws of motion" of the system and the interests of capitalists as a class. So, 
Marxists basically reject the theory of MIC as the explanation of militarism and they 
claim that militarism is economically functional for capitalism as a whole and not 
just for those groups that are directly involved in militarism. 
Smith (1977), in analysing the economic and strategic role of military expenditure 
from a Marxist perspective, claimed that military expenditure has a necessary but 
also contradictory role in the maintenance of the capitalist system". He considered 
11 But see critique by Hartley & McLean (1978) 
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this type of expenditure necessary for the maintenance of the system but at the same 
time involving high economic costs. In an article in 1983, Smith highlighted the 
importance of the linkages between the political, economic and strategic aspects of 
the military demands. These linkages integrate the military into a more general 
theory of society. For Marxist writers, capitalist states use military expenditure to 
meet economic needs. 
While Marxists generally focus on the socio-political and strategic aspects of military 
expenditure and not on the economic ones, there is a strand of the Marxist school -- 
the underconsumptionist -- that regards the purely economic functions of military 
expenditure. 
2.5.1. The Underconsumptionist Approach 
Many left-wing writers use a Keynesian or underconsumptionist framework to argue 
that military expenditure is necessary to offset a tendency towards stagnation within 
capitalism. The underconsumptionist approach within the wider Marxist framework, 
developed by Baran and Sweezy (1966), claims that as a capitalist economy grows 
richer, the available surplus grows beyond that absolutely necessary for consumption 
and investment. So, mature capitalist economies need defence spending to fight 
underconsumption because this sort of public spending allows the absorption of 
surplus without increasing wages, it maintains profits, and thus, it prevents 
realisation crises. These economies will benefit by military expenditure since 
unemployment will be reduced but this positive effect will end once the economy 
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reaches full-employment. So, within the underconsumptionist framework, military 
expenditure will be beneficial to growth when the economy is in disequilibrium. 
Smith (1977) tried to test the basic assumption of underconsumptionism (that there 
should be a relationship between the share of military expenditure in income and the 
level of prosperity) for a cross-section of 10 year averages, but failed to find this 
relationship. 
2.5.2. The Permanent Arms Economy 
Another strand within the general Marxist approach very similar to the 
underconsumptionist theory, is the one basically influenced by Kidron (1970) who 
claimed that post-war arms spending stabilised capitalism. Although he claimed that 
military expenditure affects positively profits, capitalist technology and demand for 
labour, he focused on the threat of overproduction. 
Gottheil (1986), criticised Marxist literature on military expenditure as being 
inconsistent with Marx's analysis of capitalism. This aspect provoked a debate 
mainly among him, Riddel (1986), Cypher (1987b) and Miller (1987). 
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2.6. Channels of Military Expenditures 
Reviewing the theoretical approaches on military expenditure one gets a flavour of 
the different ways through which it can affect economic growth. Following Deger's 
(1986) classification, the following channels through which military expenditure 
affects economic growth can be identified: a) the direct and indirect spin-offs b) 
the reallocation of resources and c) the creation of new resources. 
2.6.1. Spin-offs 
The spin-offs can take the form of additional aggregate demand creation or the form 
of modernisation. Military expenditure can have a positive effect on economic 
growth when aggregate demand is initially inadequate relatively to potential supply, 
since it can generate the extra demand by increased utilisation of capital stock as well 
as by greater employment of labour. In this case, apart from short-run multiplier 
effects, long-run growth can also be achieved. So, an increase in demand that results 
in more efficient capital utilisation can lead to an increase in the profit rate, which in 
turn will stimulate investment and finally increase the growth rate (Deger, 1986). 
The modernisation effect of defence spending lies on the fact that many 
technological improvements and spin-offs arise from the defence sector which is 
usually highly engaged in R&D. If these technical improvements and other spin-offs 
can be applied to the civilian sector, growth is promoted. Very often and especially 
in LDCs, part of military expenditure is used to provide a social infrastructure (roads, 
airports, communication networks) and in this way growth 
is affected positively. 
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Also, in LDCs military expenditure provide training, technical skills and education to 
a segment of population engaged in the army. If the skills obtained while in the army 
can later be applied outside the military there will be a positive impact on the civilian 
sector. Opponents of the modernisation effects doubt the usefulness of these capital 
intensive technologies since most of these security-related objectives are not usually 
beneficial to civilian needs as they may not have useful application in the civilian 
sectors. As for the infrastructure provided by the military, Smith and Smith (1980) 
argue that again it might be of little relevance to civilian needs justifying it by the 
following example: "i. e. roads may be built in remote areas where civilians will 
never use them or communication networks may exclude civilian use " (Smith & 
Smith, 1980, p. 8). Furthermore, training and technical skills that soldiers might 
obtain are likely to be of no use to them after their military service is over. 
2.6.2. Reallocation of Resources 
The reallocation of resources is considered to be the second mechanism through 
which defence spending affects economic growth. A negative effect is supported 
here, since an increase in defence spending -- given the amount of an economy's 
savings -- will reduce investment and thus retard growth. 
In other words, defence 
may divert resources away from public and private investment that are more growth 
promoting than defence. If defence competes for resources 
intended for private 
investment, then any crowding-out of private investment will have a long-run impact 
on economic growth. If in addition, a nation 
imports much of its arms (like Greece 
for example), then defence activities can lead to an adverse 
balance of payments that 
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can have a negative impact on potentially growth-promoting capital inflows. Defence 
sector may also limit growth through inefficient bureaucracies and excess burdens 
created by taxes used to finance the military expenditure. 
Furthermore, as Rothschild (1973) claimed, defence can retard growth by diverting 
resources from the export sector. The export sector is often a stimulus to growth as it 
tends to employ advanced technology and efficient management techniques in order 
to compete abroad. In many LDCs the export sector is more technologically 
advanced than other sectors of the economy. In some LDCs (Brazil, India) defence 
production is in the export sector using technologically advanced methods. So, for 
these countries, defence instead of diverting resources from the export sector, it 
rather adds more resources to it and promotes growth through technical change. 
2.6.3. Creation of New Resources 
The third mechanism through which defence affects growth is the creation of new 
resources through inflation which is brought about by increased military expenditure. 
This is particularly likely to happen in aggregate supply-constrained economies (like 
LDCs) where military, expenditure is inflationary. Through inflation defence may 
lead to an increase in profitability which in turn may lead to higher investment and 
thus, growth. "On the other hand, expectations of continuous inflation may cause a 
spending boom, `conspicuous consumption' and investment in low priority sectors 
that have little growth potential" (Smith & Smith, 1980, p. 7). Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that military expenditure helps to maintain internal and external security 
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and this secure environment attracts foreign investment, and thus, growth is 
promoted. 
Empirical studies (reviewed in the next chapter) usually attempt to capture most or 
all of these influences that defence spending may have on economic growth. Before 
moving on to reviewing the empirical studies, it is worth mentioning the problems 
that one faces when dealing with. military figures as well as the various sources for 
this type of data. 
2.7. Military Data Problems 
The reliability of military data is often questioned as military figures are usually 
questioned for their reliability as they are estimated using available information and 
this available information can often be what is made available by the government. 
As Smith (1983) claimed "military figures usually serve to disinform the general 
public or are used as tools of crude propaganda to support a particular government 
view and policy ". One can always get military data from primary sources such as 
government publications of each country. It is worth mentioning Scheetz (1992) 
efforts to collect military data for Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru which 
revealed large errors in the data published by international sources. But this can be 
extremely difficult, time-consuming and may not be worth the effort. The main 
problem connected with individual efforts to collect military data from primary 
sources arise from the secrecy that is involved around military figures and the 
governments' tendency to lie about defence spending for reasons of national security 
and internal politics. Another problem arises from the method by which imports or 
exports that have to do with military uses are reported, as they are not exactly 
separated from those intended for civilian uses, and as a result the reporting of 
military exports or imports is very difficult. For example, there is no separation 
between imported or exported goods with dual use (military or civilian), such as 
aircraft which are not separated into military and civilian. Other problems arise 
because items included in military expenditure may vary from country to country, 
some items can be put under other headings (i. e. paramilitary forces may be put 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) or the price basis 12 used to deflate military 
figures may also differ among countries. Finally, when the conversion of national 
currencies into a common currency (usually the US $) is needed, the choice of the 
conversion method (based on current exchange rate parities or average exchange rate 
of a particular year) may affect military figures. SIPRI for example uses average 
exchange rate of a particular year from the IMF (International Monetary Fund). 
Another basic problem that one faces when trying to analyse military expenditure is 
that of measurement. As Blackaby (1987) and Dunne (1990) stress, unlike other 
government expenditures it is impossible to quantify the objective of military 
expenditure. The government spends on armed forces, weapons and soldiers in order 
to provide security through military capability. While forces and spending can be 
measured, capability and security cannot. Military capability of a state is determined 
in quantitative terms (the size of the armed forces and weapons) and in qualitative 
12 Only in a few developed countries there is a military price index. The US uses a deflator for 
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terms (personnel training and weapon sophistication proxied by military expenditure 
per soldier). Of course, other factors completely unquantifiable, such as the 
psychology of the soldiers and their boldness, play an important role in military 
capability. In empirical analysis, commonly used proxies of military expenditure 
apart from their absolute value (level), include the share of military expenditure in 
GDP (military burden) and military expenditure per capita. 
2.7.1. Military Data Sources 
The main secondary international sources for military expenditure data are the 
following: 
SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) based in 
Stockholm. It collects data from published National statistics and uses the NATO 
definition of military expenditure as a guideline: 
"Where possible, the following items are included: All current and capital 
expenditure on the armed forces, in the running of defence departments and other 
government agencies engaged in defence projects as well as space projects; the 
cost of paramilitary forces and police when judged to be trained and equipped for 
military operations; military R&D, tests and evaluation costs; and costs of 
retirement pensions of service personnel, including pensions of civilian 
employees. Military aid is included in the expenditure of the donor countries. 
Excluded are items on civil defence, interest on war debt and veterans' payments. 
Calendar year figures are calculated from fiscal year data where necessary, on 
the assumption that expenditure takes place evenly throughout the year " (SIPRI 
Yearbook, 1992, p. 269) 
Military Balance published by IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 
based in London. It collects data from published national statistics and also uses 
military goods, for example. 
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some national information but gives quite inadequate time-series. World Military 
Expenditure and Arms Transfers, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 
Washington. ACDA's figures are a combination of published data and confidential 
information (CIA figures) but has been criticised for promoting government views. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data is solely based on annual volunteer 
government reports and as such they are not considered to be very reliable. Other 
sources include NATO (North Atlantic Organisation), UN (United Nations), OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), BICC (Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion), CAAT (Campaign Against Arms Trade), 
Safeworld, PRIO (Peace Research Institute in Oslo). Each of these organisations 
also uses data from the other. 
Depending on the different definition for military expenditure that each of the above 
organisations use, there are small or big differences in the data they provide, and 
sometimes the deviations from one source to the other are huge. For example, for 
1989 SIPRI reports an increase of world military expenditure of 0.9% while IISS 
and ACDA report an increase of 15.5% and 1.3%, respectively. Or for 1991, ACDA 
reports a reduction in military expenditure of -2.6% while SIPRI and IISS report an 
increase of 2.3% and 4.7%, respectively. In the 1992 SIPRI Yearbook, the authors 
do warn that despite the increase in the quantity of information provided relative to 
the past, with an increasing number of sources, there has been a decline in the quality 
of this data and its reliability has gone down (Dunne, 1998). 
2.8. Conclusions 
Reviewing the theoretical approaches to the economics of military spending suggests 
that defence can be growth promoting in the Keynesian context since it can boost 
aggregate demand when it is relatively low compared to aggregate supply or fight 
underconsumption in the Marxist context. Furthermore, in the Neoclassical 
framework, defence spending can stimulate growth through modernisation (due to 
advanced technologies that arise from defence) and other spin off effects. On the 
other hand, it is equally possible for defence to crowd-out resources that could be 
used by other sectors and could be more growth promoting or that the technological 
improvements do not find applications in other sectors. In these cases, defence 
spending would retard growth. Obviously, defence spending is unlikely to have the 
same economic effects in developed capitalist economies and in less developed or 
developing countries. In developed countries, where aggregate demand is usually 
lower than the potential aggregate supply, military expenditure can have the 
Keynesian effect of boosting aggregate demand and leading to higher economic 
growth or according to the Marxist theory, military spending can fight 
underconsumption and again promote growth. But in less developed countries 
insufficient demand rarely constitutes a problem. Rather, it is constraints on the 
supply-side that impose problems in these economies. LDCs, as it has already been 
argued, might benefit in terms of infrastructure and advanced technologies that arise 
from defence, however, this will be the case only if the infrastructure created by 
defence is beneficial for civilian uses and the technologies can be applied outside the 
military sector. Finally, in countries with developed indigenous arms industries and 
arms exports, defence is likely to have a growth promoting effect in contrast to those 
countries that rely on huge military imports, and thus, retard their growth through 
adverse effects on their trade balance. 
Since the aforementioned theories can only point the ways and channels through 
which defence spending can affect economic growth, empirical analysis is the only 
way to test the theories, despite the problems associated with military data. Given 
the different ways that military expenditure can affect countries characterised by 
different level of economic development and by different arms production 
capabilities, it is very important for the empirical studies to pay particular attention 
to these features. In the following chapter, which provides a review of the empirical 
studies on the defence-growth relationship as well as considering some 
methodological issues that arise, it appears that these features are not always taken 
into consideration. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE DEFENCE-GROWTH 
RELATIONSHIP 
3.1. Introduction 
Since no theory can state with certainty that defence spending promotes or hinders 
growth, this difficult task is necessarily assigned to empirical analysis. The 
investigation of the defence-growth relationship was initiated by Benoit's work 
(1973,1978) and followed by some studies that found mistakes in his methodology 
and others that employed a different methodology. The fact is, as Neuman (1979) 
argued, that "despite the volume of writing on the subject, we still do not know 
whether there is a causal relationship between military expenditures and 
development, much less what this relationship is " (Newman, 1979, p. 478). 
While there are a variety of ways to classify the empirical studies into groups 
(chronologically, in alphabetical order, in terms of methodologies employed, 
theoretical framework or findings), it is thought that the most comprehensive way 
would be to group them according to their theoretical underpinnings. Thus, the 
empirical studies' will be reviewed as follows: the Benoit study is considered as a 
Under no circumstances the empirical review of the studies presented should 
be considered as 
exhaustive. The categories of studies reported 
here, help the analysis that is required in this thesis. 
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separate category because this is the seminal study followed by other ad-hoc single 
equation models. Next the atheoretic approach of statistical causality between 
defence and growth is reviewed and then the structural models, specifically 
Keynesian demand-side models, Neoclassical supply-side models, and finally ending 
with the combination of the two (demand and supply models). 
3.2. The Benoit Study 
Benoit's work (1973,1978) on defence-growth relationship was the starting point for 
much research in the area. His work involved a cross-section correlation analysis of 
44 LDCs for the period 1950-1965. His finding, that there is a positive correlation 
between military burden and economic growth came in contrast to his expectations 
and to the supposition made by economists at the time - that defence spending 
reduces the resources available for investment, and thus, slows down growth. He 
agreed that defence burden may have adverse effects on growth rates since military 
expenditure may take resources that would otherwise be employed in more 
productive civilian investment. 
He estimated that an increase of 1% in military burden would reduce civilian growth 
rate by 0.25%. But he claimed that "the negative effects of defence (income shift, 
productivity effect and investment effect) were more than compensated for by the 
stimulation provided by the military sector". The stimulation can include 
modernisation of the economy, efficient organisation of the production, provision of 
There are other types of models i. e. Macroeconomic and World models 
(see Leontief & Duch in, 
1983) and structuralist models (see Kaldor, 1983) which are 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
2ö 
economic infrastructure (roads, dams, communicational facilities), technical training 
and useful skills. He acknowledged that the main determinant of the size of the 
military burden was likely to be strategic (the provision of national security) and that 
the importation of weapons could harm economic growth. He didn't believe, 
however, that the opportunity cost of increased military expenditure was a foregone 
investment but less conspicuous consumption, welfare expenditure or imported 
luxuries. 
His econometric work was based on a single equation and thus it did not account for 
the interrelationship between defence, growth and other variables. So, his work can 
be considered as partial since he didn't take into account the multiple conduits 
through which one variable affects another. Furthermore, Benoit admitted the 
possibility of defects in his data although he claimed that the defects were random 
and could not affect the strong correlations that he discovered. He, himself, also 
discussed the possibility that the simple correlation between defence and growth 
might have been "spurious". That is other factors influencing both defence and 
growth may have acted in such a way as to bring about this correlation and that's 
why he added "bilateral aid" and "investment rate" to the defence burden as 
regressors. 
Benoit's work was strongly criticised2 by many researchers in the area. The main 
points of criticism are the following: 
2 Ball (1983) provided a detailed critique of Benoit's work undermining the conclusions 
drawn. 
" he failed to provide an explicit framework of analysis and to use functional 
relationships that were consistent with his hypothesis (Lim, 1983)3 
" he used unreliable data taken from a wide sample of structurally different 
economies and he chose the variables on ad-hoc justifications (Alexander, 1990; 
Ball, 1983) 
" he failed to account for the interrelationship between variables (Deger and Smith, 
1983). 
Benoit's study forced many researchers to investigate the same relationship. Most of 
the subsequent studies are based on the Keynesian and Neoclassical theoretical 
framework which allow the development of consistent formal models but there are 
also studies that rely on more or less ad-hoc specifications. While Neoclassical 
models concentrate on supply-side (modernisation, positive externalities from 
infrastructure, technological spin-offs), Keynesian models concentrate on demand- 
side (crowding-out of investment, exports, education, health). That is why 
Neoclassical models tend to find positive effects of defence on growth while 
Keynesian ones find negative effects. The most influential studies are those which 
allow for the interactions between demand and supply influences, captured in 
simultaneous-equation models. Table 3.1, gives an overview of the studies. 
Lim (1983) suggested that Benoit's results must be treated with some scepticism "as they were 
obtained with the use of functional relationships that were inconsistent with the hypothesis to be 
tested and with the use of variables that were incorrectly measured. Also, he did not specify explicitly 
his framework of analysis. However, from his formulation of the problem it seems that he was 
implicitly testing the hypothesis that there is a trade-off between defence and economic growth within 
a Harrod-Domar model". 
' Alexander (1990) criticised this because in that way the form of the regression equation does not 
derive from any coherent theory but simply from an ad-hoc justification of the variables used. He also 
claimed that these two variables are not sufficient to control 
for all other influences on growth and that 
they shouldn't enter a growth equation in the manner specified. 
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3.3. Other Ad-hoc Models 
Using the same methodology as Benoit (correlation analysis) and an ad-hoc equation, 
Rothschild (1973), tried to explain the relationship between growth and military 
spending for 14 OECD countries over 1956-1969. His conclusion was that increased 
military spending reduces exports and thus economic growth. But his conclusion 
should be treated with caution since he used a limited data base, his methodology 
consisted of simple correlations and the correlation coefficients were statistically 
insignificant. 
Frederiksen & Looney (1982,1983) and Looney & Frederiksen (1986) attempted to 
re-examine the defence-growth relationship by taking into account the great 
differences in an individual country's international borrowing capacity. Each of 
these studies used a factor and discriminating analysis to classify their sample of 
LDCs into resource constrained and resource unconstrained and estimated ad-hoc 
single equations for the total sample and for each group (constrained - unconstrained) 
separately. Dependent variable was GDP and the independent included investment, 
external debt, military expenditure, external capital flows and the growth in public 
sector consumption. In all three studies, the results indicated a positive effect of 
military expenditure on growth only for the resource unconstrained countries but this 
was either insignificant for the resource constrained countries (Frederiksen & 
Looney, 1982; Looney & Frederiksen, 1986) or negative (Frederiksen & Looney, 
1983). What is more interesting is that the Frederiksen & Looney (1983) study 
which found a negative effect of defence on growth 
for the resource-constraint 
countries used Benoit's sample and model. A study 
for Greece by Kollias (1995b) 
employed advanced econometric techniques, cointegration and error correction 
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model, on an ad hoc equation to find a positive effect of defence on growth for the 
period 1963-1990. But despite the advanced techniques, his model can be criticised 
for not relying on a theoretical framework but rather on ad-hoc justifications. Of 
course this criticism applies to all the ad-hoc models mentioned before. 
Ad-hoc single equation models that focus on human capital have been estimated by 
Dixon and Moon (1987) for a sample of 116 countries over the period 1969-1971, 
finding ambiguous effects of military indicators on basic human needs and by 
Looney (1992) also finding mixed results for the effect of military burden on 
education for a cross section of 96 LDCs over 1974-84. Dommen & Maizels (1988) 
instead of testing the effect of military spending on growth, tested the effect of 
military regimes, obviously assuming that military regimes tend to spend more on 
defence than non-military regimes. Their results suggested a negative effect of 
military regimes on economic growth for a cross section of 38 LDCs over the period 
1978-80. 
3.4. Causality Analysis 
The aforementioned studies rely on the implicit assumption that defence is causally 
prior to economic growth or in econometric terms, that defence is an exogenous 
variable'. Without a clear theoretical perspective, however, it could be equally 
plausible for economic growth to precede defence. Instead of simply assuming 
exogeneity or endogeneity of the defence variable in the growth equation, the 
5A discussion of the notion of exogeneity with reference to causality 
is presented in Appendix H. 
The approach followed here is the one most commonly used 
in the defence economics literature. 
investigation of the statistical causality between the two variables has attracted the 
interest of many researchers. The presence and direction of a causal relationship is 
directly addressed by employing Granger causality tests6. According to these tests, 
the information for the prediction of the variables defence and growth is contained 
only in the time series of these variables and there are four possible outcomes for 
their causal ordering: uni-directional causality from defence to growth and vice 
versa, bi-directional causality between them and lack of any causal ordering. 
Joerding (1986) using Granger causality tests, but in a multivariate model 
(containing also investment and government spending), investigated the direction of 
causality between defence spending and growth for a pooled sample containing 15 
observations (1962-77) from 57 LDCs. He found unidirectional causality from 
growth to defence suggesting that defence should not be considered as exogenous. 
But his study can be strongly criticised for pooling all 57 countries into one sample 
and thus, suggesting that any causal relationship found by his analysis is common to 
all countries. A somewhat simplistic and unreal assumption given the differences in 
the socioeconomic structure of each country. Furthermore, the choice of the lag 
length was made on an ad hoc basis (no criteria were used) and a common lag 
structure (4 years) was assumed for all countries which again is incorrect because it 
is unlikely to be the same for all countries. And as Looney (1991) pointed out: 
"The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag length. 
If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, relevant lags may be omitted, 
causing bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, irrelevant lags 
may be included, causing estimates to be inefficient", (Looney, 1991, p. 44) 
b Detailed analysis of the Granger causality tests is presented 
in Chapter 6. 
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Chowdhury (1991) determined the appropriate lag length based on Akaike's(1969) 
minimum final prediction error but did not find any causality for most of the 55 
LDCs over 1961-87 and he stressed that the defence-growth relationship cannot be 
generalised across countries. On the other hand, LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991) 
found a feedback relationship between defence spending and economic growth for 
most of the 21 countries that they examined over the period 1952-1982, suggesting 
that neither defence nor growth should be considered exogenous. Looney (1991) 
studied India, Pakistan and South Asia over 1958-88 finding that for Pakistan 
military expenditures have a negative impact on growth while for India he found 
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possible effect of military expenditure on growth". 
Granger's definition of causality has been operationalised in various ways, the most 
common being a vector autoregression8 (VAR) specification in which each variable 
is regressed on lags of all variables in the system, including itself (Sims, 1980). The 
VAR specification has become increasingly popular in the applied econometrics in 
recent years, its main advantage being that such models are dynamic specifications, 
free of economic assumptions imposed a priori. "Thus, they allow for the testing of 
causal linkages without the need to f irst construct arguments and develop 
hypotheses 
justifying those linkages " (Georgiou et al, 1996). Under a VAR specification Kusi 
(1994) could not find a dominant result across 77 LDCs for causality 
between 
defence and growth, indicating again the need for case studies. Case studies that 
employed a VAR methodology to test for Granger causality among the two variables 
In fact, maximum lag length might be calculated as an average across 
the sample; there is a trade-off 
between the advantage of pooling (increased power) with contamination of 
the test by nuisance 
parameters (which reduce the power). 
In the limit, this should not be a problem. 
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tend to find no evidence of a causal relationship between the two variables. For 
example no causality was found by Kinsella (1990) for the US, by Madden & 
Haslehurst (1995) for Australia, by Chen (1993) for China, by Kollias & Makrydakis 
(1997a, 1998) for Turkey and Greece respectively. 
Granger causality tests have been widely criticised (Jacobs et al, 1979) for being 
sensitive to a wide variety of factors, including structural changes over the period 
examined, stationarity of the variables and cointegration across the variables. Ram 
(1995) warned that: "inferences based on these tests can be problematic and several 
notes of caution seem warranted even if one overlooks the inferential uncertainties 
inherent in such tests" (Ram, 1995, p. 263). But once those factors (structural 
breaks, stationarity and cointegration) are controlled and accounted for (as will be the 
case here), these tests can be informative and useful for the specification of the 
structural models. 
3.5. Demand-Side Models 
In the Keynesian framework empirical studies employ the national income identity to 
estimate a consumption, savings or investment equations. Smith (1980a), using data 
for 14 large OECD countries between 1954-1973, tested the hypothesis of 
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crowding-out" - that the principal cost of military expenditure 
is foregone 
investment. He derived his model as a savings function but the estimated equation 
was regarded as a reduced form. His hypothesis of a trade-off 
between the shares of 
8 Causality analysis should really be undertaken in the VAR system and not 
in a so called, structural 
system. For the advantages of the 
VAR approach vis-ä-vis the structural one, see: Sims, C. A. (1980), 
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military expenditure and investment in GDP was made in the sense that the 
coefficient of military expenditure is significantly less than 0 and not significantly 
different from -1. Estimates based on time-series, country cross-sections and 
pooled data, gave results that were robust and indicated that the coefficient of 
military expenditure was -1. Thus, an increase in the share of military expenditure 
comes necessarily from an equivalent reduction in investment share9. But Smith 
(1980a) also pointed out that this does not necessarily apply in LDCs where the spirit 
of militarism and nondemocratic internal repression helps the government to increase 
defence at the expense of the social wage. 
Faini, Annez & Taylor (1984) using a particular type of demand-side Keynesian and 
structuralist model, found that defence has negative effect on growth for 69 countries 
- mainly LDCs - over some or all of the period 1952-1970. Specifically, an increase 
of 10 percentage points in defence burden leads to a reduction of annual growth by 
0.13%. They also found that defence spending is associated with lower savings and 
investment shares of GDP, higher tax burden and a shift in economic activity from 
agriculture towards the manufacturing sector. 
Keynesian single equation models for Greece have been estimated by Antonakis and 
Karavidas (1990) over 1950-1985 and 1958-1986, finding a negative relationship 
between military expenditure and other aggregates in the economy (in particular that 
the principal opportunity cost of defence was a foregone investment), and thus, they 
Freeman et al (1989). 
9 Smith (1980a) claimed that in developed countries for a given level of national output, the share of 
"social wage" (private consumption and publicly provided goods 
for social consumption) is relatively 
inflexible. Public opinion and institutional pressure from trade unions prevent governments 
in these 
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concluded that military expenditure constitutes a burden on the economy. Another 
author, Kollias (1995a) after estimating traditional single-equation Keynesian models 
over the period 1963-1990, found that military expenditure in Greece can have 
stimulative effects through aggregate demand generation, but his results did not 
provide a strong conclusion about the defence-growth relationship, as both 
investment and savings were found to be adversely affected by military expenditure. 
Chletsos and Kollias (1995) ended up with similar findings for the period 1974-1990. 
They based their model on a typical Keynesian national income equation. Total 
consumption depended on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, on indirect 
taxes as a share of GDP and on GDP. Total investment depended on the budget 
deficit as a share of GDP, the lagged value of GDP, military burden, and a dummy 
for elections. Military burden depended on the ratio of per soldier spending of 
Greece/Turkey, GDP, a dummy for wars and a dummy for elections. 
The significance of the last study lies on the fact that it accounted for the 
heterogeneity of military expenditure. The authors estimated the three equations 
using disaggregated data for a) wages and allowances to military personnel b) 
procurement and construction, as well as using total military expenditure. In this 
way they could capture any differences in economic effects for the various 
components of military expenditure because, as Grobar and Porter (1989) point out, 
the heterogeneity of military -expenditure is responsible for the 
different effects of 
military expenditure on the economy. Each form of military expenditure 
(R&D, 
domestic arms production, imports, construction, wages and salaries, retired military 
countries to reduce the proportion of social wage 
in national income. This does not happen in LDCs, 
though. 
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personnel) influences the economy through different channels. In addition, although 
the use of disaggregated military data is beneficial for empirical studies and future 
research should focus on the effects that each component of military expenditure may 
have on economic growth, the availability of such data is limited to the last two 
decades for most countries. This makes it difficult if not impossible to use advanced 
econometric techniques. 
3.6. Supply-Side Models 
In the Neoclassical theoretical framework empirical models are based on an 
aggregate production function. A widely employed supply side model for the 
defence-growth relationship is based on Feder's model (1982) of the role of exports 
in growth. Feder (1982) formulated a production function that related economic 
growth to investment, labour force growth, and export growth, to examine the 
relationship and the externalities that arise between the export sector and the non- 
export sector in LDCs. Ram (1986) used the same model to examine the relationship 
between the government sector and the non-government sector in 115 countries. 
Biswas and Ram (1986) were the first to adopt Feder model (1982) to investigate the 
relationship between the military and non-military sectors, as well as to assess the 
externality effect of the military sector and the factor productivity variation 
between 
the two sectors. Their augmented model was based on the Neoclassical production 
function and their estimates suggested that there was no significant externality effect 
of military sector on civilian output and also that there was no statistically significant 
factor productivity difference across the two sectors. 
They concluded that military 
expenditure neither promotes nor retards growth 
in LDCs. After them, many 
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versions of the Feder model have been developed (including more than two sectors. 
defining very complex externalities) for both developed and LDCs with most of the 
studies employing cross-sectional methods-10 
The best example of a multisectoral Feder-type model that "suffers" from a very 
complex set of externalities is Alexander's (1990) study for 9 industrial countries 
over the period 1974-84. Aiming to "remedy Biswas and Ram's model which failed 
to include some relevant variables, and thus, failed to include important economic 
linkages", he assumed that the economy consists of four mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive sectors: the defence sector, the government sector, the exports sector and 
the rest of the economy. From the four production functions he derived and 
estimated a single reduced form equation, concluding that the gross effect of military 
expenditure on growth is neither significantly positive nor negative, although the 
defence sector is less productive than the `rest' of the economy. While his study can 
be considered as an important development of the Feder model, it can be criticised 
for two main deficiences. First, his aim to capture the externality effect of some 
sectors on others as well as the possibility of inter-sectoral productivity differentials 
made the model very complicated and specifying such a complex set of externalities 
among sectors (i. e. the non-military sector could influence both the defence, the 
export and the civilian sector while the defence and export sector could influence 
only the civilian sector) meant that some coefficients (such as the coefficient of the 
non-military government sector), were so complex they could not be interpreted. 
Second, as Mintz and Stevenson (1995) point out, he proxied non-military 
10 Also see, Ward et al (1991), Ward & Davis (1992), Huang & Mintz (1990,1991), Atesoalou & 
Mueller (1990), Ward, Davis and Chan (1993). 
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government expenditure by government consumption, overvaluing government 
consumption by the amount of military consumption. In this way, he ignored the 
assumption of mutually exclusive and exhaustive sectors. Finally, the significantly 
negative effect of investment on economic growth contrasts with the predictions of 
economic theory and indicates a misspecified model. 
An important issue that arises from the Feder model (particularly when the 
augmented model is in question) is that of multicollinearity. The issue of dealing 
with multicollinearity by employing a k-class ridge regression is discussed in Huang 
and Mintz (1990,1991). Both studies employed a three sector Feder model for the 
US over the period 1952-88, however, the first one (1990) considered only the 
overall effect while the subsequent one (1991) also accounted for the externality and 
relative productivity effects. Reporting results for both ridge and OLS estimators, 
they noticed that although there were no significant differences in the results 
themselves, collinearity was reduced under the ridge regression. They concluded that 
the overall effect of defence in the US was not significant and the same applied to the 
externality or factor productivity effect of defence spending on growth when the 
augmented model was considered. On the other hand, a three sector model by Ward 
& Davis (1992) for the same country (US) over a similar period (1948-90) found 
negative overall effect with positive externalities and negative productivity for the 
defence sector. Furthermore, Ward et al (1995)11 found a negative overall effect for 
the US but over a longer time period (1889-1991). The different results obtained for 
the same country (especially for those studies that examined similar time periods) 
1 Ward et al (1995) apart from the US also studied Japan for which they found a positive effect of the 
defence sector on economic growth. 
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might be attributed to the slightly different specification of the externality and overall 
effect terms. Although for the size effect, the Feder-type composite term MM is 
Y 
most commonly employed, there are some studies that use 
AM 
Y i. e. 
Huang & 
-1 
Mintz (1990), Ward et al (1993), Ward et al (1995), Sezgin (1997) and for the 
S 
j, externality term instead of MC some studies use just M, ie. Biswas & Ram 
(1986), Ward et al (1993), Sezgin (1997), Antonakis, (1997). But Ram (1995) warns 
that different proxies for the defence variable can lead to very different conclusions, 
and he says: 
"While the Feder type composite term MY shows no significant overall effect of 
defence, the M version shows a strong positive effect and the M/Y version suggests 
a significant negative effect. ...... 
It is possible that the Feder type term reflects the 
0 
overall effect, the M version indicates the externality effects, and the M/Y version 
reflects the demand-side consequences of diversion of resources from other uses " 
(Ram, 1995, p. 267). 
But he also warns that the suggested interpretation is only a conjecture and has some 
obvious limitations. 
Most of the studies that employ a Feder-type methodology avoid the ridge regression 
as a remedial solution for multicollinearity, as its usefulness to dealing with 
multicollinearity has been widely contested (see, Kennedy, 1986) and usually report 
results with this caveat. Ward et al (1991) found a positive effect of defence 
spending on growth for India using an augmented Feder-type model over the period 
1950-1987 while Linden (1992) estimating the same type of model, but only with 
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two sectors, for 13 Middle Eastern countries over 1974-1985 and found negative 
effects. McMillan (1992) applying the same model to South African data over the 
period 1950-1985 found a negative size effect of defence on growth but also some 
positive externalities. The study by Biswas (1993) for 30 LDCs over 1981-89 by the 
use of an augmented Neoclassical model gave positive results. In a case study for 
Taiwan over the period 1961-1988, Ward, Davis and Chan (1993) with the same 
methodology found positive size effects of the defence sector on economic growth 
but negative externalities. 
Mintz and Stevenson (1995) applied an augmented Feder-type, 3-sector model to 103 
countries (developed and LDCs) over the period 1950-85. They faced some 
problems in deriving values for non-military government spending. 12 The approach 
they followed was to subtract the SIPRI figures for military expenditure from the 
Summers and Heston government consumption data. The conclusion was that there 
was no short-run relation between military expenditure and growth and no externality 
effect. 13 
An important development of the Feder-type model is found in Macnair et al. (1995) 
study that allowed for the influence of defence "spillin" externalities14 (externalities 
that arise from one country's NATO allies) and applied it to a sample of ten NATO 
18The approach that Alexander (1990) followed to derive values for non-military government spending 
was to use government consumption as a proxy for non-military government consumption. But in this 
way as Mintz and Stevenson (1995) stressed government consumption is overvalued by the amount of 
military consumption. 
'' Mintz and Stevenson (1995) also reported estimates using Alexander's (1990) method. 
14 By introducing the defence "spillin" externalities, Macnair et al (1995) tried to examine whether 
defence expenditure of a nation's allies affect the nation's own defence and civilian sectors in either a 
positive or negative way. 
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allies over the period 1951-88. Using a variety of error components models, they 
reported both pooled time-series and cross-sectional estimations of the model. Their 
results are generally consistent with Benoit's finding of a positive association 
between defence spending and economic growth in developing countries while 
defence "spillins" had a small negative effect. Murdoch, Pi, Sandler (1997), 
following the above study used cross-section and time-series data for two well- 
defined LDCs cohorts - Asian and Latin American market economies - with similar 
economic, political or regional characteristics. Their empirical estimations are based 
on a three-sector Feder-Ram model containing a civilian (private) sector, a military 
and a non-military one. The empirical findings indicate that private investment, 
defence spending and other forms of public sector spending are growth promoting in 
the context of a purely supply-side Feder-Ram analysis. But both these studies 
(probably because of multicollinearity concerns) looked only at the overall effect of 
the defence sector, missing out the externality and relative productivity effects. 
A quite ad-hoc assumption was made in Alexander's (1995) four-sector model in 
which, instead of using growth in real output as the dependent (as the Feder-type 
model postulates), he used growth in real non-defence output. But if defence output 
is to be deducted from total output then surely the output of the government and 
export sector should also be deducted. The approach taken in this study is not 
satisfactorily justified. Under this assumption, Alexander (1995) concludes that 
there is no significant effect of defence on growth of non-military output for 11 
OECD countries. Another attempt to develop the Feder-type model, this time by 
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incorporating human capital' 5 proxied by education, was made by Sezgin (1997) who 
employed a two-sector model for Turkey over the period 1949-1993. His results, 
however, were not improved by adding the education variable (which was 
insignificant) and suggested that defence spending in Turkey helps economic growth 
although externalities from defence sector to the rest of the economy were negative. 
There are three studies using a Feder-type analysis for Greece, the first two 
(Antonakis, 1997 and Sezgin, 1998b) employing a two-sector augmented model and 
the third one (Antonakis, 1999) employing a four-sector model. The first one by 
Antonakis (1997) found a negative effect of defence on growth for Greece over the 
period 1958-91 and the second one by Sezgin (1998b) who found an insignificant 
effect over a similar period. The first study found problems of dynamic 
misspecification and introduced lags in the dependent variable and in the military 
terms, which then gave the significant negative effect, while the latter study suffers 
from serial correlation and very low explanatory power. Both of these studies for 
Greece are, however, too "restrictive" as they only allow for two sectors in the 
economy (civilian-military) and this can lead to misspecification, as will be shown 
in Chapter 7. The third and very recent study for Greece by Antonakis (1999) 
overcomes the last shortcoming by allowing for four sectors in the economy. Despite 
that, there are a number of problems with the paper which call the results into 
question. For a start, having specified all the variables (apart from investment) in 
growth rates, Antonakis (1999) investigates their stationarity properties. Although 
he does not report results for the unit root tests, he claims that all the variables reject 
He claimed that the main weakness of the Feder model is that it assumes that the production 
function consists only of physical capital and labour , and thus, the very significant 
human capital 
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the hypothesis of no unit root, in other words, all the variables are non-stationary. 
This is rather strange given that the variables are already in growth rates. 
Nevertheless, based on this conclusion (that all the variables are integrated of the 
same order) he proceeds to test for cointegration. Both the CRDW and ADF 
statistics point to the existence of cointegration. The way he proceeds after that is 
questionable. He follows a general-to-specific methodology (introduces an ARDL 
model) and gradually imposes parameter restrictions to find the "preferred equation". 
This "preferred equation" contains no term for the government sector and bears little 
relation to the Feder-type model that was specified initially. 
Several shortcomings arise from the fact that these Feder-type models concentrate on 
the supply-side. Firstly, they ignore the demand-side, assuming that it stays in 
equilibrium with the supply constraints of the economy. Second, high collinearity 
between the two terms of each sector (growth rate and share in GDP) is inevitable, 
and, the estimates may not provide a good feel for the magnitude of the externality 
effect and/or the productivity differences and .... as is common with most single 
equation models, there are some measurement and data problems and there may be 
feedback' from the dependent variable to some of the regressors" (Ram, 1995, 
p. 260). Third, they assume that the production function consists only of physical 
capital and labour and so exclude human capital, which can comprise native ability 
and talent as well as education and acquired skills' 6. Furthermore, as will be shown 
in the analysis that follows, the two-sector model appears too restrictive, suggesting 
that government and export sectors should also be included. 
which includes native ability, talent as well as education and acquired skills is omitted. 
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The main advantage of the Feder-type model is that it is well based on theory, it 
considers externalities between sectors and may explain both the size effect of 
defence expenditure and the externality effects as well as factor productivity 
differentials. Furthermore, it needs relatively less data than other models (which 
solves many problems when dealing with developing countries) and includes the 
supply constraints which are likely to be important for developing economies. 
3.7. Demand and Supply Models 
Obviously, Keynesian demand-side models concentrate on demand while 
Neoclassical supply-side models concentrate on supply. In order to overcome the 
problem of concentrating on one side only, efforts have been made to include both 
influences in a model. Demand-side influences are captured in a Keynesian 
aggregate demand function while supply-side influences are captured in a growth 
equation derived from a production function. These models hypothesise possible 
direct effects of defence on growth through Keynesian demand stimulation and other 
spin-off effects and negative indirect effect through reductions in savings or 
investment, balance of payments, education, and health. The relative strength of the 
positive and negative influences of defence spending determine the net impact of 
military expenditure. 
These models, thus, account for supply-side influences (technological spin-offs, 
positive externalities from infrastructure) and demand-side factors (crowd-out of 
16 Sezgin (1997) proxied human capital by educational expenditure but "the results were not improved 
suggesting that educational expenditure was not a good proxy". 
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investment, exports, education or health). Such effects are interdependent and 
interrelated and the best way of modelling them is by using a simultaneous equation 
model (hereafter SEM), most commonly consisting of a growth equation, a savings 
or investment equation, a trade balance equation and a military burden equation. 
Although these models provide a more complete picture of the defence-growth 
relationship by accounting for the interrelationships between the variables, they have 
been criticised for not being strongly based on theory and thus, relying on more ad- 
hoc justifications (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). But this is more than compensated 
for by the advantages that they offer in overcoming problems of exogeneity, 
simultaneity and causality that are problematic for single equation methods. 
SEMs specify each individual channel of impact from military expenditure to growth 
and then identify whether each separate impact effect is positive or negative. "It is 
therefore possible to quantify as to how military spending affects growth in addition 
to providing an answer to the standard question as to whether the aggregate effect is 
positive or negative " (Deger and Sen, 1995, p. 291). 
This framework was developed by Smith and Smith (1980) to examine the defence- 
growth relationship in a group of LDCs as well as in a group of OECD countries. 
Specifically, they developed a Keynesian three-equation model with a production 
function and found an insignificant direct but a negative indirect effect of military 
expenditure on growth for 50 LDCs for 1965-1973, with a significantly negative 
effect for the developed countries. Their model consisted of a production function 
that included employment, capital stock, and a total factor productivity term; an 
equation that related changes in capital stock to growth, military expenditure and the 
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rate of unemployment; and an equation that related the growth in total factor 
productivity (R&D as a percentage of GDP) to military expenditure. According to 
their results, the R&D effect of military expenditure was positive for the OECD 
countries but this positive effect was dominated by a negative effect on investment 
and when both factors were taken into account, military expenditure resulted in lower 
economic growth. Although, they initially estimated each equation separately by 
OLS to avoid the possibility of simultaneity or feedback from the left hand side 
variables to the right hand side ones (which leads to a correlation between the right 
hand variable and the error term and causes the OLS estimates to be biased and 
inconsistent) they also estimated the system of equations by 3SLS. This method is a 
system estimation procedure which simultaneously estimates the equations. For 
example, if the system consists of the following equations: 
G=ao+a1M+a2S 
S=bo+biM+b2G 
where G is GDP growth, M the military burden and S the savings ratio. When the 
equation is estimated as part of a system, the effect of M on G is not given just by the 
coefficient of M in the growth equation, because a change in M also changes savings 
which feeds back to G. The total effect of a change in M on G can be obtained by 
substituting the savings equation into the growth equation (above), to give: 
G=ao+al M+a2(bo+bi M+b2G)or 
G= 
I- a' bz I 
ao + a, bo + a1 + a2b1 
1-a2b, 
M 
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Deger and Smith (1983) and Deger (1986) further developed the Smith and Smith 
(1980) model and applied it to 50 LDCs. Both studies represented the aggregate 
demand and the spin-off effects of military expenditure in a growth equation in 
which the rate of growth was made a function of the savings ratio, the defence 
burden and other variables (per capita income and foreign capital flows as a 
percentage of GDP). The effects of the reallocation of resources and creation of new 
resources were captured in a savings equation, in which savings-income ratio was 
made to depend on the defence burden and the average annual growth of GDP. A 
third equation had military burden depend on government spending as a proportion 
of GDP. The system was then estimated by 3 SLS to account for the simultaneity and 
high covariance between the equations. They concluded that, while there was a 
positive direct effect of defence spending on economic growth, this was outweighed 
by a negative indirect effect through reduced savings, to give a negative overall 
effect. In other words, military expenditure on the supply side affected growth 
positively while on the demand-side, they affected savings, and thus, investment 
negatively, with the overall effect being negative. 
Scheetz (1991) extended the model by including a fourth equation for the trade 
balance in the system. He investigated the effect of defence on growth in four Latin 
America countries over 1969-1987. Both the time-series and the pooled results 
suggested a negative macroeconomic impact of military burden on growth. A 
negative effect was also strongly supported by the time series results from 13 Sub- 
Saharan African countries in Dunne & Mohammed (1995), who augmented the 
system of equations by including an equation 
for education. However, their cross- 
section and pooled results suggested no significant effects of military 
burden on 
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economic variables. They concluded "... there is no evidence of military spending 
having a positive effect in our sample, with the aggregate results and individual 
country results suggesting that there are substantial costs " (Dunne & Mohammed, 
1995, p. 341). 
Roux (1996) estimated a simultaneous equation model consisting of four equations 
for South Africa over the period 1960-1990 but his results were disappointing and he 
concluded that military expenditure did not affect economic growth in either 
direction. Finally, a three-equation simultaneous equation model was estimated for 
Greece by Antonakis (1997) over the period 1960-1990. His conclusion was that 
"the combined effect of military expenditure on the output growth rate is negative, 
independently of the level of significance used in calculating of the relevant 
multiplier" (Antonakis, 1997, p. 89). 
Table 3.1. provides a comprehensive, though not exhaustive, list of previous studies. 
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3.8. Methodological Issues 
Comparing Benoit's studies (1973,1978) with recent ones, one can easily note a 
quality change in terms of methodologies employed and theoretical specification of 
the models. While studies in the 1970s and the 1980s relied on correlation analysis. 
factor and discriminant analysis and very simple regression analysis most recent 
studies rely on more advanced econometric techniques (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS, IV, AR, 
ARDL, Cointegration, ECM) applied either to single-equation models, simultaneous- 
equation models or macroeconometric and world models. Most of the recent studies 
avoid a reliance on ad-hoc specifications and tend to be based on well-specified 
theoretical frameworks - usually the Keynesian or the Neoclassical framework 
analysed previously, which allow the development of consistent formal models. The 
variables included in a model represent the direct and indirect channels (analysed in 
the previous chapter) through which military expenditure affects economic growth. 
Also, investigation of the causality between defence and growth, instead of assuming 
exogeneity or endogeneity of the defence variable in the growth equation, has lately 
been enriched by advanced econometric techniques (Joerding, 1986; Chowdhury, 
1991; Kollias & Makrydakis, 1997a). And although different methodologies and 
different theoretical frameworks can lead to quite noticeable differences in the 
results, there are two very important methodological issues that arise when 
examining the defence-growth relationship that can also lead to conflicting results 
and misinterpretation of these results. These issues which are analysed 
below, 
involve the country versus the cross-country studies and the developed versus the 
less developed country studies. 
ý9 
3.8.1. Country versus Cross-country Studies 
Empirical work may involve cross-section or pooled data analyses, which look at the 
different or common characteristics of groups of nations, and time-series analysis, 
which examines the influence of military expenditure within one country'7. While 
cross-section studies provide general conclusions on long-term effects, time-series 
are more relevant in investigating short-term effects for policy purposes and 
decision-making in a national setting (Balfoussias and Stavrinos, 1996). 
Many authors have criticised the methodology of cross-country analysis as this type 
of analysis requires a high degree of homogeneity among the countries examined. 
Ward et al (1991) claimed that cross-sectional analysis fails to capture the dynamic 
element of the relationship between defence spending and the economy. As Kusi 
(1994) indicated, the effects of military expenditure can not be generalised across 
countries since these, among other things, may depend on the sample period and the 
level of the socioeconomic development of the country concerned. This is an 
important observation which is taken into account in this thesis. 
Summarising the criticism against cross-country studies we can say that: 
" Countries are different 
" It is difficult, if not impossible, to find countries at the same time in the same 
economic circumstances. While some of the sample countries are in recession 
others may be expanding and growing. According to Ram (1995) "While the 
17 Some of the most important case-studies in the literature are the 
following: Benoit (1973) for 
Argentina, India, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, United Arab Republic; Deger and Sen (1983) for 
India; Faini, Annez, Taylor et al (1984) for India; Atesoglou and Mueller (1990) for USA; Scheetz 
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rate of return to capital might be fairly similar across countries, labour 
productivity may differ dramatically, especially if the sample includes countries 
at very different levels of development " (Ram, 1995, p. 264). So, choosing cross- 
country sample periods needs careful attention due to different economic 
situation. 
Externality effects of military expenditure may vary from country to country. 
These effects may be seen after a lag (Deger and Sen, 1995). 
To find robust evidence for the defence-growth relationship, cross-country studies 
should be supported with individual country studies (Ram, 1995), and as Chan 
(1985) suggested `future research will profit more from discriminating diachronic 
studies of individual countries ". He also stressed that: 
"The results based on cross sectional designs are less trustworthy, as this approach 
is inherently limited in its applicability to inform us about causal relationships. To 
tackle questions such as the impact of military expenditure on economic performance 
we need dynamic analysis to determine temporal leads and lags, the reciprocal 
influences among the variables, and the over-time changes in the empirical 
parameters ", (Chan, 1985, p. 407). 
3.8.2. Developed versus Less Developed Countries 
An important factor that must be taken into consideration when the defence-growth 
relationship is examined, is whether a country faces a constraint on the demand or on 
the supply side. Depending on this, defence spending can have different effects on 
(1991) for Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru; Roux (1996) for South Africa, Sezgin (1997) for 
Turkey, Antonakis (1997) for Greece, Kollias (1995,1996) for Greece. 
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economic growth. Constraints on the demand side are more likely to exist in 
developed capitalist economies while constraints on the supply side are usually met 
in developing and less developed countries. In developed countries, defence 
spending can increase aggregate demand and lead to a fuller utilisation of labour and 
capital and in this way growth can be promoted. In contrast, 
GC 
in LDCs defence 
spending can impose additional burdens on the economy by compounding existing 
production bottlenecks (especially in the key enginnering and capital goods areas), 
and thus, lead to lower economic growth " (Chan, 1985, p. 420). 
Furthermore, in countries with indigenous arms production and arms exports, 
defence is likely to have different effects than in those countries with huge military 
imports (Alexander, 1990). A domestic developed defence industry which is usually 
engaged in R&D and high level technologies, can provide externalities and spin-off 
effects to other industries and other sectors in the economy, thus, promoting growth. 
In addition if the country exports arms this may be growth promoting. On the other 
hand, countries without an indigenous arms industry (like Greece for example) that 
rely heavily on arms imports are unlikely to experience such positive spin offs. On 
the contrary, it is more likely that they will experience lower economic growth 
because of the adverse effect of arms imports. Defence spending might result in 
higher government deficit, which in turn can reduce business investment and 
consumer demand, and so, retard growth. It is obvious, then, that before attempting 
any empirical analysis, one must determine whether a country is developed or less 
developed and whether it has indigenous arms production or not, as these two factors 
can have a considerable influence on the economic effects of defence spending. 
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3.9. Conclusions 
From surveying both the theoretical and empirical literature on the defence-growth 
relationship it becomes evident that the economic impact of defence spending 
depends on the relative importance of each of the channels through which defence 
spending operates in the economy. Chan (1985) in his review of the literature on the 
consequences of military expenditure, cautions analysts that differences in their data 
bases, country samples, and research designs can contribute to inconsistent and 
confusing research findings. Despite the huge controversy in the empirical results 
and the lack of a general conclusion on the relationship between defence spending 
and economic growth, one can observe that supply-side models tend to support a 
positive effect of defence on growth (through modernisation, and other spin-offs), 
while demand-side models tend to support a negative effect (via crowding-out of 
investment, exports). Studies using a combination of the two types of models 
(demand and supply), tend to find positive direct effects of defence on growth and 
negative indirect effects, through savings and trade balance, with a most commonly 
negative net effect. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the more "atheoretic" Granger causality 
approach, empirical evidence is almost equally divided between 
interdependence, 
mutual dependence and one-sided dependence between 
defence spending and 
growth. It is not possible to specify a common 
finding. What also becomes 
apparent from reviewing the studies is that 
in developed countries the economic 
effects of military spending on growth are quite 
different to those in LDCs. 
Developed countries may benefit from military expenditure, through 
increases in 
aggregate demand and increased utilisation of capital and 
labour, or they may be 
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worse off if defence spending crowds-out investment from other sectors that are 
potentially more productive than the military. Also, if a country has domestic arms 
production and arms exports it is more likely to be positively affected by military 
expenditure than those countries that have high arms imports. 
Once again the importance of studying individual countries becomes evident. A 
researcher must have good knowledge of a country's background to be able to build a 
complete model that is not only consistent with a certain theory but most importantly 
takes into account those specific characteristics that are unique to the country. If 
these unique characteristics are not taken into account, there is a great possibility for 
misspecification of the model (failing to account for structural changes, political or 
strategic factors) leading to misinterpretation of the results obtained. Investigating 
the defence-growth relationship in Greece under three different empirical 
specifications will provide a more insightful approach to the issue and at the same 
time will overcome all the shortcomings that arise from cross-sectional studies. The 
next chapter provides a background analysis of the Greek economy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GREECE: POLITICS, ECONOMY, SECURITY 
4.1. Introduction 
Greece constitutes a particularly interesting case for investigating the defence-growth 
relationship as it is a small, newly industrialised country, with many economic 
problems and security concerns, that even after the end of the Cold War continues to 
spend a significant share of its GDP on defence. Situated in an interesting 
geostrategic point in the European continent, the south of the Balkan peninsula, it is 
the only EU country that does not have borders with any of the member-countries. It 
is bounded on the North by the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and Bulgaria, on the Northwest by Albania, on the East by Turkey and the 
Aegean Sea and on the Southwest by Mediterranean, the Sea of Crete and the Ionian 
Sea. Its small size and its geographic location have always made Greece an 
economically extroverted country heavily dependent on international economic 
relations. But these same characteristics have also always attracted the attention 
from Great Powers with vested interests in the eastern Mediterranean. 
The 1960s and early 1970s was a period of uninterrupted growth and economic 
prosperity for all the industrialised West. By the mid-1970s the situation had 
changed due to the international recession and the world energy crisis. The 
international economic crisis coincided with the collapse of the dictatorship in 
Greece and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974). The transition towards 
parliamentary democracy led to internal political and economic changes and the 
desire for international recognition became apparent. Greece was the first of the 
Mediterranean "New Democracies" to consider membership of the European 
Community (joining the Community in 1981) as the way to strengthen its economic 
and political situation. 
One important aspect of the economic development of Greece that has not attracted 
much interest from researchers is defence spending. This potentially constitutes a 
huge burden on the economy, (5.6% of GDP during the last decade compared to 
NATO's average of 3.5% for the same period) and may bear some responsibility for 
the delayed progress of the Greek economy. 
4.2. Political History 
Until the late 1950s Greece was an underdeveloped country, with low productivity 
agriculture and a very weak industrial sector; a situation partly attributed to the 
Greek Civil War (1944 - 1949) between the left and the right (see Curtis, 
1994). The 
end of the Civil War resulted in the defeat and banning of the communists and the 
establishment of a political system which added anti-communism to 
Greek party 
politics'. The end of the Civil War also found Greece 
in a very difficult political and 
During the Civil War (1946-49), Greece was ruled by a coalition of the two main political parties, 
the People's Party (right) and the Liberals (centre), under a 
Liberal Prime minister. 
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economic situation which was quickly overcome by massive aid from the United 
States. To conform with the rules for dispensation of Marshall Aid. Greek 
governments had to draft comprehensive medium to long-term plans, the first 
systematic attempts to promote economic development and financial stability 
(Alogoskoufis, 1995). An important aspect of economic policy at the time was the 
participation the Greek Drachma in Bretton Woods. In the meanwhile the US and 
the army had become important forces in Greek politics and Greece became tied to 
Western organisations such as OEEC, the Council of Europe and, in 1952, NATO. 
The 1952 constitution, which declared Greece a parliamentary democracy with a 
monarch, was followed by a decade of domination by the right-wing parties. The 
Papagos2 government lifted many price and imports controls, drastically devalued the 
drachma in 1953 and reduced interest rates. It also introduced accelerated 
depreciation for tax purposes, legislation to protect and attract foreign capital, and 
measures to control the bureaucracy. However, labour and credit markets remained 
under firm government control (see Alogoskoufis, 1995). 
Papagos successor, Constantinos Karamanlis, renamed Papagos party as National 
Radical Union (ERE) and ruled Greece from 1956 to his electorate defeat in 1963. 
His government had paid special attention to the improvement of the economic 
infrastructure and the development of industrialisation. In 1963, the Centre Union, 
party of George Papandreou won the elections3. The new government, which was in 
power for only two years, paid special attention to educational reforms and the 
2 The 1950 inconclusive elections were followed by two and a half years of weak coalitions until the 
Greek Rally (evolved from the People's party) led by Alexandros Papagos, won the elections of 1952 
and governed the country until his death in 1955. 
3 The Centre Union Party evolved from the Liberal Party. 
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welfare state. A brief period of alternative governments resulted in a constitutional 
crisis over the role of the military; the political instability resulted in the militany 
coup of 21 April 1967 which led to a military dictatorship. The military government 
was in power for 7 years (1967-1974) and it collapsed immediately after the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus in 1974, which followed the Athens instigated coup against the 
elected president of the Cypriot Republic. 
In 1974, after democracy was restored, Karamanlis ruled the country for seven years 
as the leader of New Democracy (a new party he founded which evolved from ERE). 
In 1975 a new constitution was promulgated to establish Greece as a republic with a 
political structure modelled on that of France (Curtis, 1994). In 1979, the treaty of 
Accession to EC was ratified by the Greek parliament and in 1981, Greece became a 
full member of the EC - which is considered to be a big achievement of the 
Karamanlis government. During the Karamanlis years (1974-1981), there was a 
significant expansion in the role of the state in the economy with many 
nationalisations taking place. Also, there were large increases in defence and 
general government expenditure, as well as in real wages due to the emergence of 
powerful labour unions. In late 1981 the Socialist party of Andreas Papandreou 
(PASOK) was elected, while Karamanlis was elected as President of the Republic. 
The party (PASOK) was reelected in the mid-1985 elections, with its leader 
Papandreou continuing nationalisations and strengthening price controls. During his 
rule, (1985-89) a number of financial scandals and personal humiliations 
became 
public, while public deficits and debts were greatly increased and the 
balance of 
payments deteriorated, reaching a crisis point in 1985 and 
1989 (Jouganatos, 1992). 
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A Stabilisation Program was adopted in 1986-87 that introduced austerity measures 
that were eased in 1989-90 (as it is common for pre-election periods). 
The years 1989-90 were characterised by political instability, as while the general 
election of June 1989 placed the relatively conservative New Democracy Party (ND) 
first, it did not hold the majority of seats in Parliament. As a result, the leader of ND, 
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, could not form a government and an interim government4 
was formed under an unusual coalition between ND and the Alliance of the Left and 
Progress. Two general elections followed within seven months. The result of the 
first was identical to that of June 1989, leading to another interim government. This 
time the interim government that aimed to mend the economy was headed by 
Xenofon Zolotas, an economist and former governor of the Bank of Greece. But the 
general election of April 1990 gave ND the majority of seats in Parliament. Its 
leader Konstantinos Mitsotakis had to deal not only with the problems that the 
economy was facing but also with pressing issues in Cyprus and in Greek-Turkish 
relations. He ruled the country until 1993, when the general election placed PASOK 
under the rule of Andreas Papandreou. After his death, the Socialist party won the 
elections of 1996 again with Constantinos Simitis as the prime minister governing 
the country since then. The Simitis' government main concern is to achieve the 
"convergence criteria" of the EMU. 
4 Tzannis Tzannetakis, a highly regarded member of Parliament from ND, was selected as prime 
minister of the interim government whose purpose was to prosecute the officials accused of financial 
scandals during the PASOK administration as well as to improve relations with the US (Jouganatos, 
1992). 
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4.3. Defence Spending and Economic Performance 
In the 1960s the Greek economic structure faced important qualitative changes. In 
1962 for the first time, the contribution of the industrial sector to national output was 
greater than that of agriculture (Kollias, 1996). During 1961-1970, Greece allocated 
an average of 4.3% of GDP to defence yearly and achieved an annual average growth 
rate of GDP equal to 7.6% - well above the European average (see Figure 4.1. ). 
The annual average of inflation for this period was very low at 3.1. Despite the 
economic growth social conditions declined during this period. The emigration that 
had begun in the late 1950s continued into the 1960s (about 452,000 Greeks left 
between 1963-67). Also crowding into big cities gave rise to increased demand for 
social security and better income distribution (Curtis, 1994). In 1963, Makario's 
demand for reduction in the powers of the Turkish minority in Cyprus provoked a lot 
of tension on the island and it was at that time that Turkey threatened an invasion to 
defend Cypriot Turks. United States intervention prevented an invasion in early 
1964 when United Nations' peacekeeping forces entered the island to prevent war 
and have remained on the island ever since. 
The 1970s brought developments on the economic and defence fronts. The 
impressive growth rates of the previous decades started to decline, as the structural 
weaknesses of the Greek economy became apparent. Despite the fact that the annual 
average growth rate fell to 4.7% (in comparison to 7.6% of the previous decade) it 
was still well above the average of EC countries. Military burden was increased to 
5.75% of GDP. 
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Figure 4.1. Real Growth of Greek Military Expenditure and GDP* 
-- ME -GDP 
Years 
*calculated from figures in constant 1990 mn US S 
Source: SIPRI and EUROSTAT 
The first energy crisis and the international monetary turmoil following the Arab- 
Israeli war in 1973 had an adverse effect on the Greek economy. The high cost of 
foreign oil could not be covered by exports and as a result the Greek balance of 
payments faced a large deficit (see Figure 4.3) and the economy suffered inflationary 
pressures (inflation went up to 13.7% for that decade), while unemployment was 
kept at very low levels (see Figure 4.4. ). In the early 1970s government controlled 
defence industries were established because of weapon embargoes during the seven 
year military government but also because Greece wanted some independence in 
weapon procurement due to the increasing tensions with Turkey. The huge 
economic problems increased popular resistance to the dictatorship and contributed 
to its collapse in 1974. In this year, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the 
establishment of democracy in Greece marked a huge increase in defence spending 
and at that time the threat of an open confrontation with Turkey seemed highly likely. 
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All these events contributed to dramatic decreases in investment which during the 
mid-1970s saw negative rates of growth (see Figure 4.2. ). 
Figure 4.2. Real Growth of Greek Investment and Military Expenditure* 
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Figure 4.3. Greek Exports and Imports as a share of GDP 
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Figure 4.4. Greek Inflation and Unemployment Rates* 
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*Unemployment as a percentage of civilian labour force and inflation as the annual percentage change 
in GDP deflator in 1990 
Source: OECD 
In the 1980s the Greek economy deteriorated. The average annual growth rate was 
1.6% compared to that of the rest of Europe which was 2.3%, while inflation 
increased even more, averaging 18.4% annually (see Figure 4.4. ). Despite the 
persistent economic problems military expenditure was kept at a high level due to the 
perceived threat from Turkey. During the 1980s Greece allocated an average of 
6.52% of GDP to defence annually, a percentage much higher than that of the NATO 
alliance as a whole (see Figure 4.5) and in 1985 Greece officially declared a defence 
doctrine according to which Turkey was identified as the principal threat to its 
security. 
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Figure 4.5. Greek and NATO Military Burden* 
+ Greece -NATO 
2H 
1- 
I 
o T- -- ýN ýr 
ýýý 
-ý-- -- T--- - -- - ---- -. i-- - -7- --ý - 
11D 00 Cl ,: I tiD 00 ON "t ýD 00 ON "Zi- tic 
1-4) I- l- l-- I- 00 00 00 00 00 CT CT CT CT 
CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT CT 
r. ý.. ._ "-- r. r. .ý ._ . -. . -r r.. . -ý . -ý . -ý . --. _.. 
Years 
*military expenditure as a share of GDP 
Source: SIPRI 
During the last decade there was a deep concern over the events in the Balkans as 
Yugoslavia began to break up. Greeks were particularly upset by the creation of a 
state called Macedonia (as Macedonia is the name of the northern part of Greece) 
and there was some concern over the treatment of the Greek minority in Albania. 
Initially these events seemed to add to the security concerns for Greece, but since 
none of these countries possessed large military establishments Greek defence policy 
and military planning was not affected. 
As can be seen in Table 4.1., economic indicators improved slightly during 1991- 
1997 mainly because of Greece's effort to achieve the required criteria for joining 
EMU. For this period GDP growth rate was 1.9% while military burden fell to 5.5% 
of GDP because of the tight macroeconomic policies. Inflation was brought down to 
an annual average of 11.7% for the same period. Despite the slight improvements in 
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the main economic indicators5, Greece's economy is still very weak and well below 
the EU average. On top of this, the conflict with Turkey6 remains unresolved. There 
are still disagreements over Cyprus, over the continental self of the Aegean Sea, and 
over the control of the airspace above it. These security considerations are used to 
justify Greece's high defence spending8. The end of the Cold War left Greece with 
major foreign policy concerns to its immediate North and East. 
5 Table Al in Appendix A gives the main economic indicators for Greece annually. 
6 For a comprehensive view of the Greek-Turkish relations, see Constas, D. (1991). 
' From the Greek perspective, Turkey is characterised by imperialism and aims to change the status 
quo which was established by the treaties of Lausanne (1923), Montreux (1936) and Paris (1947). 
The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the up to date occupation of 40% of the island by Turkish 
troops is a clear proof of Turkey's ambitions and strategic aims. 
s Table A2 in Appendix A gives the Greek military figures annually. 
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4.4. National Security Concerns 
Although the end of bipolar geopolitics has eliminated the communist threat, Greece's 
eastern neighbour remains a major concern that necessitates large military expenditures 
affording the opportunity for continued political input by the military establishment. 
Also, the protracted Balkan crisis of the early mid-90's highlighted the military's 
politically sensitive role (Curtis, 1994). 
Greece's strategic position at the junction of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa) 
and nearly totally surrounded by sea has made continuous involvement with close 
neighbours and constant attention from great powers with vested interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean inevitable. Its national security concerns can be divided into a pre-1974 
and a post-1974 period. The pre-1974 period was characterised by instability and 
conflicts between royalists and republicans, communists and nationalists. The collapse 
of the last Greek military dictatorship signalled the beginning of a new era for Greece. 
Since 1974, the Hellenic forces' primary mission has been to maintain a balance of 
power with Turkey, specifically deterring the infringement of Greek national interests 
and sovereignty and preventing a Turkish attack on the Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus. 
Given Turkey's quantitative advantage of a population six times larger than Greece's 
and larger armed forces (see figure 4.6. ), Greece has always tried to "compete" 
in 
qualitative terms. Greek military expenditure per soldier has always been 
higher than 
Turkish (see figure 4.7. ), furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 4.8., the Greek ratio of 
armed forces to population exceeded the Turkish one throughout the period examined. 
As a secondary mission, Greece's status as a member of 
NATO requires military 
contributions to the alliance's efforts to deter threats 
in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and 
the Mediterranean. 
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Figure 4.6. Greek and Turkish Armed Forces 
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Figure 4.7. Greek and Turkish Military Expenditure per Soldier* 
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In 1994, Greece and Cyprus announced the creation of a Joint Defence Area. According 
to this doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an occupation force of more than 30,000 
troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot forces would remain in the posture of joint defence. 
In late 1994, all Greek political parties regarded Turkey as the principal threat to 
Greece's security. This perception has been used to justify increased emphasis on 
military expenditures in the 1990s. Spending that has supported deployment of military 
forces to demonstrate Greek resolve at a time of reduced reliance on NATO - an 
organisation that Greece has blamed for its inability to prevent the invasion of Cyprus 
by another member of the alliance9. 
Figure 4.8. Greek and Turkish Ratio of Armed Forces to Population 
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9 During the post-war period Greece's security considerations 
have been the threat from the Warsaw Pact 
countries and from Turkey. By joining NATO, 
Greece secured its northern borders but not the eastern 
ones, since the strategic interaction 
between Greece and Turkey has two contradictory facets: they are 
state to state adversaries and NATO allies 
(Sezer, 1991). 
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So, in the 1990s, Greece's most critical concerns were the chronic disagreements with 
and the perceived security threat from Turkey together with the instability in the Balkans 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia). Policy makers in Greece justify high levels of military 
expenditure because of these security concerns. 
4.5. Defence Industries 
In the 1950s Greek defence policy was primarily organised by the US. This continued 
until 1974 when the Turkish invasion of Cyprus proved that this strategy degraded 
Greece's independence in defence by exposing it to threats from within the NATO 
alliance. After 1974, Greece attempted to achieve partial independence from NATO. 
But it soon became apparent that this policy was not beneficial for Greece, as it was 
extremely difficult for a small country to organise its defence without being a member 
of one or more defence alliances. So Greece, after many efforts, managed to find the 
right balance between independence and attachment to the alliance's policies. 
Greece is a net importer of military equipment, mainly from US, France and Germany. 
According to SIPRI it ranked fifth among the major recipients for conventional weapons 
during 1990-1995 while Turkey ranked first, Spain twentieth and Portugal twenty-third 
(see Table 4.2. ). During the 1950s, under a military aid programme that aimed to 
integrate smaller NATO countries in the allied structure of armed forces and production 
capabilities, equipment from World War II and the Korean War was transferred to 
Greece. In other words, Greece was obtaining used military equipment through military 
grants and under these circumstances there was 
little hope for the development of 
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indigenous military production. Instead, Greece was involved in creating maintenance 
networks for the imported weapon platforms and developing capabilities in ammunition 
and aircraft maintenance. 
Table 4.2. Imports of Major Conventional Weapons* 
1988-92 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1991-95 
Turkey 6167 954 1640 2288 2089 1125 8096 
Greece 6197 559 2632 891 1185 489 5756 
Spain 3747 126 261 580 863 359 2189 
Portugal 1374 1062 3 300 500 5 1870 
* in constant 1990 mn US $ 
Note: For the years 1991-95, Turkey was ranked first among the major recipients for conventional 
weapons, Greece fifth, Spain twentieth and Portugal twenty-third 
Source: SIPRI 
In the mid-1960s the transfer of used military equipment from US and other NATO 
countries was eliminated, as were military grants towards countries with developing 
defence industries (DDI countries). Greece was spending a large amount on defence 
and this amount was further increased after 1974 (after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus). 
It was during this time (mid-late 1970s) that state owned defence industries started to be 
established. The development of an indigenous military industry was seen as necessary 
because of weapons embargoes during the seven year military government, but also 
because of the need to reduce balance of payments deficit on current account via import 
substitution. Manufacturing plants were built-up whenever a big order could create a 
sufficient market for a new production line (Bartzokas, 1992). 
The creation of the Defence Industries Directorate within the Ministry of National 
Defence in 1977, was the first step towards organising Greece's defence industry. In 
1998, the Greek military industry consisted of four large state-owned companies -- 
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Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO), Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), Greek Powder and 
Cartridge Company (PYRKAL), and Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELBO). There was a 
fifth one - the Hellenic Shipyards SA - which was privatised in the early 1990s. Besides 
the state-owned military suppliers, there were also some small and medium-size 
companies that allocate from 20% to 80% of their capacity to military production. 
These companies are now grouped under the auspices of the Association of Greek 
Producers of Defence Materials (SEKPY). SEKPY was founded in 1982 by 20 
companies with experience in the area of defence, employing about 2,000 people. 
SEKPY's objective was to substitute some of the defence imports by domestically 
produced defence products. The other objective was to promote and develop co- 
operation between the armed forces and the defence industries, to develop indigenous 
arms production and exports. Currently, there are 105 members of SEKPY' °, including 
almost all the defence industries - public and private ones - employing in total 20,000 - 
25,000 full-time workforce (Balfoussias & Stavrinos, 1996). 
In the 1980s, the possibility for countries like Greece to participate in an integrated 
European arms sector was seen as a great opportunity, since local firms could benefit 
from joint programmes and increase their exports to other West European countries. 
The basic difficulty for Greece seemed to be its dependence on military imports from 
the USA, who had used military aid funds, knowledge transfer, cheap prices and direct 
political pressure in order to secure sales. Greece became a significant market for 
advanced weapons systems and this led to a foreign trade deficit, shortages of foreign 
10 SEKPY's member-companies produce the following types of defence material: explosives, guns and 
gun-systems, battleships, military vehicles, aircraft components, electronic components, satellite 
components, telecommunication components, electrical components, wires, 
bullet-proof vests, batteries, 
protective masks for chemicals and at around 
40,000 parts. 
currency and devaluation of the national currency against the US dollar. In these 
circumstances, the advanced countries' efforts to promote exports in the Greek market 
were connected with credit supplies from the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
programme, with terms of loans a significant input in the decision making process for 
new orders. 
Some investments were made in established sub-sectors such as ammunition and 
transportation and in the mid-1980s, a large scale modernisation of the Greek air force 
was accompanied by a shift towards advanced manufacturing in aircraft assembly and 
electronic components. According to Bartzokas (1992), "After the first import- 
substitution phase, many arms producing companies were involved in "grey" military 
exports and benefited from the Iraq-Iran war (i. e. exports for 1982 were 120mn $, for 
1984 100mn $, for 1986 40mn $ and for 1987 40mn $). This export-led growth forced 
these industries to further expansion in military manufacturing projects" (Bartzokas, 
1992, p. 171). 
However, significant economic problems arose, mainly because of management 
mistakes including delayed response to technological developments, the changing needs 
of the armed forces, and the inefficient use of offset agreements". The policy of 
industrial modernisation through the expansion of military industry has now been 
abandoned due to huge financial debts. In 1990 because of economic difficulties, the 
Greek government asked some of the main state-owned military companies to convert 
their activities to the production of civil goods. Meanwhile the privatisation programme 
Agreements by which Greek plants supply components to foreign military manufacturers in return for 
aircraft and equipment. 
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of public enterprises created some interest among European and US firms to buy parts 
of the Greek armaments sector. The move towards mergers with foreign interests, or 
even a long-term programme for the conversion to civilian production is likely to face 
political opposition and hostility from the armed forces (Bartzokas, 1992). 
Countries like Greece with no developed military industrial sector but spending a large 
proportion of GDP on defence due to security considerations, obviously aim to develop 
indigenous defence industries in order to gain a certain degree of independence in 
defence procurement as well as political and national strength. But also, and maybe 
most importantly, because the substitution of imported military equipment by 
domestically produced can have very important economic and technological benefits, 
such as reduction in the loss of domestic currency for imports, reduction of 
unemployment, and increase in demand as well as the achievement of know-how and 
technical skills. These technological spin-offs may have beneficial effects for other 
sectors of the economy if there is an adequate infrastructure. But in Greece, the existing 
industrial infrastructure is inadequate, the scale of manufacturing plants too small, the 
indigenous technological capabilities very limited and the involvement in high 
technology sectors almost non-existent. The major activity, therefore, is assembly work. 
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4.6. Conclusions 
It is clear from this brief background analysis of Greece that it is a country with many 
economic and security problems, with no developed defence industry, but with a large 
military burden. The absence of a developed indigenous arms industry and the existence 
of huge economic problems, make high defence spending seem irrational or 
unjustifiable by pure economic reasoning. But what could appear to force Greece to 
spend a lot on defence are security concerns, mainly the perceived threat from Turkey 
and the instability of the Balkans. Certainly policy makers use these threats to justify the 
substantial share of GDP that is allocated to defence each year. But what about the 
economic consequences of high defence spending? This is usually a secondary issue 
when a nation fears for its national security and policy makers tend to avoid asking this 
sort of questions. Defence spending, however, may bear considerable responsibility for 
the delayed progress of the Greek economy. Only recently, the economic effects of 
defence spending in Greece has attracted some interest from researchers. This study will 
provide a contribution to this area of research, thoroughly investigating the economic 
effects of military spending in Greece using three empirical approaches. Prior to this, 
though, it seems necessary to examine the determinants of Greek military expenditure, 
which given the important security considerations are likely to be strategic rather than 
economic. This issue is empirically investigated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DETERMINANTS OF GREEK MILITARY 
EXPENDITURE 
5.1. Introduction 
Prior to investigating the economic effects of military expenditure in Greece it is 
appropriate to examine the determinants of such spending. There are a wide variety 
of models of the demand for military expenditure based on different theories about 
the decision-making process and the influence of various military, political and 
economic factors (see Smith, 1977,1989,1995). Military factors (i. e. military 
spending of potential enemies, or of allies) are considered to be external influences 
on the demand for military expenditure, in which case it is represented by arms-race 
models or models of alliances. Internal influences include economic factors (income 
and prices, or even the need to stabilise demand and control public expenditure), 
political factors (lobbying by the Military Industrial Complex and other interest 
groups, or even the ideology of the government) and bureaucratic factors (bargaining 
over the budget starting from the status quo). As such, the demand for military 
expenditure is represented by public choice models, models of bureaucratic 
behaviour, or general models of aggregate defence spending in which all the above 
can be either incorporated or seen as special cases (Dunne, 1996). The majority of 
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empirical studies on the determinants of military expenditures focus on arms-race 
models and on general models of aggregate defence spending. The rest of this 
chapter reviews these two types of models and provides empirical estimations of: a) 
an arms race model for Greece and Turkey and b) a general model of aggregate 
defence spending. 
5.2. Arms-Race Models 
The starting point for arms-race models was Richardson's (1960) seminal work 
which explains the time-series pattern of military expenditure between potential 
enemies in an action-reaction framework. The Richardson model uses a coupled pair 
of differential equations to explain the change in levels of weapons in each of two 
nations as a function of the weapons held by both sides. He postulated three motives 
which lead a nation in time of peace to increase or decrease its preparation for war. 
"First, there is the motive of revenge or hostility which is independent of existing 
armaments, and which tends to be enduring and constant. Second, there is the 
very strong motive of fear, which moves each group to increase its armaments 
because of the existence of those of the opposing group. Finally, there is always a 
tendency for each group to reduce its armaments in order to economise 
expenditure and effort ", (Richardson, 1960, p. 13). 
To mathematically represent these ideas, he described a process in which one side in 
a competitive relationship reacts to increases in the other side's arms by increasing 
its own arms. So, for two rival states with armament levels ml and m2 , 
Richardson 
(1960) gave this process the following mathematical form: 
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dmI /dt= a1 + (31 m2 - 71 ml 
(1) 
dm2 /dt= a2 + P2 MI - 72 m2 (2) 
According to these equations, the rate of change in one state's armaments, ml , rises 
with increases in the other state's armaments, m2 , and vice versa. The coefficients 
ß1 and ß2 represent the sensitivity of each state's arms acquisition to the arms level 
of the other state and Richardson interpreted them as "reaction" terms. The 
coefficients 71 and 72 represent "fatigue" terms, as the rate of arms acquisition falls 
with increases in each state's own arms levels. Finally, Richardson called the 
contants a1 and a2 "grievance" terms, which are positive as the two states are in a 
competitive relationship to begin with. 
Although the Richardson arms-race model constitutes one of the best known and one 
of the most influential formal models in international relations literature, it is a 
descriptive model without an explicit objective or an assumption of maximizing 
behaviour and its results have been quite disappointing when applied to data as 
Hartley and Sandler (1995) note (Hartley & Sandler, 1995, p. 115). Also, finding that 
a country responds to current armaments of a potential enemy country (as the 
classical Richardson model postulates) is problematic in terms of interpretation since 
a country cannot know the current armaments of its potential enemy at the time it 
makes its own defence decisions. The common thing is that policymakers justify 
high military expenditure in the name of national security which is at stake due to 
perceived threats. Another problem that arises from arms-race models is their 
limited applicability since, according to Deger and Sen (1990), these models can only 
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be successful if applied to countries that are in conflict. Also, arms-race models do 
not perform well empirically (Deger, 1986; Mohammed, 1992; Smith. 1989). 
Finally, arms-race models are characterised by a further difficulty of choosing a 
measure of defence (Anderton, 1989, Hollist, 1977, Ward, 1984). Deger and Sen 
(1983) remarked that, since most of the studies investigate the nuclear arms-race 
between superpowers, such measures may not be applicable when studying smaller 
countries that lack nuclear capabilities. And as Smith (1980) claimed: 
" Unlike other government expenditures it is impossible to quantify the objective 
of military expenditure. The government spends on armed forces, weapons and 
soldiers in order to provide security through military capability. While forces 
and spending can be measured, capability and security cannot. Military 
capability of a state is determined in quantitative terms (the size of the armed 
forces and weapons) and in qualitative terms (personnel training and weapon 
sophistication proxied by military expenditure per soldier). The consensus 
among arms race modellers tends to be that military expenditure is a good 
measure of military capability or at least the best available " (Smith, 1980, p. 32). 
After an extensive use of the classical Richardson model in the 1960s and early 
1970s, researchers tried to modify and alter it by introducing, for example, more 
relevant variables (ie income), by using different theoretical formalisations of the 
arms race process such as game theory', by introducing strategic capabilities 
measures, by adding a variable for military stocks alongside that for military 
spending (Ward, 1984) or, more commonly, by introducing some more general 
variants of the classical model such as distributed lag or vector autoregression and 
error correction representations. So, any review of the studies on arms race models 
shows a diversity of model specification, data and testing procedures. 
' lntriligator (1975), Intriligator and Brito (1990). Levy (1984) developed arms race models by using 
game theory and by introducing strategic capability measures 
in their models. 
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Empirical studies of arms races seem to end up with quite puzzling results. Most 
puzzling of all seems to be the inability of researchers to find evidence of an arms 
race between the US - USSR, indicating that defence spending in these countries 
may be influenced by internal factors only (Isard and Anderton, 1985; Intriligator and 
Brito. 1990; Gleditsch, 1990; McGinnis, 1991; Kinsella and Chung, 1998). 
Something that seemed strange given the Cold War confrontation between the 
superpowers. Certainly within the context of an action-reaction model, there was no 
apparent arms race between the US and the USSR, which suggests that it makes 
sense to move to other theories which try to explain the growth in military 
expenditure (see Chapter 2) in developed countries. For example, the Keynesian 
theory of defence spending would emphasize lack of effective demand or the Marxist 
theory would emphasize underconsumptionism and in both cases increases in 
defence spending arise from economic (internal) reasons. Furthermore, since most 
developed economies have a developed military industry, they also benefit from 
technological spin-offs that arise from research and development in this area. 
In the case of developing countries these economic determinants may still be 
important but lack of aggregate demand is unlikely to be a problem. In contrast, 
constraints on the supply side are more likely to be a problem in LDCs. As such, the 
usual thing to claim for these economies is that the military competes for scarce 
resources leading to crowding-out of investment which in turn hinders economic 
growth. Since, there seems no logical economic reason to explain high military 
expenditures in LDCs, it is more likely to be strategic factors that influence these 
countries' high military burdens. Deger (1982) suggests that these strategic factors 
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are highly localised and lead to arms race and aggression between neighbours2. The 
well-known Greek-Turkish conflict forced a number of researchers to test for the 
existence of an arms-race between the two countries. In the following section a brief 
review of empirical studies of arms race models for Greece and Turkey is presented. 
5.3. Arms Race Models for Greece and Turkey 
There is considerable debate over the Greece-Turkey arms race as previous studies 
have given mixed results. Majeski and Jones (1981) and Majeski (1985) using 
causality analysis, tested for interdependence in the military expenditures of Greece 
and Turkey for 1949-1975 and their results indicated the presence of instantaneous 
causality. Kollias (1991) applied the classical Richardson model for the two 
countries over the periods 1950-1986 as well as over 1974-1986 (the period after the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus), but his results were very poor and did not indicate the 
existence of an arms-race. However, by employing specific indices of military 
capabilities, he found that Greek military expenditure depends on Turkish military 
expenditure and on the relative size of the arms forces. Also, a recent study, Kollias 
and Makrydakis (1997b), using cointegration and causality tests, found evidence of a 
systematic armaments competition between Greece and Turkey over the period 1950- 
1995. Refenes et al. (1995) using neural networks and indices of military 
capabilities (ratio of armed forces and military expenditures per soldier) examined 
the hypothesis of an arms-race between Greece and Turkey over 1962-90 and found 
2 Examples of neighbouring countries that are involved in arms race or they are characterised by 
conflicts include apart from Greece and Turkey, also, Iran-Iraq, India-Pakistan, 
Vietnam-Cambodia, 
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that Turkey's quantitative advantage is the most significant external security 
determinant of the Greek military expenditure. 
On the other hand, there are studies that cannot provide strong evidence of an arms- 
race between the two countries. Georgiou (1990) tested the hypothesis of an arms- 
race over the period 1958-1987 but could not find any evidence of one. Also, 
Georgiou, Kapopoulos, Lazaretou (1996), based on the work of McGuire (1977), 
Desai and Blake (1981) and a vector autoregression specification ended up with 
similar conclusions for the period 1960-1990. 
A review of these studies shows that results are mixed as to the existence of an arms 
race between Greece and Turkey. In the rest of this chapter, the same issue for the 
two countries is reexamined over the period 1960-96 by initially employing the 
classical Richardson model and later considering variants of it which draws on more 
advanced econometric techniques than have so far been used, namely VAR 
specifications using the notion of cointegration. Furthermore, the effect of adding 
other variables such as income to proxy the budget constraint is also considered. 
Egypt-Israel and others. 
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5.4. Methodology and Specification of the Arms Race Model 
The familiar Richardson model (see equations 1 and 2 of this chapter) can be written 
in discrete time with the addition of a stochastic error term as: 
Omit = a1 + ßl mzt + Yi mit-i +Eit (3) 
Om2t = a2 + P2 mit + 72 m2t-1 +E; 2t (4) 
where m; t is some measure of military preparedness of country i in year t (i=1,2), and 
as mentioned previously, Richardson interpreted a; (i=1,2) as exogenous "grievance" 
terms, ß; >0 as "reaction" terms and y; <0 as "fatigue" terms. The following 
assumptions are made: 
E(Eir) = 0, E(E2j) = 62' , E(EýtEjc) = ßij , E(ErtEjr-s )=0, where s#0 and i, j =1,2. 
The structural shocks Fit in these countries will be driven partly by idiosyncratic 
factors (events in former Yugoslavia and instability in the Balkans in general for 
Greece and the conflict with the Kurds for Turkey) and partly by common factors 
(events in the former Soviet Union or NATO modernisation). So, one would not 
expect the structural shocks to be independent. 
The reduced form of the system can be written in VECM (Vector Error Correction 
Model) form of a first order VAR (Vector Autoregression) specification (see Smith 
et al, 1999) as: 
Amlt 611 + 612 m1t-1 + 613 met-1 + Ult (5) 
Am2t = 521 + 622 m1 t-1 + 623 met-1 + U2t (6) 
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where E(u; t) = 0, E(u21) = w2; , 
E(u; tujt) = w; j , 
E(utujr_s) = 0, where s#0 and i, j= 
There will be Granger (1969) causality from m1 to m2 if 622#0 and from m2 to mI if 
613 #0. In the theory the military expenditure variables are treated as stationary 
variables, integrated of order zero I(0)3. If the variables are I(1), or equivalently 
contain a stochastic trend, then there is a danger of spurious regression. In a 
regression of one I(1) variable on another, the R2 tends to unity with the sample size 
and the t ratio to a non zero value, even if the two series are unrelated. The 
requirement for the regression not to be spurious is that the two variables cointegrate. 
If this is the case, then the process can be represented as a restricted form of the error 
correction model outlined above. If the long-run relationship is mit = ßm2t , then the 
disequilibrium is measured by zt = mit - ßm2t and the VECM takes the form: 
Am 1t =611 + (xi zt- i 
Am2t =821 + a2 zt-1 
where the feedbacks are stabilising if a1 <0 and a2 > 0. 
(7) 
(8) 
Estimation and testing of the cointegrating vectors can be done in a number of ways, 
including the maximum likelihood framework suggested by Johansen (1988). 
Unit root tests and cointegration have been widely adopted, Kollias and Makrydakis 
(1997b) is an arms race example. However, there are a number of problems with the 
A variable is said to be I(d), integrated of order 
d, if it must be differenced d times to become 
covariance stationary. A variable is said to 
be covariance stationary if its expected value, variances 
and autocovariances are all constant, perhaps after 
the removal of a deterministic trend. An 1(0) 
variable is thus stationary. 
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techniques. Both the tests for unit roots (used to determine the order of integration) 
and the tests for cointegration tend to have low power, so determining the order of 
integration and cointegration is not straightforward. The tests are also sensitive to the 
choice of lag order, the treatment of serial correlation, the treatment of the 
deterministic elements, the presence of structural breaks and various other factors. 
There are also questions of interpretation, since the order of integration is not a 
structural property of the series but a description of the time-series properties of a 
sample. Series which appear I(1) on short spans of data often appear 1(0) on long 
spans, where span refers to the length in time of the series not necessarily the number 
of observations. Over centuries of data, the UK share of military expenditure is 
clearly 1(0), over shorter spans it appears to be I(1). While cointegration allows the 
estimation of the long-run equilibrium, it does not help in identifying the short-run 
structural interaction (Smith et al, 1999). 
A major problem with the Richardson model is the lack of a budget constraint. This 
can be dealt with by, for example, including GDP to reflect income . Care needs to 
be taken in including variables within a VAR, however, as the number of parameters 
grows very rapidly with the number of variables and the number of lags, and the 
small sample properties of large VARs are rather poor. In addition, inference (e. g. 
Granger Causality tests), tends to be sensitive to specification and including or 
excluding variables can change the results. However, adding income may provide 
more plausible identifying restrictions. For instance, it is possible that countries 
adjust their military expenditure in response to their own GDPs, but not to the other 
countries GDP, or have an arms race in shares of military spending in GDP (military 
burdens). 
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There are a variety of interesting testable system restrictions on the VAR (e. g. 
exogeneity of income, levels versus shares). In principle, starting from a general 
system and testing system wide restrictions is an appropriate way to develop a model 
of the arms race process. In practice, it can be difficult to find theoretically coherent 
and statistically acceptable specifications on a large system through such a 
procedure. Ad hoc deletion of individual insignificant coefficients is also 
unsatisfactory because what looks like acceptable single equation restrictions can 
produce unacceptable systems properties. A further consideration is the expectations 
process, which is left, unspecified in the theoretical model. Within the framework 
discussed above there are a number of possible interpretations, which are discussed 
in Smith et al (1999). The following section starts by providing estimates of the 
classical Richardson model and of its reduced form, allowing each time for structural 
breaks in the data. Finally the possibility of including income is assessed. 
5.5. Data and Empirical Results 
Using SIPRI data (see Figure 5.1. ) on military expenditure for the two countries, the 
starting point is to test the integration properties of the two series both in logs and in 
levels. Initial tests for unit roots showed the series to be I(1). The Dickey Fuller tests 
are given in the Appendix B, in Tables B1 and B2. Table B1 gives the Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) results when only an intercept is 
included, for the levels and logarithms of the Greek and Turkish military expenditure 
series. These show that the levels of Greek and Turkish military spending for 1960- 
96 do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. For the logs of the variables, the 
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null hypothesis of no unit root is not rejected only for the Turkish series but it is 
rejected for the Greek ones. Before reaching a conclusion about the integration 
properties of the series, the DF and ADF tests with an intercept and a linear trend 
must also be considered. These are presented on Table B2 in Appendix B and 
indicate that both the levels and the logarithms of both countries military expenditure 
contain unit roots. When the series are first differenced (see Appendix B, Table B3 
for the DF and ADF tests with only an intercept), the hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected, indicating that the variables are integrated of order one [1(1)]. The 
implication of this is that the variables should be used in first differences and the 
Richardson model does not do so. 
Figure 5.1. Military Expenditure for Greece and Turkey* 
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5.5.1. Empirical Results for the Richardson Model 
Although results from the Richardson model (equations 3 and 4) are presented in 
Table 5.1., given the fact that the two series contain stochastic trends or equivalently 
they are integrated of order one, I(1), there is a danger of spurious regression. As 
such, one would not expect the Richardson model to work particularly well. 
Table 5.1. Estimates of Richardson Model (eq. 3,4) 
Levels Logs Logs with Dummy 
Greece Turke Greece Turke Greece Turkey 
Constant 304 (2.1) -5.23 (0.0) 0.55 (2.2) -0.08 (0.2) 0.53 (2.3) 0.08 (0.3) 
Other 0.04 (0.8) 0.11 (1.1) 0.02 (0.3) 0.13 (1.6) 0.001 (0.0) 0.04 (0.7) 
Own(-1) -0.12(1.6) -0.06(1.0) -0.08 (1.2) -0.11 (1.9) -0.06 (1.0) -0.05 (1.0) 
D75 0.22 (2.6) 0.44 (4.8) 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.27 0.48 
DW 2.07 1.40 1.79 1.38 1.79 1.69 
Ser. Cor. 0.11[. 744] 3.58[. 059] 0.22[. 639] 3.83[. 122] 0.20[. 657] 0.92[. 338] 
Function 7.70[. 006] 1.95[. 162] 11.82[. 001] 2.39[. 122] 10.28[. 001] 0.25[. 616] 
Normality 2.45[. 294] 3.71 [. 156] 1.24'[. 537] 23.12[. 000] 0.39[. 825] 0.22[. 897] 
Heterosc. 1.48[224] 6.09[. 014] 0.10[. 750] 3.57[. 059] . 31 [. 575] 
0.61[. 433] 
All x2(1) except normality x2(2) 
Note: D75 is a shock dummy taking the value of 1 for the year 1975 and 0 otherwise 
The results in Table 5.1. show that the model performs poorly as expected. 
Investigating the residuals (see Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B) suggests the need 
to consider the role of Cyprus invasion in producing some instability in the 
relationship and some possible outliers. The residuals were regressed against a 
number of dummies to account for this event, taking the value of one for the whole 
period after 1975, looking at the first few years (1975-8), or a shock 
dummy that 
takes the value of 1 in 1975 and 0 otherwise. Another attempt was made to 
have a 
step dummy which took the value of 0.5 in 1974,1 
in 1975-79 and 0 otherwise. In 
fact the most significant dummy was the shock dummy, which took the value of one 
for 1975 only and zero otherwise. Estimating in 
logs improved the performance of 
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the model, though it was still a relatively poor fit for a time series regression. This 
again illustrates the problems of attempting to estimate these models, how sensitive 
the are to specification and how important dummy variables are to pick up structural 
breaks in the relationships. 
5.5.2. Empirical Results for the Reduced Form Model 
Writing the reduced form of the models as a VAR, equations 5 and 6 are estimated 
giving the results that appear in Table 5.2. These are simply the change in one 
country's military spending as a function of the lagged levels of its own and the other 
country's military spending. These are estimated using OLS equation by equation in 
this instance. The results are every bit as poor as one would expect from the 
Richardson model. Again the 1975 dummy is significant. 
Table 5.2. Estimates of the Reduced Form Model (eq. 5,6) 
AMGt AMTt 
Constant 296.1 (2.1) 267.8 (2.0) 81.8 (0.4) 33.6 (0.2) 
MG-1 -0.09 (1.2) -0.10 (1.5) 0.06 (0.6) 0.04 (0.4) 
MT-1 0.02 (0.4) 0.03 (0.7) -0.04 (0.6) -0.01 (0.2) 
D75 720.9 (2.6) 1226.9 (3.6) 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.29 
DW 2.12 2.19 1.44 1.69 
Serial Correlation 0.24 [. 628] 0.54 [. 462] 3.12 [. 077] 0.98 [. 321] 
Functional Form 8.65 [. 003] 7.51 [. 006] 0.15 [. 700] 0.21 [. 644] 
Normality 2.54 [. 280] 3.17 [. 205] 7.45 [. 024] 1.02 [. 602] 
Heteroscedasticity 1.70 [. 192] 0.55 [. 458] 1.26 [. 262] 0.38 [. 536] 
All x2(1) except normality x2(2) 
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As discussed in the previous section, the significance of the coefficient on the lagged 
other country's military spending term gives a test of Granger causality4. In this case 
there is no evidence for it for either country. 
5.5.3. Empirical Results for the VECM 
Given that the variables do seem to be I(1), especially in logs the possibility that they 
are cointegrated should be considered. Making an initial estimate of a VAR(5) for 
the logs5 and using a step dummy6 (CD) as an exogenous variable, the adjusted 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) indicate a 
first order VAR, though the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and unadjusted LR 
tests suggest longer lags, as can be seen on Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Determination of the Order of the VAR for MG, MT (in logs) 
1965-96. Order of VAR=5, Variables included: MG, MT. Exogenous: CD 
Order 
5 
4 
3 
2 
I 
0 
LL AIC SBC LR 
73.0910 51.0910 34.9679 
71.1679 53.1679 39.9763 
65.0967 51.0967 40.8365 
58.6323 48.6323 41.3036 
56.7142 50.7142 46.3170 
X2 ( 4)= 3.8 [. 427] 
X2 ( 8)=16[. 043] 
X2 ( 12)=28.9[. 004] 
X2 ( 16)= 32.7[. 008] 
X2 ( 20)= 381.9[. 000] -117.8735 -119.8735 -121.3393 
LR Adjusted 
2.5 [. 640]. 
10.5 [. 232] 
19.0 [. 089] 
21.5 [. 160] 
250.6 [. 000] 
4 Given the discussion of exogeneity and Granger causality (see Appendix H), the causality tests in 
Table 5.2. do not have standard t and F distributions as they have Dickey Fuller style distributions. 
This means that the t value at 95% interval is closer to 3 than to 2. But this would not alter the results 
here. 
5 Non-nested tests indicated that the log equation was prefered to the levels one. 
6 The step dummy takes the value of 0.5 in 1974,1.0 during 1975-1979 and 0 elsewhere. 
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Given the length of the time series, a VAR(1) is chosen to investigate whether or not 
the variables are cointegrated. Testing for cointegration between the logs of the two 
countries military expenditure including the step dummy which takes the value of 
0.5 in 1974,1.0 from 1975-1979 and zero otherwise, gives the results presented on 
Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Cointegration Tests with Unrestricted Intercepts and Restricted 
Trends for MG, MT (in logs) and Step Dummy 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
36 observations from 1961 to 1996. Order of VAR =1 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: MG, MT, Trend 
List of 1(0) variables included in the VAR: CD 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: . 
45235 
. 
11432 0.00 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r=1 21.6764 19.2200 17.1800 
r <= 1r=24.3703 12.3900 10.5500 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r >= 1 26.0467 25.7700 23.0800 
r <= 1r=24.3703 12.3900 10.5500 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 66.8060 62.8060 59.6390 61.7006 
r=1 77.6442 69.6442 63.3101 67.4334 
r=2 79.8294 69.8294 61.9118 67.0659 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The null hypothesis of r=0 against the alternative of r=1 can be rejected, for both the 
eigenvalue form of the test and the trace version at 5%s. The SBC and HQC model 
7 When the step dummy (CD) was not included or other dummies were included in its place (such as a 
dummy equal to 1.0 for the years 1975-1979 and zero elsewhere) there was no evidence of 
cointegration in the data. 
8 Without the restricted trend the result were much less clearcut. 
101 
selection criteria indicate a single cointegrating vector, though the AIC does not. It is 
fairly common for these tests to differ. Estimating with a single cointegrating vector 
in the Johansen Estimation procedure with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends gives long run solution of. 
Zt = 0.04 MG +1.18 MT -0.06 Trend (9) 
which normalised (imposing the exactly identified restriction that the coefficient of 
MG equals one (A 1=1), becomes: 
MGt =- 29.1 MTt + 1.6 Trend (10) 
Which has the wrong sign on MT. The finding of a cointegrating vector was sensitive 
to changes in the specification. Indeed, when the CD dummy was not included or 
other dummies were included in its place (such as a dummy variable equal to 1 in 
1975-79 and zero otherwise), there was no evidence of any cointegrating relations in 
the data. This illustrates the care needed in dealing with such models. 
5.5.4. Empirical Results for the VECM with Income Variables 
These are clearly problematic results and may reflect the failure to specify the arms 
race correctly (e. g. failing to take account of the budget constraint). To consider this 
a VAR model in military expenditure and GDP variables, which were calculated 
from SIPRI figures for military expenditure and shares, was estimated. The GDP 
variables for Greece (YG) and Turkey (YT) were tested for unit roots (see Appendix 
B, Tables B4, B5 and B6) and were found to be 1(1) and non-nested tests suggested 
that the log equation was favoured over the levels one. The SBC indicated a second 
order VAR, while the AIC suggested a fifth order VAR (see Table 5.5.. ). 
102 
Table 5.5. Determination of the Order of the VAR for MG, MT, YG, YT, CD 
1965-96. Order of VAR=5, Variables included: MG, MT, YG, YT. Exogenous: CD 
Order LL AIC SBC LR LR Adjusted 
5 252.3095 164.3095 99.8172 ----- ----- 4 219.7961 147.7961 95.0296 X2 (16)=65.0 [. 000] 20.3 [. 206] 
3 200.8595 144.8595 103.8189 X2 (32)=102.9 [. 000] 32.2 [. 459] 
2 190.5405 150.5405 121.2258 X2 (48)=123.5 [. 000] 38.6 [. 832] 
1 160.7833 136.7833 119.1945 X2 (64)=183.1 [. 000] 57.2 [. 714] 
0 35.3838 27.3838 21.5209 X2 (80)=433.8 [. 000] 135.6 [. 000] 
A joint Likelihood ratio test for the exclusion of the GDP variables gave x2(8) = 
42.9, which is well above the 5% critical value, suggesting that income is important. 
Moving on to test whether the variables are cointegrated assuming unrestricted 
intercepts and restricted trends in a VAR(2) gave the results on Table 5.6. below: 
Table 5.6. Cointegration Tests with Unrestricted Intercepts and Restricted 
Trends for MG, MT, YG, YT (in logs) and Step Dummy 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
35 observations from 1962 to 1996. Order of VAR =2 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: MG, MT, YG, YT, Trend 
List of 1(0) variables included in the VAR: CD 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: . 
73987 
. 
39033 
. 
23874 
. 
20338 0.00 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r=1 47.1299 31.7900 29.1300 
r <= 1r=2 17.3192 25.4200 23.1000 
r <= 2r=39.5471 19.2200 17.1800 
r <= 3r=47.9582 12.3900 10.5500 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r >= 1 81.9544 63.0000 59.1600 
r <= 1r >= 2 34.8244 42.3400 39.3400 
r <= 2r >= 3 17.5053 25.7700 23.0800 
r <= 3r=47.9582 12.3900 10.5500 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL 
r=0 170.9986 
r=1 194.5636 
r=2 203.2232 
r=3 207.9967 
r=4 211.9758 
AIC SBC HQC 
146.9986 128.3345 140.5558 
162.5636 137.6780 153.9731 
165.2232 135.6716 155.0220 
165.9967 133.3344 154.7217 
167.9758 133.7582 156.1639 
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The LR tests based on both the eigenvalues and the trace suggest one cointegrating 
vector, though only the SBC test results are consistent with this. Estimating this as a 
cointegrating VAR gave the long run solution: 
Zt = -0.42 MG +1.7 MT +0.7 GY -0.59 YT -0.05 Trend (11) 
which normalised becomes: 
MGt = 4.01 MTt + 1.64 YGt -1.38 YTt - 0.13 Trend (12) 
This relationship is again difficult to interpret. Looking at the coefficients it is 
possible that this is a relation in shares and this was tested using overidentifying 
restrictions (that the coefficient on YG is -1 and the coefficients of MT and YT sum 
to 0) giving: 
(MG - YG) = 4.98 (MT - YT) + 0.08 Trend (13) 
This does not give sensible coefficient values and when the dynamic properties of the 
system were investigated, the system converged quickly (see Figure B3 in Appendix 
B) but the impulse response was slow and had the wrong feedbacks. The restrictions 
were also rejected by the data with x2 (2) = 12.8. The VECM estimates for the just 
identified system were: 
OMGt =2.43+0.1 OOMGt_, - 0.060MTt_, - 0.580YG t_, - 0.260YT t_, +0.10Zt_, +0.12CDt 
(14) 
(2.74) (0.55) (0.39) (2.17) (1.36) (2.68) (2.10) 
R' =0.29; SER=0.09; DW=2.02 
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AMT, =5.10 - 0.270MG, _, +0.370MT, _, - 
0.590YG, 
_, -0.62AYT, _, +0.21Z, _, +0.24CD, 
(15) 
(6.83) (1.86) (2.64) (2.61) (3.80) (6.76) (4.91) 
R2 =0.69; SER=0.07; DW=2.08 
(t-ratios in brackets) 
The diagnostic tests as well as the equations for GDP are reported in Appendix B, 
Tables B7 and B8, respectively. 
For the Greek equation, four of the seven coefficients are significant at 5%, although 
the specification easily passes the tests for first order serial correlation, functional 
form, normality and heteroscedasticity (see Table B8 in Appendix B for Diagnostic 
tests). The equation for Turkey is a better specification in terms of the coefficient 
estimates, with six of the seven significant, but fails the tests for functional form x2 
(1) = 7.68. Cusum and Cusum squared tests suggest structural stability (see Figures 
B4) B5, B6 and B7 in Appendix B), while the persistence profiles to system wide 
shocks are fairly similar (see Figures B8 and B9 in Appendix B). The persistence 
profile of system wide shocks to the CVs show a relatively fast convergence, around 
3 years (see Figure B 10 in Appendix B). The coefficients on Z1 and Z2 measure the 
speed at which any disequilibrium is removed and suggest that Turkey adjusts 
quicker than Greece. Again there seems to be some evidence of cointegration, but 
not in the form of a long run arms race model and the results are sensitive to the 
specification used. 
If the cointegrating VAR is estimated with unrestricted intercepts and no trend the 
results in the Table 5.7. below are found: 
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Table 5.7. Cointegration Tests with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends for 
MG, MT, YG, YT (in logs) and Step Dummy 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
35 observations from 1962 to 1996. Order of VAR =2 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: MG, MT, YG, YT 
List of 1(0) variables included in the VAR: CD 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: . 
68683 
. 
38973 
. 
20598 
. 
17482 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r=1 40.6348 27.4200 24.9900 
r <= 1r=2 17.2848 21.2000 19.0200 
r <= 2r=38.0725 14.8800 12.9800 
r <= 3r=46.7253 8.0700 6.5000 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r >= 1 72.7173 48.8800 45.7000 
r <= 1r >= 2 32.0825 31.5400 28.7800 
r <= 2r >= 3 14.7978 17.8600 15.7500 
r <= 3r=46.7253 8.0700 6.5000 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 170.9986 146.9986 128.3345 140.5558 
r=1 191.3160 160.3160 136.2081 151.9940 
r=2 199.95 84 163.95 84 13 5.9622 154.2941 
r=3 203.9947 164.9947 134.6654 154.5250 
r -- 4 207.3573 167.3573 136.2503 156.6192 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
Although the different tests give conflicting results, based on the Maximal 
Eigenvalue test one cointegrating vector can be identified and this gives the 
following long run relation: 
Zt = MGt - 
3.86 MTt -1.35 YGt +3.07 Ytt (16) 
Looking at the coefficients and remembering that the variables are in logs suggests 
that the long run relation may be in a ratio form, between the military burdens. 
Imposing the overidentifying restriction that the coefficient on YG was equal to -1 
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gave x2 (1) = 0.675, which is not significant at 5%. Adding the restriction that the 
coefficients on MT and YT sum to 0 gave a value x2 (2) = 20.57 for the joint test 
which is significant. This rejects a long run solution between the military burdens 
and suggests : 
Zt = (MGt - YGt )-4.3 9MTt + 3.21 YTt (17) 
or (MGt - YGt )=4.39MTt - 3.21 YTt (18) 
Which again is not very meaningful. To progress, the possibility of a second 
cointegrating vector is considered as the results were not conclusive9. Estimating a 
VAR(2) with two cointegrating vectors gave the following: 
Vector 1: Zt = -0.45MGt + 1.75MTt + 0.61 YGt - 1.39 YTt (18) 
Vector 2: Zt = 1.18MGt - 1.29MTt - 1.66 YGt + 1.32 YTt (19) 
This again suggests a relation between the shares in the second cointegrating 
regression. Imposing the exactly identifying restrictions on'Vector 1 that al=l; a3=0; 
and Vector2 bl=1 b3=-1 and adding the overidentifying restriction that b2+b4=0 
gave x' (1) = 1.06 which is not significant at 5% (for testing the restrictions, see 
Johansen, 1995). This gives: 
Zt = (MGt - YG) - 0.472(MTt - YTt) (20) 
9 In fact, a small sample adjustment such as that of Reimers is likely to tend to reject r=2, but it was 
thought worthwhile looking at the r=2 case. 
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which suggests that the long run solution is for the Greek military burden to be just 
under half of the Turkish one. However, it is not possible to find any meaningful 
interpretation or restrictive form for the first cointegrating relation' °. 
Other identifying restrictions, (e. g. two reaction functions with the restriction that 
each country's demand depended only on its own income, or each share is 1(0)) also 
did not give sensible results. Overall, there is some evidence of cointegration in 
Greece and Turkey, but not in the form of a long run arms race. The results obtained 
are difficult to interpret and very sensitive to minor features of the specification' 1. 
Greece and Turkey are in a complex strategic environment, both members of NATO, 
concerned about a Soviet threat for much of the period. Furthermore, Turkey faces 
internal conflict with the Kurds and Greece is quite concerned about the instability in 
the neighbouring Balkan countries. The strength of their antagonism waxed and 
waned with internal and external political developments and they adopted rather 
different military force structures. Thus, it is not surprising that the evolution of their 
military expenditures over a period of 35 years cannot be described by a simple 
mechanical rule. The next section considers a more general approach to the 
determinants of military expenditure. 
10 When two cointegrating vectors are selected (r=2), the model makes sense. When r is wrongly 
selected the size of the test has a large right shift. 
" Alternative specifications of the model using stocks of weapons/military spending, as 
discussed in 
Smith et al (1999) were tried but failed to provide sensible results. 
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5.6. General Models of Aggregate Defence Spending 
The second group of studies (the general models of aggregate defence spending) 
either focuses on the pure economic or political determinants of military expenditure 
or considers all possible influences of military expenditure (economic, political, 
strategic) and tries to operationalise them in empirical analysis. By combining all 
possible influences, these studies provide a more complete picture of the 
determinants of military expenditure. 
These studies usually start by defining a welfare function which is maximised subject 
to resource and security constraints. There is a wide variety of forms used for the 
welfare function as well as for the security and budget constraints. Smith (1980b) 
assumed a constant elasticity of substitution utility function for the UK while 
McGuire (1987) used a Stone-Geary utility function for Israel, Dunne et al (1984) 
employed a Deaton-Muellbauer functional form to estimate the determinants of UK's 
defence and other government spending and Hewitt (1991) used a Cobb-Douglas 
welfare function for a cross section of countries. 
5.6.1. General Models of Aggregate Defence Spending for Greece 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (1993) investigated the strategic determinants of Greek 
military expenditure by a long-run equilibrium demand function and an error 
correction model. They concluded that Greek defence spending was strongly 
influenced by Turkish military expenditure for the period 1962-1988. Kollias (1994, 
1996) ended up to similar conclusions. Avramides (1997) using both a Stone-Geary 
utility function and a restricted Deaton Muellbauer system, 
found that Greece 
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responds to Turkish military expenditure and as for the alliance effect (NATO) that 
Greece is a follower in the short-run and a free-rider in the long-run. Antonakis and 
Karavidas (1990) and Antonakis (1995,1997a) investigating the determinants for 
military expenditure in Greece over the post-war period found that the demand for 
military expenditure is not motivated by economic factors. 
5.7. Methodology and Specification of the Aggregate Defence Spending Model 
A simple demand model is developed here to reflect the features of the Greek 
economy (see Smith, 1980; Dunne and Mohammed, 1995). Within the Neoclassical 
framework, the state as a `rational actor' tries to maximise social welfare subject to a 
budget constraint. The social welfare function is determined by the state (based on 
individual preferences or on the median voter) and military expenditure is 
determined by balancing the opportunity cost and the security benefits they provide. 
So, social welfare is a function of utility derived from private consumption C (non- 
military) I security S (produced by military expenditure), other government 
expenditure G and some other political and strategic factors Z (exogenous). So, the 
social welfare function (W) will be: 
W=W(C, S, G, Z) (21) 
The level of security (S) will depend on military expenditure conditioned on the 
political and strategic factors (Z). So, the following security constraint will apply: 
S_=S(M, Z) (22) 
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Assuming that Greek national output (Y) is devoted to military (M) and civilian uses 
(C), the usual budget constraint will be: 
Y= Pm M+ Pc C (23) 
where Pn, and P, are the prices of M and C relative to an income deflator. 
Maximising the social welfare function subject to the security and budget constraints, 
the demand for Greek military expenditure can be modelled as: 
M=D (Y, Z, P. , P, ) (24) 
Prices can be dropped from the equation without biasing the results since there is not 
a separate price deflator for military goods in Greece. Based on the above 
considerations, the equation that best describes the determinants of Greek military 
expenditures should incorporate economic, political and strategic effects all of which 
need to be specified and quantified. This leads to the following specification: 
M=M (GDPC, POP, NG, TB, NATO, TM, M(-1), CYP, POL) (25) 
where : 
M: share of military expenditure in GDP 
GDPC: GDP per capita in constant 1990 mn US $ 
POP: population (in `000s) 
NG: share of government expenditure (excluding military) in GDP 
TB: share of trade balance (exports - imports of goods and services) in GDP 
NATO: NATO's share of military expenditure in GDP 
TM: Turkish share of military expenditure in 'GDP 
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CYP: dummy variable to account for the perceived Turkish threat after the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus (takes the value of I for the years 1974-1996 and 0 elsewhere). 
POL: dummy variable to account for the military government (takes the value of 1 
for the years 1967-74 and 0 elsewhere) 
Defence is a considered a public good and conventional public finance theory 
suggests that the levels of military spending should be positively related to income. 
This should be captured by the positive coefficient of real GDP per capita (GDPC). 
However, once a country attains a certain degree of security, further increases in 
income leave defence budgets relatively unchanged, thus, leading to reductions in 
military spending shares (Antonakis, 1997a). If this were the case for Greece, then 
the coefficient of GDPC would be negatively related to the share of military 
spending (M). Following Deger's (1986) study, population (POP) is also introduced 
as a proxy variable to capture the public good effect of military spending with an 
expected positive sign. 
The inclusion of the share of non-military government expenditure (NG) in the 
model represents the economic burden of defence and is expected to enter the 
equation with a negative sign to account for the opportunity cost of defence. The 
share of the trade balance in GDP (TB) reflects the openness of the economy and its 
sign is ambiguous. To account for the strategic and political factors that played an 
important role in military spending during 1960-1996, two dummy variables are 
introduced. POL to capture the effect of the military government that was in power 
for seven years (1967-74) and CYP, an impulse dummy for the year 
1974 to capture 
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the effect that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Although military governments12 tend 
to spend more on defence this is not a general fact and as Dunne and Mohammed 
(1995) claimed that "... there is unlikely to be a simple dichotomy between military 
and non-military governments" (Dunne & Mohammed, 1995, p. 335). As such. the 
sign of POL cannot be predetermined. The second dummy variable captures the 
threat of war, the expected sign is positive. Since Greece is a member of the NATO 
alliance, the inclusion of the alliance's military burden, excluding Greece and 
Turkey, seemed reasonable in order to account for the spill-in effect. If the sign on 
NATO is positive Greece is a `follower', otherwise a 'free-rider'. Turkey's military 
burden (TM) is introduced to see whether Greece's military burden depends on the 
44 
enemy's" military burden. Finally, the lagged value of the dependent (M) is 
introduced to account for inertia, such as hangover from previous expenditures or 
commitments to programmes (Dunne and Mohammed, 1995). 
5.8. Data and Empirical Results 
Data for the Greek, Turkish and NATO military burden (the share of military 
expenditure in GDP) come from various SIPRI Yearbooks. Data on government 
expenditure, trade balance, population and GDP per capita (in 1990 mn US $) come 
from the EUROSTAT database. Specifically, the share of non-military government 
expenditure was constructed by deducting military expenditure (taken from SIPRI) 
from general government expenditure and was then divided by GDP (taken from 
EUROSTAT). All variables were tested for unit roots by Dickey-Fuller tests and 
12 Military governments are thought to spend more on defence. But as Zuk and 
Thompson (1982) 
claimed, ceteris paribus, military governments do not spend more on 
defence than the civilian ones. 
11 3 
were found to be non-stationary, while their first differences had no unit roots and so 
the differenced series are used for the estimation (the DF and ADF tests are reported 
in Appendix B, Table B9). The proposed equation of the demand for military 
expenditure for Greece over the period 1960-96 is the following: 
DM=DM (DGDPC, DPOP, DNG, DTB, DNATO, DTM, DM(-1), CYP, POL) (26) 
where D in front of a variable indicates first-difference. 
In estimating this model over the period 1960-96, the data were allowed to determine 
the particular short-run dynamic form using a general to specific methodology for 
testing exclusion restrictions. Surprisingly, the coefficient of the dummy for the 
military government in Greece (POL) although positive was insignificant and the 
same applied for the population variable (DPOP). Joint tests of zero restrictions on 
the coefficients of these variables could not be rejected (LR X2(2)=2.26) suggesting 
that they were both individually and jointly insignificant and as such they were 
13 excluded from the model. Further specification searches led to : 
DM=0.12 -0.56DGPC_l -0.44DNG-0.15DTB_1+0.27DTM_1+0.50NATO+2.42CYP-0.14DM_, 
(1.83) (2.11) (4.31) (3.98) (2.50) (1.42) (6.58) (1.22) 
(27) 
R2=0.73, DW=2.00 
13 Note that this is a VAR model of the Sims (1980) type. Finding cointegration earlier might 
suggest that this equation has a small moving average error and a unit root when the error structure 
is 
modelled in a system, due to partial differencing. 
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The results support the initial expectations for the effect of the change in non- 
military government expenditure (DNG), which is significant and negative indicating 
the opportunity cost of defence, and for the Cyprus dummy, which is significant and 
positive. The change in previous year's income (DGDPC_1) is negative and 
significant, which implies that increases in income will not lead to increases in 
defence budgets; this further implies that defence is an inferior good. The effect of 
the lagged value of the change in Turkish military burden (DTM_1) is positive and 
significant. This suggests that Greek defence spending is influenced by the "potential 
enemy's" spending, but it is not influenced by NATO's spending, as NATO although 
positive is not significant. The lagged value of the change in the share of trade 
balance in GDP (DTB_1) is negative and significant while Greek military burden does 
not seem to depend on previous year's burden4 1 
These "rational actor" models of military expenditure have attracted a lot of 
criticism. Governments are not always unified rational actors but coalitions 
operating in a political and bureaucratic environment (Smith, 1995). Defence policy 
can be affected by lobbying, class interests, bureaucratic and interest group models 
(see Smith, 1977,1980b; Griffin, Wallace and Devine, 1982; Sandler and Hartley, 
1995). 
Given these limitations, empirical findings for the case of Greece suggest that the 
determinants of military expenditure are unlikely to be found in economic factors but 
14 Tests for serial correlation are relevant. If they are not significant, this confirms the result that the 
levels appear in the Turkish but not in the Greek equation for military expenditure and in this case the 
Greek behaviour would be weakly exogenous to the Turkish behaviour. 
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rather in strategic factors - namely the perceived threat from the neighbouring 
country, Turkey. 
5.9. Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the causes of high military expenditure in Greece. Given 
the poor economic performance of the country and its security considerations, it was 
expected that economic factors would not play an important role in determining 
Greek military burden. This was indeed supported by empirical evidence. 
Specifically two different models were considered: an arms race model and a general 
model of aggregate defence spending. 
The long-term animosity between Greece and Turkey has led historians and political 
commentators to argue that there exists an arms race between the two countries, 
which explains the high levels of their military expenditures. Although a widely held 
view, it is not fully supported by the empirical evidence provided by previous studies 
and by that provided in this chapter. The deficiencies of the classical Richardson 
arms race model are to be blamed for the poor empirical performance and the 
inconclusive results. 
Recent econometric techniques (unit root tests and cointegration) were applied to 
deal with most of the deficiencies that arise from the Richardson model. The 
analysis provided evidence of a long-run relationship between Greek and Turkish 
military burdens (suggesting that income variables are important) but not in the form 
of a long-run Richardson type arms race. So, although it can be said that there is 
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something going on between the two countries this is definitely not an arms race in 
the classical Richardson form. This might be due to the fact that both countries are 
in a more complex environment especially Turkey with a number of conflicts and 
potential conflicts. Also, another important factor that might affect the spending 
patterns of the two countries is that they are both members of the NATO alliance. 
One implication of this could be that both countries before the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact had a common threat (the containment of communism) and that this 
was affecting their procurement decisions. 
As far as the general model of aggregate defence spending is concerned, the 
empirical findings suggested that strategic factors and not economic ones play an 
important role in determining Greek military burden. Specifically, the Greek 
military burden is determined by the Turkish military burden and the threat of war 
after 1974 as captured by a dummy variable. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A GRANGER CAUSALITY APPROACH FOR THE 
DEFENCE - GROWTH RELATIONSHIP IN GREECE 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter, instead of assuming exogeneity or endogeneity of the defence variable 
in the growth equation or instead of relying on the implicit assumption that defence 
is causally prior to economic growth - as most of the previous studies have done, it 
systematically analyses the presence and direction of the causal relationship between 
the two variables in Greece over the period 1960-96. In other words it investigates 
whether the rate of output growth affects defence outlays or defence outlays affect 
the rate of output growth. 
The contribution of the analysis that follows, lies on the fact that in addition to 
standard `pre-cointegration' Granger causality techniques, a vector autoregression 
methodology (hereafter VAR) that utilises cointegration via Granger's representation 
theorem is employed. The VAR specification has become increasingly popular in 
the applied econometrics literature in recent years, its main advantage being that such 
models are dynamic specifications, free of economic assumptions imposed a priori. 
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"Thus, they allow for the testing of causal linkages without the need to first construct 
arguments and develop hypotheses justifying those linkages ", (Georgiou et al, 1996, 
p. 233). 
The rest of this chapter discusses the methodology to be employed, the empirical 
results obtained and the conclusions. 
6.2. Methodology Employed 
The approach adopted in this chapter is to analyse the statistical causality' of military 
burden and economic growth within a VAR framework, starting off by investigating 
the integration properties of the two series. If the two series are integrated of the 
same order (i. e. they both are I(1)), Granger causality must exist in at least one 
direction, at least in the 1(0) variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). The Granger 
representation theorem demonstrates how to model cointegrated I(1) series in the 
form of a VAR model. The VAR can be constructed in terms of the levels of the 
data or in terms of their first differences with the addition of an error correction term 
(hereafter ECT) to capture the short run dynamics. These features are used as pre- 
test strategy to establish whether causality exists prior to identifying the direction via 
standard Granger-type tests. Specifically, the empirical analysis will rely on the 
following steps: 
1 For a discussion on exogeneity and Granger causality, see Appendix H. 
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6.2.1. Testing for unit roots 
The first step prior to applying the Granger causality tests is to establish the 
integration properties of the Greek time series by employing the Dickey-Fuller 
(1979) unit root tests. According to these, for a time series, Xt, DF test is based on 
an autoregression that includes either only an intercept or both an intercept and a 
linear trend. For the first case, where only an intercept is included, the following 
autoregression takes place: 
k 
Axt = ßo + (XI xt-i +Ya; Axt-] + Et (1) 
i=1 
and for the second case (where both an intercept and a linear trend is included), the 
autoregression is: 
Axt = ßo + ßi t+ a1 xt-1 +ýai Axt-i + Et (2) 
1=1 
In both cases the null hypothesis of a unit root is the same (Ho: a, = 0) but the 
critical values differ. The maximum lag order2 , 
k, is selected according to some 
information criteria which usually give quite contradictory results. 
2 Lagged differences of the series are added to "whiten" the error of the autoregressions 
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6.2.2. Testing for Cointegration 
It is important to establish the integration properties of the involved time series to 
justify further cointegration analysis. If both series are integrated of the same order 
(i. e. they are found to be I(1)), then there might exist a long-run relationship between 
them - that is the two series might be cointegrated. Hence, the second step involves 
testing for cointegration via Johansen's (1988) maximum likelihood approach3. If 
cointegration exists then either unidirectional or bi-directional Granger causality 
must exist in at least the 1(0) variables. Furthermore, the existence of a long-run 
relationship between them will have important consequences when examining the 
short-run Granger causality. 
6.2.3. Granger Causality Tests 
The third step involves the construction of the standard Granger causality tests 
augmented with an appropriate error correction term derived from the long-run 
cointegrating relationship in case such a relationship exists. Granger tests presume 
the use of stationary data so, they must be applied on 1(0) series in order to derive 
valid inferences. The standard Granger causality test (when cointegration is not taken 
into account) assumes that the information for the prediction of the variables Xt and 
Zt is contained only in the time-series data of these variables. The test involves 
estimating the following regressions: 
The common approach followed in the literature is the two step Engle-Granger procedure, according 
to which the series are initially tested for unit roots and if they are integrated of the same order then 
the residuals of the static model are tested for unit roots. If the residuals contain no unit roots, then the 
series cointegrate and the lagged value of the residuals can be included in the short-run model as the 
ECT. But testing for cointegration under this procedure has lower power against the Johansen 
procedure (see Harris, 1995) 
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kk 
Xt ai Zt-i +lß. i X, -. i 
+ult (3) 
i=1 J=1 
mm 
Zt =IA, Zt-; +I gj Xt -j + 
u2t (4) 
r=1 J=1 
Equation 3 postulates that current X is related to past values of X itself as well as of 
Z and equation 4 postulates a similar behaviour for Z. Generally, if Z Granger causes 
X, then changes in Z should precede changes in X. Therefore, in a regression of X 
on other variables (including its own past values) if past or lagged values of Z are 
included and they significantly improve the prediction of X, then it can be said that Z 
Granger causes X. A similar definition if X Granger causes Z. 
A final consideration in estimating the equations is the possibility of structural 
change. That is, the parameter values may change through time which is very likely 
to have happened in the time period examined here. A Chow test will be performed 
in order to determine whether the parameters of the model remained constant during 
the whole period covered by the data. In case a structural break is present, it will be 
accounted for by introducing a dummy variable. In the section that follows, 
empirical results are presented under three specifications: the standard Granger 
causality test, the one augmented by the ECT, and the one augmented by both the 
ECT and dummy variables that account for structural breaks in the data. 
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6.3. Data and Empirical Results 
Following the methodology outlined above, this section starts by testing the 
integration properties of the two series, namely the logarithm of Greek GDP (Yt) and 
Greek military burden (SMt). Data for the GDP series in 1990 mn US dollars were 
taken from EUROSTAT and for the military burden series from SIPRI. Table Cl ' in 
Appendix C gives the Dickey Fuller tests for unit roots of various lag orders when 
only an intercept is included. According to these tests the null hypothesis of no unit 
roots is rejected for both series. But before concluding about the integration 
properties of the series, DF tests with an intercept and a linear trend must also be 
examined. These results are presented in Table C2 in the Appendix and also indicate 
that the logarithm of GDP and the military burden (the share of military expenditure 
in GDP) contain a unit root, and appear to be I(1), (integrated of order one). 
Figure 6.1. Greek Military Burden* 
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Source: SIPRI 
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There is persistence of military burden to either low spending levels, when the 
burden is low, or to persistently higher spending levels, when burden is high. Indeed, 
one observes that a considerably higher proportion of Greece's GDP is devoted to 
defence spending after 1974 (after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus) than before. (See 
Figure 6.1. As for the Greek GDP series, one can easily note a drop in real GDP in 
the year of the invasion (see figure 6.2). See, also, Figure 6.3 where the annual 
percentage change in the two series is presented and according to which for the year 
1974 Greek GDP grew at a negative rate of around 0.4% while for the same year 
military burden had an impressive growth rate of around 40%. 
Figure 6.2. Greek GDP in 1990 mn US $ 
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To justify the conclusion that the series (Greek GDP and Greek defence burden) are 
I(1), the DF tests for the differenced series are also presented in Table C3 in the 
Appendix. If the differenced series are proved to be stationary, then by induction, the 
level series are I(1). If on the other hand, the differenced series are still non- 
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stationary, but the second differenced series are stationary that means that the levels 
series are 1(2) and so on. For the first differenced series the hypothesis of a unit root 
is rejected at 95% level of significance. So, there is no doubt that the level series are 
I(1). Also, the plot of the two differenced series in Figure 6.3, shows a stationary 
behaviour with a possible outlier for 1974 (the year of the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus). 
Figure 6.3. Annual Percentage Change in Greek GDP and Military Burden* 
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Having established the integration properties of the series, which are integrated of the 
same order [1(1)] as was shown in the previous section, it can be examined whether 
there is a long-run relationship between them. In other words it can be tested 
whether cointegration exists between the logarithm of real Greek GDP (Y) and the 
Greek military burden. If they are cointegrated, this will have important 
consequences when examining short-run Granger causality between them. 
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Table 6.1. Cointegration Tests for Military Burden and the log of GDP 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR for Greece 
36 observations from 1961 to 1996. Order of VAR =1 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: Y, SM, Intercept 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: . 79953 . 15350 0.00 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r=1 57.8560 15.8700 13.8100 
r <= 1r=25.9991 9.1600 7.5300 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0 r>= 1 63.8551 20.1800 17.8800 
r <= 1r=25.9991 9.1600 7.5300 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 194.2370 194.2370 194.2370 194.2370 
r=1 223.1650 219.1650 215.9980 218.0597 
r=2 226.1646 220.1646 215.4140 218.5065 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion, SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
Testing for cointegration using Johansen's (1988) ML cointegration method, a 
VAR(1) model with restricted intercept, as the two series are quite different in nature 
is estimated (See Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Table 6.1. gives the results of two tests for 
cointegration - the Likelihood Ratio test based on the maximum Eigenvalues of the 
stochastic matrix and one based on the Trace of the stochastic matrix. It also 
presents the various selection criteria for the choice of the number of cointegrating 
vectors. The null hypothesis of no cointegration (Ho: r=0) is rejected by both tests in 
favour of the alternative (r=1), indicating that there is one cointegrating vector in the 
Greek series. Results from a VAR(2) model point to the same conclusions. As for 
the selection criteria, it is very common to give contradictory results as far as the 
choice of the number of cointegrating vectors is concerned, and as such one should 
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not rely on them (Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997). Nevertheless, the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion suggests the choice of one cointegrating vector. 
The existence of one cointegrating vector between the series should be taken into 
consideration when the short-run causality between the variables is examined. On 
the basis of such results it can be established that Yt and SMt are causally related, 
since they are cointegrated, but to find the direction of the causality, the standard 
Granger tests must be augmented by the error correction term4 (ECT), which is 
derived from the long-run cointegrating relationship. The cointegrating regression 
for Greece is: 
Yt = 9.34 + 28.82 SMt + £t (5) 
(36.64) (6.28) 
Bearing these results in mind, the cointegrating series can be modelled as a VAR. 
The choice of the VAR's order (the lag-length) was made on the basis of Akaine's 
final prediction error and a second order VAR model is accepted (see Table C4 in the 
Appendix). Three specifications of the VAR models are presented. First, the 
standard Granger causality test (that is the existence of cointegration is ignored), 
second, the Granger causality test augmented by the error correction term derived 
from the cointegrating regression and finally, the above specifications are further 
augmented by dummy variables to capture possible structural breaks in the data. 
4 
The ECT is nothing more than the lagged value of the estimated residuals from equation 5. 
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An important feature of the Granger causality tests (as mentioned earlier) is that they 
presume the use of stationary data. Since both the Greek level variables are I(l ), 
their first differences which are stationary [1(0)] must be used. So, the VAR(2) for 
Greece when cointegration is ignored is: 
AY = ao + al AY(-1) + a2 DY(-2) + a3 OSM(-1) + a4OSM(-2) +u (6) 
ASM = ßo + ßI ýýSM(-1) + ß2 ASM(-2) + ß3 AY(-1) + ß4 AY(-2) +s (7) 
The null hypothesis in equation 6 is that ASM(-1) and ASM(-2) do not Granger cause 
AY (Ho: a3 = a4 = 0) and in equation 7 that AY(-1) and AY(-2) do not Granger cause 
ASM (Ho: P3 = ß4 = 0). Results on Table 6.2 for the standard Granger causality test 
(column 1) indicate that defence is causally prior to economic growth while there is 
no causality running from growth to defence. Given the positive and highly 
significant sign of the defence term in the growth equation, it appears that defence 
promotes growth. The Lagrange Multiplier test, the Likelihood Ratio test and the F 
statistic, all suggest that military burden Granger causes economic growth at 5% 
level of significance with the effect being positive. 
When the long-run relationship that exists between Greek growth and military 
burden is taken into account by introducing the ECT from equation 5 in the Granger 
causality tests, the VAR(2) model for Greece is: 
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AY = ao + a, AY(-1)+ a2 DY(-2) + a3 OSM(-1) + a4 OSM(-2) + yj ECT(-1) +u (8) 
ASM = ßo + (31 OSM(-1)+ ß2 OSM(-2)+ ß3 DY(-1) + ß4 DY(-2) +'Y2 ECT(-1) +E (9) 
Table 6.2. Granger Causality Results of a VAR(2) for Greece (1963-96) 
Dependent AY Dependent ASM 
Eq. 8 Eq. 10 Eq. 12 Eq. 9 Eq. 11 Eq. 13 
AY(-1) 0.44 0.35 -0.02 -0.02 -0.009 -0.04 
(2.49)* * (2.21)* * (0.10) (0.54) (0.28) (0.76) 
AY(-2) 0.28 0.18 -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 
(1.68) (1.16) (0.47) (0.79) (1.13) (0.47) 
OSM(-1) 2.67 1.43 0.88 0.008 0.14 0.11 
(2.75)*** (1.45) (0.96) (0.04) (0.70) (0.50) 
ASM(-2) 0.02 -0.68 -0.25 -0.07 0.005 0.03 
(0.02) (0.68) (0.27) (0.35) (0.02) (0.16) 
Constant 0.008 0.02 0.07 0.001 0.001 0.003 
(1.04) (2.19)** (3.40)*** (0.09) (0.51) (0.58) 
ECT(-1) -0.06 -0.06 0.006 0.006 
(2.77)*** (3.33)*** (1.46) (1.36) 
D74 -0.04 -0.003 
(2.71)** (0.81) 
R2 0.43 0.55 0.65 0.04 0.11 0.14 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.005 0.005 0.005 
DW 1.87 1.92 1.99 2.05 2.10 2.08 
Causality Tests 
LM X2(2)=7.0 X2(2)=2.89 X2(2)=1.20 X2 (2)=O X2(2)=1. X2(2)=1.09 
9 [. 236] [. 549] . 75 56 
[. 579] 
[. 029] [. 687] [. 458] 
LR X2(2)=7.9 X2(2)=3.02 X2(2)=1.22 X2(2)=0 X2(2)=1. X2(2)=1.11 
5 [. 221] [. 543] . 76 60 
[. 574] 
[. 019] [. 684] [. 450] 
F F(2,29)=3. F(2,28)=1.3 F(2,27)=0. F(2,29) F(2,28)= F(2,27)=0.4 
8 [. 289] 5 =0.3 0.7 [. 643] 
[. 034] [. 615] [. 723] [. 518] 
t-ratios for regression results in parenthesis and probabilities for causality tests in brackets 
Again in equation 8, the null hypothesis is that ASM(-1) and ASM(-2) do not 
Granger cause AY, (Ho: a3 = a4 = 0) and in equation 9 that AY(-1) and AY(-2) do not 
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Granger cause OSM (Ho: ß3 = ßq = 0). Results in Table 6.2 (column 2) show that the 
existence of the unidirectional Granger causality from defence to growth is not 
sustained once the ECT is added. The null hypothesis that military burden does not 
Granger cause economic growth can not be rejected according to the LM, LR and F 
tests. So, now there is absence of any causal relationship between the two series. 
Finally, the hypothesis of structural stability in the data during the whole period 
examined was rejected by a Chow test 5 [X2 (6)=22.28 at 1% level of significance] 
suggesting the use of a dummy variable. A dummy variable D74 taking the value of 
zero before 1974 and one thereafter is included in the above VAR models to capture 
the structural break in the data that occured after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 
From the results in Table 6.2, it is clear that the invasion had a significant negative 
effect on Greek growth. But again there is absence of any causal relationship 
between economic growth and military burden. 
The analysis provided in this chapter showed that if the usual approach to Granger 
causality testing was taken, (column 1 of Table 6.2. ), the conclusion would be that 
military burden has a significant positive effect upon growth, with no significant 
effect from military burden to growth. Military spending would appear to Granger 
cause growth. This is, however, the result of a misspecification as the standard 
Granger causality testing fails to allow for the long run properties of the data and the 
possible structural break caused by the shock of the Cyprus invasion. When either or 
both of these are considered the significant positive effect disappears and there is no 
causality from military burden to growth nor vice versa. 
r the Chow test the data were split 
in two groups: 1960-1973 and 1974-1996 
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These results are in contrast to those of Joerding (1986)6 who found that causality 
runs from growth to defence with little evidence of causality from defence to growth 
for 57 LDCs over the period 1962-77. But Joerding did not account for the long-run 
relationship that might have existed in his data nor for structural breaks and 
information unique for each country in his sample. On the other hand, Chowdhury 
(1991) and Kusi (1994) did not find any causality between defence spending and 
growth for most of the 55 and 77 LDCs respectively. And although this supports the 
findings reported here, it comes from generalising the findings from many countries, 
failing to capture specific information unique for each country. Among the studies 
that have focused on cases of individual countries an interesing example that 
provides evidence of the importance that the Vector Autoregression and ECM can 
have on testing short-run causality is that of Chen (1993) and Hasan (1994). Chen 
(1993) employing the standard Granger causality test found no causal link for China 
but Hasan (1994) when reworking Chen's data with Vector autoregression (VAR) 
model found a positive effect of military spending on growth. Dunne and Vougas 
(1999) found that military burden has a negative impact on growth in South Africa, 
but only when analysed within a VAR framework. Two recent studies that employed 
the VAR methodology for Turkey (Kollias & Makrydakis, 1997a) and Greece 
(Kollias & Makrydakis, 1998) support the results here. 
6 But see Chapter 3, section 3.4 for a brief critic of this study. 
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6.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has empirically investigated the existence of a causal relation between 
defence spending and economic growth in Greece over the period 1960-1996. It has 
systematically analysed the presence and direction of the causal relationship between 
defence and growth, paying attention to the integration properties of the series and 
using vector autoregression methodology (VAR). In this way it has extended the 
methodology commonly employed and has shown that the standard approach can 
lead to spurious findings of Granger causality. This is the case for Greece, where a 
positive effect of military burden on growth is found for the standard Granger 
causality test, but does not survive the introduction of long run information, nor a 
dummy to allow for the impact of the Cyprus invasion in 1974. 
Granger causality tests have been widely criticised (see Jacobs et al, 1979) for being 
sensitive to a wide variety of factors, including structural changes over the period 
examined, stationarity of and cointegration across the variables. 
Ram (1995) warned that: "inferences based on these tests can be problematic and 
several notes of caution seem warranted even if one overlooks the inferential 
uncertainties inherent in such tests" (Ram, 1995, p. 263). But the methodology 
employed here has overcome many of the shortcomings that the standard Granger 
causality may have - especially when applied to a group of countries, in which case 
many of the unique characteristics of each country are ignored. Testing for Granger 
causality between the growth and military burden is still useful prior to developing 
the structural models which follow in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A SUPPLY-SIDE ANALYSIS FOR THE DEFENCE- 
GROWTH RELATIONSHIP IN GREECE 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter estimates the defence-growth relationship in Greece over the period 
1960-96 by employing an augmented Feder-type model consisting of the civilian, 
military, government and export sector. The model allows the identification of the 
size (total) effects of each sector on growth, externality effects and factor 
productivity differentials. The sensitivity of the model to the inclusion of each 
additional sector is also taken into consideration by reporting estimates for a two and 
a three-sector model over the same period. 
The contribution of this empirical investigation lies on the following features: It 
attempts to account for as many economic linkages as possible by decomposing the 
economy in four sectors (civilian, military, government and export) and it examines 
the sensitivity of the Feder-type model to the inclusion of the extra sectors. Also, in 
addition to the total (size) effects of each of the sectors on economic growth, it 
estimates the externalities and productivity differentials of each sector with respect to 
the `base' sector (civilian). In this way it overcomes many of the problems that arose 
in Alexander's (1990) four-sector model' with a very complicated set of externalities 
between sectors. As Ram (1995) suggested: 
"... extensions of Feder-type two-sector models to cover three or more sectors should 
be done cautiously...... such models might be more informative than two-sector 
formats and could attenuate the problem of omitted variables. However, it seems 
hazardous to use such multisector models to obtain separate information about the 
external effects and productivity differences relative to any sector", (Ram, 1995, 
p. 261). 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the methodology 
employed as well as the specification of the Feder-type model. Section 3 provides 
the data used and the description of the variables while Section 4 gives the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results and gives the main conclusions. 
7.2. Methodology and Model Specification 
The method followed in this chapter is to estimate the defence-growth relationship in 
Greece based on a widely used supply-side model, the Feder-type model. In the 
Neoclassical framework, Feder-type models for the defence-growth relationship 
have developed from Biswas and Ram (1986)2 who adopted Feder's (1982) model of 
the role of exports in economic growth, as a two-sector framework (military and 
civilian) to assess the externality effect of the military sector and the factor 
productivity variation between the two sectors. After them, many versions of the 
Feder model have been developed (i. e. assuming different sets of externalities or 
'See Section 3 of this chapter for a brief critique of Alexander (1990) study. 
2 Their estimates suggested that there is not any significant externality effect of military sector on 
civilian output and also that there is no statistically significant 
factor productivity difference across the 
two sectors. They concluded that military expenditure neither promotes nor 
retards growth in LDCs. 
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more sectors) with most of the studies employing cross-sectional methodologies. 3 
This type of model considers externalities between sectors and may explain both the 
size effect of defence expenditures as well as their externality effects and factor 
productivity differentials4. 
The form of the model used here assumes the economy consists of four sectors 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive: the civilian sector (C), the non-military 
government sector (G) , the export sector (X) and the military sector (M) so that total 
output of the economy is the sum of the civilian output, the non-military government 
output, the export output and the military output. That is: 
Y=C+G+X+M (1) 
Capital and labour are allocated among the four sectors at each point in time. So, 
that: 
K=Kc+KG+Kx+KM and 
L=Lc +LG +Lx+LM (2a, b) 
where uppercase subscripts denote the civilian sector (C), the non-military 
government sector (G), the export sector (X), and the defence sector (M). 
Each of the M, G and X sectors has an externality effect on the civilian (C) sector. 
For this approach the production functions for the four sectors are: 
Also see, Ward et al (1991), Ward & Davis (1992), Huang 
& Mintz (1991), Mintz & Huang (1990), 
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G-G(Ko>Lo) 
M-M(KM, LM) 
X=X (Kxý Lx ) 
C=C (Kc, Lc, G, X, M) 
where subscripts C, M, G, X denote sectoral inputs. 
(3a, b, c, d) 
Allowing for relative productivity differences between the "base" sector (civilian) 
and the other three sectors, i. e. by (1+6), the ratios of the marginal productivities for 
the sectors are: 
ML/CL=MKICK=(1 +b,,, ) 
GL CL = GK/ CK =(I + bg) 
XLICL=XK/CK=C1+6x) 
(4 a, b, c) 
where the uppercase subscripts on M, G, X, C denote partial derivatives (or marginal 
products) of labour and capital (i. e. ML=oM/eLm and MK = OM/OK,, ). Also, the size 
of M, G, X may act as "externality" factors for the civilian sector (C). In other 
words, the model also identifies marginal externality effects of each of the three 
sectors (M, G, X) on the civilian sector (C), so that: 
GK =(1 +bg) CK and GL = (1+ bg) CL 
XK = (I +5X) CK and XL = (I +'X) CL 
MK=(I+bm)CK and ML=(1+5m) CL 
(5a, b, c) 
Atesoglou & Mueller (1990), Mueller & Atesoglou (1993), Ward, Davis and Chan (1993). 
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where 6i is the relative factor productivity between the "base" sector and the other 
three sectors, If, for example, the productivity index for defence 8m is positive then 
the defence sector is more productive than the civilian sector. A zero value for Sm 
would indicate the absence of a productivity difference while a negative value for bm 
would indicate that the civilian sector is more productive. 
Due to the unavailability of sectoral input data the model is reformulated in terms of 
aggregate inputs. The general equation for this approach that gives the total effect 
can be derived by manipulating the production functions (see Feder, 1982, 
Ram, 1986,1989,1995) : 
ý+Yý 
, _2 
cc . Cl' 
+C, Y; I 
1+61 y 
('6) 
where a is the marginal product of capital in sector C (civilian), ß is the elasticity 
type measure equal to CL(L/Y), and [8i/1+6; +C; ] is the sum of the externality and 
factor productivity differences (the overall effect of sector i on economic 
performance). (6j/1+6i ) alone is the relative productivity effect of the i sector on 
economic growth while C, alone represents the marginal externality effect of the i 
sector on the civilian sector (Huang and Mintz, 1991). Note that the full derivation 
of the Feder-type model is given in Appendix D. 
Based on (6), the four-sector model in which the total effect of each of the sectors 
can be measured is the following: 
4 See, Chapter 3 of this thesis for a review of the studies that employ the 
Feder-type model. 
137 
.T. 
Y=aY+ý3L+ 1(5 9 
1+6ý 
ý 
+ Cc Y l 
G 
F, / 
+ 
Sx 
II 
ý1+tSxJ + c, V 
. 
X 
Xý+I I llý 
ný 
1+ý A M(Ml L YJ 
(7) 
Adding an intercept and a disturbance term gives the equation to be estimated for 
Greece over the period 1960-96 to get the size (total) effect of each of the sectors on 
economic growth. 
A further assumption that G, M and X affect the production of C with constant 
elasticities of 9$ , 
9n, and 9X respectively (see Feder, 1982, Ram, 1986,1989), 
suggests that: 
C=C (Lc , Kc , 
G, X, M) = Geg X0' M 
6m 
cp (Lc , Kc), and 
it can be shown that: 
aciaG = CG = eg (c/G) 
acrax = cX = eX (c/x> 
ac/am = Cm =0., (C/M) 
(8 a, b, c) 
Then, plugging (8a, b, c) into equation 7 (see Huang and Mintz, 1991), equation 7 can 
be reformulated to give the separate externality effects of each sector as well as the 
productivity differentials between the "base" and the other sectors5. 
5 As Ram (1995) mentioned, if one wants to include externality effects across the non-base sectors or 
to obtain separate estimates for the externality effect and the 
factor productivity differences many 
problems arise and the advantage of multisectorial modelling seems uncertain. 
This issue arises in 
Alexander's (1990) study. 
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Equation (9) is the second equation to be estimated and captures the externality 
effects (e) and the productivity differentials (b) between the "base" and the other 
three sectors. In other words, it allows for the isolation of both the productivity and 
externality effects of government, defence and export sectors. The elasticity measure 
of the intersectoral externalities 6; (i=g, x, m) may be interpreted as the effect on 
economic growth of the interaction between the growth rate of sector i and the share 
of the civilian sector (C) in total output (Y), while (6i/1+6, ) can capture the direct 
effect of sector i on growth. Note that in order to estimate equations 7 and 9, the 
instantaneous change rate of the variables is replaced with their discrete equivalents 
. 
(i. e. Y=DY/Y_i). 
(XY) 
\ý 
G(Y) 
/ýý, 
I ý9 
Several shortcomings arise from these models concentrating on the supply-side, as 
they ignore the demand-side, assuming that it stays in equilibrium with the supply 
constraints of the economy. Also, high collinearity between the two terms of each 
sector (growth rate and share in GDP) is inevitable, and thus, "the estimates may not 
provide a good feel for the magnitude of the externality effect and/or the productivity 
differences and .... as 
is common with most single equation models, there are some 
measurement and data problems and there may be feedback' from the dependent 
variable to some of the regressors " (Ram, 1995, pp261-262. ). Another weakness of 
the Feder-type model is that it assumes that the production function consists only of 
physical capital and labour and in this way it excludes human capital, which can 
comprise native ability and talent as well as education and acquired skills6. 
Furthermore, as will be shown in the analysis that follows, the two-sector model can 
appear too restrictive, suggesting that government and export sectors should also be 
included. 
Despite such shortcomings, one should not ignore the advantages of such models, 
which tend to outweigh their weaknesses. First of all, these models are well based in 
economic theory and can describe the supply constraints that are important for 
countries like Greece. They require relatively less data than full demand and supply 
models, which is an important advantage when analysing less developed countries. 
Finally, they allow the identification of size effects, externality effects and the 
relative marginal productivities of each sector (Ward et al., 1991). 
6 Sezgin (1997) proxied human capital by educational expenditure but "the results were not improved 
suggesting that educational expenditure was not a good proxy". 
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7.3. Data and Variable Description 
Data required for the estimation of the above models come from SIPRI. EUROSTAT 
and OECD. Specifically, data for GDP, investment, government expenditure, and 
exports were taken from the EUROSTAT database, labour force data were taken 
from OECD while military expenditure data were taken from SIPRI Yearbooks. All 
figures were first deflated in constant 1990 million drachmas and then converted to 
1990 million US dollars by means of exchange rates. A problem that is often 
observed and usually ignored - especially when dealing with developing countries - 
concerns labour force data. As Scheetz (1991) mentioned, LDC data series are very 
imprecise ".. even figures published by international organisations " (Scheetz, 1991, 
p. 66). Usually labour force data is not available and its growth is proxied by the 
population growth rate - as Ram (1986), Ward et al (1992), Alexander (1990) did. 
For Greece, labour force data was in fact available from 1970 onwards, with labour 
force growth proxied by population growth prior to 1970. To measure non-military 
government spending military expenditure was subtracted from government 
expenditure. This overcomes the problem exemplified by Alexander (1990) where 
government consumption was used as a proxy for non-military government 
consumption leading to an overvaluing of government consumption by the amount of 
military expenditure, leading to the invalidity of the assumption of the mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive sectors. 
To consider the existence of cointegration all the variables in equations 7 and 9 were 
tested for unit roots by Dickey Fuller tests. Apart from the investment variable 
which contained a unit -root, all the other variables appeared to be stationary - which 
was expected given their specification in growth rates. No evidence of cointegration 
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was found, so the models are estimated without the addition of an Error Correction 
Term (ECT). As for the investment variable, which appeared to exhibit a unit root, it 
was not first differenced on the grounds of losing the interpretation of the coefficient. 
The existence of non-stationary variables on the right hand side when the dependent 
is stationary may have two effects: First, the coefficient on the non-stationary 
variable (here on IY_j) should theoretically be zero in infinite samples. Given that 
results reported here come from finite sample, this theoretical expectation does not 
apply. Second it may lead to inefficiencies that affect all the variables in the 
equation. This was examined by comparing results from equations that included the 
investment variable in first difference form. No significant changes in the estimates 
were observed. 
7.3.1. Description of Variables 
Y= AY/Y_1 = GDP growth 
I/Y_1 = Share of investment in GDP 
L= AL/ L_1 = Labour force growth 
= OM/ M-1 (M/Y_ 1)= Total effect of defence sector Y 
G= AG/ G_1 ( G/Y_1) = Total effect of non-military government sector 
"( X 
Y= 
AX/ X_1 (X/Y_1) = Total effect of export sector X- 
M= AM/ M_1 (C/Y_1)= Externality effect of military sector 
GY= AG/ G_1 (CY_1) = Externality effect of non-military government sector 
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Y= 
AX! X_ 3 (C/Y_ 1) Externality effect of export sector 
where C=Y-M in the two-sector model 
C=Y-M-G in the three-sector model 
C=Y-M-G-X in the four-sector model 
b,,, = productivity difference of the military sector with respect to the civilian 
sector 
8g= productivity difference of the government sector with respect to the 
civilian sector 
6, = productivity difference of the export sector with respect to the civilian 
sector 
and Y=GDP in constant 1990 mn US $ 
M=Military Expenditure in constant 1990 mn US $ 
G=Government Expenditure (excluding military) in constant 1990 mn US $ 
X=Exports in constant 1990 mn US $ 
I=Private Investment in 1990 mn US $ 
L=Labour Force in `000s 
7.4. Empirical Results 
Equations (7) and (9) were estimated by OLS using Microfit 4.0. Table 7.1. gives 
results for the total (size) effects of each sector (equation 7) and Table 3 also gives 
the externality effects and the productivity differentials (equation 9). In each case the 
first column gives results from the two-sector model (military and civilian), the 
second column from the three-sector model (civilian, military and government) and 
the third column gives results from the four-sector model (civilian, military, 
government and export). 
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7.4.1. Empirical Results for the `Total Effect' 
Starting from equation 7, that describes the total (size) effects of each sector on 
economic growth, it is obvious that the overall performance of the model in terms of 
explanatory power is not very satisfactory with the R2 being 0.41,0.47,0.48 for the 
two, three and four sector models, respectively. But another consideration when 
evaluating the overall performance of this model (as Mintz & Stevenson, 1995 
stress), concerns the coefficients on the investment and labour variables. "In 
general, one would be more confident in the specification of the model if the 
coefficients on these variables conform to the standard predictions of the economic 
theory" (Mintz & Stevenson, 1995, p. 293). If, for example, investment is found 
significantly negatively related to economic growth, the validity of the model should 
be questioned. But this is not the case for any of the three specifications of the model 
for Greece in all of which investment is positive and highly significant. Labour 
force growth on the other hand has an unexpected significantly negative effect, 
which is a bit problematic as it does not conform to the standard predictions of the 
economic theory although the theories underlying the impact of labour on the 
economy is less conclusive than that of investment. Its significance might suggest 
that, in Greece, increases in the workforce do not necessarily imply a more 
productive workforce. In fact, this is not an unusual finding and Ward et al. (1991) 
justify it by arguing that: "Economies of scale in the production process are not 
always linear and also they don 't necessarily apply to the wage bill" (Ward et al., 
1991, p. 53). Furthermore, Antonakis (1997) in his two-sector model for Greece 
found a negative but insignificant effect for the labour force? variable justifying it by 
' Antonakis (1997) as most other studies have done, proxied labour force growth by population 
growth. But this can cause the impact of labour growth to be underestimated, especially in cases 
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saying ".. in labour surplus economies like Greece, the natural rate of growth is not a 
binding constraint" (Antonakis, 1997, p. 653). As far as the total effect of the 
military sector is concerned (in the 2-sector model) it is positive and significant at 
10% supporting the modernisation and spin off arguments for defence spending. 
On the second column of Table 7.1., the government sector (excluding the military) 
enters the equation with a positive sign, significant at 10%, As for the effect of the 
military sector, it is still positive but now insignificant. The intercept, investment and 
labour force growth continue to have the same signs as before with their significance 
slightly altered. Finally, by adding the export sector (see column 3 of Table 7.1. ), all 
of the variables' signs remain the same, the significance of the government sector 
increases (from 10% to 5%) and the significance of investment and labour force 
growth drops slightly to 5%. The effect of the export sector is positive but not 
significant, which is not surprising for a country like Greece which mainly exports 
agricultural products. As for the constant term, which measures an average trend rate 
of technological progress, it is insignificant in all three specifications. 
where the size of the labour force changes significantly while population remains stable 
(almost stable 
population is a fact for Greece). 
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Table 7.1. OLS Results of the Feder-type model for Greece (1961-1996) 
Dependent GDP Growth (equation 7) 
Indep. Variables 2 Sectors 3 Sectors 4 Sectors 
Intercept -0.03 (1.23) -0.03 (1.15) -0.03 (1.29) 
1/Y1 0.33 (3.06)*** 0.27 (2.51)** 0.26 (2.39)** 
AL / L-a -0.92 (2.50)** -0.95 (2.71)*** -0.83 (2.21)** 
dM !M 1(M/ y 1) 
1.59 (1.84)* 0.43 (0.42) 0.37 (0.36) 
AG/G-, (G/Y) 1.04 (1.92)* 1.14(2.05)** 
ox/x_, (x/Y1) 0.49(0.90) 
R2 0.41 0.47 0.48 
SE 0.03 0.02 0.03 
DW 1.66 1.74 1.54 
F-statistic F(3,32)=7.3*** F(4,31)=6.85*** F(5,30)=5.61*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=0.06 [. 801] X2(1)=0.03 [. 861 ] X2(1 )=0.63 [. 427] 
Functional Form X2(1)=0.01 [. 918] X2(1)=0.05 [. 830] X2(1)=0.05 [. 825] 
Normality X2(2)=9.74 [. 008] X2(2)=10.94[. 004] X2(2)=8.80 [. 012] 
Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.08 [. 299] X2(1)=0.18[. 675] X2(1)=0.45 [. 501 ] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. 
For all estimations Microfit 3.0 was used. 
Non-nested tests indicated that the three and four-sector models are preferred to the 
two-sector one, while no clearcut preference could be made among the three and 
four-sector models (as the Akaike's information criterion was in favour of the four- 
sector model while the Schwarz Bayesian criterion was in favour of the three-sector 
one). Given this, plus the fact that results are very similar for the three and four- 
sector models, reliance on either model is acceptable. It would appear that the 
military sector in Greece does not have a significant impact on economic growth, and 
that the same applies to the export sector. Only the non-military government sector 
seems to be growth promoting in Greece. This is in contrast to Antonakis (1997) 
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who found a significant negative effect of the defence sector. But this result can be 
questioned as he assumed only two sectors in the economy (the civilian and the 
military), did not use recent data (his data covered the period 1958-91) and, most 
importantly, claimed a negative and significant effect of the military sector in the 
original form of the model at 5% level of significance when the t-ratio that he 
reported for the specific coefficient was just 1.7. Only when he introduced lags in 
his model was the effect significantly negative, though still he did not report the long 
run coefficients. In addition, one would expect differences to this study's results as 
he used different data to this study, using the Greek National Accounts data and he 
proxied labour force growth by population growth. 
On the other hand, the three-sector model for India that Ward et al (1991) estimated, 
gave a positive overall effect of the military sector and a negative one for the 
government sector. But for a country like India that spends a lot on R&D for 
advanced defence technologies, the growth promoting effect of the military need not 
be surprising, given the spin-off effects that the military sector might have on other 
sectors. The three sector model by Murdoch et al (1997), for a well-defined cohort 
of nations (8 Asian and 16 Latin American countries) with similar economic, 
political or regional characteristics over the period 1955-1988 indicated that private 
investment, defence spending and other forms of public sector spending are growth 
promoting in the context of a purely supply-side Feder analysis. This is in line with 
the results for Greece as far the non-military government sector and investment is 
concerned, but not for the military sector. It is worth noting that studies for the US 
which has the most developed defence industry (i. e. Huang & Mintz, 1990,1991; 
Ward & Davis, 1992; Ward et al, 1995) found a negative overall effect of the 
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defence sector on economic growth rejecting the modernisation and spin off effects 
of defence, probably because defence diverts scarce resources (top scientists) from 
other sectors that might have been growth promoting. 
7.4.2. Empirical Results for `Externality and Relative Productivity Effects' 
Moving on to equation 9, which decomposes the overall effect in the original two, 
three, and four sector models into externality and relative productivity effects, the 
results are slightly altered. The specification seems to be a reasonable one, according 
to the different tests, with some minor problems as far as the normality assumption is 
concerned. The R2 suggests that the equation only explains 44% of the variation of 
the dependent variable in the two-sector case, 56% in the three-sector case and 61% 
in the four-sector case but the statistical insignificance of most of the variables is also 
apparent. This low individual significance combined with the high F statistics 
(reported in Table 7.2. ) point to the existence of multicollinearity, which is the most 
commonly observed problem with this type of model, given the high collinearity 
between the two terms of each sector (i. e. between the size effect of the defence 
sector AM / M-1 (M / Yand its externality effect AM /M, (C / Y) ). The 
implication of this is that although the OLS estimates are unbiased they are imprecise 
and unstable. Given that multi col linearity is typically caused by lack of sufficient 
information in the sample, common remedial measures involve getting more data to 
break the pattern of multicollinearity or dropping some independent variables. The 
first can be impossible if more data are not available while the second can lead to 
specification error if the variables dropped are theoretically relevant (i. e. Atesoglou 
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& Mueller, 1990; Alexander, 1995, dropped the externality effects from their 
analysis). There are some other studies that in order to deal with multicollinearity 
(i. e. Huang and Mintz, 1990,1991) employ a k-class ridge8 estimator. Reporting 
results for both ridge and OLS estimators they find no significant differences in the 
results, although collinearity is reduced. Most studies simply report the results 
accepting the existence of multicollinearity and do not attempt ridge regressions as 
the value of such regressions is widely contested (Kennedy, 1986). 
The approach taken here is to report the OLS results with this caveat. Starting from 
the two-sector model (civilian and military) in column 1 of Table 7.2, investment and 
labour force growth are the only variables that continue to be significant and to have 
the same signs as before. The size effect of the defence sector is negative while its 
externality is positive, with both effects being insignificant. This means that 
although the productivity differential can be calculated (it is -0.87)9 it would not be 
reliable as it comes from insignificant estimates. Despite that, the joint test of zero 
restrictions on the military coefficients is rejected at the 5% level of significance 
suggesting that the two military terms are important in the growth equation 
(Likelihood Ratio test X2(2) 5.80). 
The inclusion of the government sector gives similar results as far as the individual 
effects of the two military terms are concerned and they remain insignificant. But 
now (unlike in the two-sector model) the military terms are not even jointly 
8 The ridge technique introduces small biases in the coefficient estimates to achieve substantial gains 
in variance reduction 
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significant (Likelihood Ratio X2 = 0.28). The total effect of the non-military 
government sector is negative and insignificant while its externality is positive and 
significant at 10%. 
Table 7.2. OLS Results of the Augmented Feder model for Greece (1961-1996) 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. 2 Sectors 3 Sectors 4 Sectors 
Intercept -0.03 (1.22) -0.01 (0.56) -0.01 (0.23) 
1/y1 0.32 (3.09)*** 0.17 (1.55) 0.10 (0.89) 
AL / L_i -0.91 (2.53)** -0.73 (2.13)** -0.58 (1.60) 
AM/ M I(M/ y) -7.42 
(1.13) -1.89 (031) -0.64 (0.13) 
AG l G-1 (G /Y 1) 
-2.02(1.21) -0.70 (0.53) 
A. X/X_1(X/Y1) -0.21 (0.23) 
AM/ M 1(C /Y 1) 
0.54 (1.39) 0.12 (0.25) 0.03 (0.07) 
AG / G_1(C/ Y1) 1.29 (1.91)* 0.89 (1.36) 
AX / X_1(C Y1) 0.18 (1.23) 
Sm -0.87 -0.64 -0.38 
6g -0.42 0.23 
6x -0.02 
R2 0.44 0.56 0.61 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 
DW 1.91 2.32 2.10 
F-statistic F(4,31)=6.12*** F(6,29)=6.19*** F(8,27)=5.30*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=0.53 [. 469] X2(1)=2.32 [. 127] X2(1)=0.53 [. 467] 
Functional Form X2(1)=0.10 [. 754] X2(1)=0.01 [. 969] X2(1)=0.93 [. 336] 
Normality X2(2)=15.27 [. 000] X2(2)=36.86[. 000] X2(2)=18.76[. 000] 
Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.06 [. 304] X2(1)=0.04 [. 851] X2(1)=0.12 [. 732] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) wniie the 
bottom columns give the Diagnostic tests and their probabilities (in brackets). 
Note that the productivity differential is calculated from the estimated coefficients of the total effect 
8 
"' and the externality effect ý9,,, , as. , 
ö"ý, 
- ý9,,, 
1+ CSni 1 tOm 
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Furthermore, the two non-military government terms are jointly significant at 5% 
(Likelihood Ratio X2 = 8.45). The further addition of the export sector improves the 
model in terms of R2 but at the same time all of the variables become insignificant. 
The signs of the size and externality effects of the military and government sectors 
remain the same as in the previous specification. As for the export sector, it gives 
negative size effects and positive externalities, though again the insignificance of the 
variables makes calculating the productivity differentials unrevealing. The joint test 
of zero restrictions on the military terms cannot be rejected (Likelihood Ratio X2 
(2)= 0.11), suggesting that there is no significant impact of military spending on 
growth. This is also the case for the export sector terms (Likelihood Ratio X2 (2)= 
4.34) while the non-military government sector terms are jointly significant at 5% 
level (Likelihood Ratio X2 (2)= 6.43) 
These results support those of Mintz and Stevenson (1995) based on a three-sector 
Feder-type model for 103 developed and less developed countries. According to 
their findings, there was no short-run relation between military expenditure and 
growth and the externality effect was much smaller than the total effectl0. Contrary 
to the results for Greece reported earlier, Sezgin (1997) in a two-sector Feder-type 
model for Turkey found a positive and significant relationship between military 
spending and economic growth while externalities from the defence sector to the rest 
of the economy were negative. The growth promoting effect of the defence sector 
must be attributed to the fact that Turkey has managed to develop an indigenous 
arms industry that interacts with other sectors and has spin-off effects. 
'0 They found that defence sector has a significant positive effect in only 10% of the cases (10% of 
103 countries). 
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Alexander's (1990) conclusion for 9 industrial countries under an augmented four- 
sector Feder-type model that the gross effect of military expenditure on growth is 
neither significantly positive nor negative, although the defence sector is less 
productive than the `rest' of the economy seems to fit perfectly the conclusion drawn 
for Greece. But what is of particular importance is that the model for Greece has 
overcome many of the shortcomings that arose in Alexander's study. Specifically, 
unlike his study that specified a very complex set of externalities among sectors (i. e. 
the non-military sector could influence both the defence, the export and the civilian 
sector while the defence and export sector could influence only the civilian sector) 
making some coefficients, (i. . the coefficient of the non-military government 
sector), so complicated that could not be interpreted, the study for Greece defined 
simple externalities from each of the defence, export and non-military government 
sector only to the base sector (civilian sector). Furthermore, in the present study 
values for non-military government spending were derived by deducting military 
spending from total government spending while Alexander proxied non-military 
government expenditure by government consumption overvaluing in this way 
government consumption by the amount of military consumption, (as also Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995) stressed). Finally, in the present study the sensitivity of the Feder- 
type model to the inclusion of extra sectors was examined, leading to the conclusion 
that the three and four-sector models perform better and are much more informative 
than the two-sector ones, which appear to be very restrictive and can be misleading. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided evidence of the economic effects of military spending in 
Greece, using a supply-side model. The approach taken was to estimate a popular 
multi-sectoral Neoclassical model - the Feder-type model with special attention 
given to the sensitivity of the model to the number of sectors included and to the 
specification of the externalities and the productivity differentials. 
Starting with the two-sector model, a positive effect of the defence sector on 
economic growth (significant at the 10% level) was found. However, this positive 
effect changed into a negative and insignificant one when either the government 
sector alone or both the government and the export sectors were introduced. The 
overall effect of the non-military government sector was positive and significant in 
both the three and four-sector model, while the export sector had a positive but 
insignificant effect on growth. The signs and significance of the intercept, the 
investment and the labour force variables remained unchanged. Furthermore, the 
general performance and the explanatory power of the three and four-sector models 
was higher than that of the two-sector model and this was also supported by non- 
nested tests, suggesting that one should rely on estimates from these models rather 
than the more restrictive two sector ones which can lead to misspecification. 
The same story is repeated when the augmented models that give separate estimates 
for the total and the externality effects of each sector are considered. Again, the two- 
sector augmented model is poorly defined compared to the three and four-sector 
ones, but now it also gives insignificant total and externality effects of the military 
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sector and most of the variables are insignificant. The four-sector model in particular 
shows the absence of any statistical significance of the coefficients. 
So, first of all the analysis provided in this chapter has pointed to the observation that 
the Feder-type model is very sensitive to the inclusion of additional sectors of the 
economy, especially when the size effects of the sectors are separated from their 
externalities in which case one gets insignificant estimates. The results for Greece 
fully support Biswas and Ram (1986) finding for a cross-section of countries, that: 
"... the augmented models appear to suggest absence of any statistically significant 
impact of military expenditure on growth of total output. These models also indicate 
that neither the M (military) sector generates any significant positive or negative 
externality for the C (civilian) sector nor is the relative factor productivity 
differential across sectors statistically significant. So, although we can compute 
values of Cj and i5i from the relevant parameter estimates, these computations would 
not be useful since most of these estimates are statistically insignificant" (Biswas 
and Ram, 1986, p. 369-370). 
Under the limitations of the Feder-type model, empirical evidence for Greece over 
the period 1961-96 indicates that the overall effect of the defence sector on growth is 
neither significantly positive nor negative, although the defence sector seems to be 
less productive than the civilian sector. This suggests that shifts of resources 
(spending or investment) out of the military sector into the private sector are likely to 
bring about higher economic productivity in the country. 
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I CHAPTER 8 
A DEMAND AND SUPPLY-SIDE ANALYSIS FOR THE 
DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP IN GREECE 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates the defence-growth relationship in Greece over the period 
1960-1996 by employing a demand and supply model. Specifically it estimates a 
simultaneous four-equation system consisting of a growth equation, a savings 
equation, a trade balance equation and a military expenditure equation. The military 
expenditure equation is the one already specified and estimated in Chapter 5 
(aggregate model of defence spending). This type of model hypotheses possible 
direct effects of defence on growth through Keynesian demand stimulation and other 
spin-off effects and negative indirect effects through possible reductions in savings 
and trade balance (as discussed in chapter 2) allowing the calculation of the overall, 
the "net" effect. 
In the rest of the Chapter a growth, savings and trade balance equations are specified 
and initially estimated by OLS. At a later stage these equations are combined with 
the demand for military expenditure equation (estimated in Chapter 5) to form a 
simultaneous equation system which is estimated by system estimation procedures - 
three stage least squares (3SLS) to deal with simultaneity and high covariance 
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problems and to give an estimate of the net effect of defence spending on economic 
growth. 
8.2. Methodology Employed and Specification of the Model 
Smith and Smith (1980) were the first to use simultaneous equation models (SEM) to 
capture both the demand-side influences in a Keynesian aggregate demand 
framework and the supply-side ones in a growth equation derived from an aggregate 
production function. This framework was further developed by Deger and Smith 
(1983), Deger (1986), Scheetz (1991), Dunne and Mohammed (1995), Roux (1996), 
Antonakis (1997a), Sezgin (1998a, b), Dunne & Nikolaidou (1999) among others. 
These models hypothesise possible direct effects of defence on growth through 
Keynesian demand stimulation and other spin-off effects and negative indirect effect 
through reductions in savings or investment, balance of payments, education and 
health. 
The analysis followed here is based on Hendry's "general to specific" methodology. 
According to this, the starting point is to develop each equation by including as many 
variables as seem relevant according to economic theory (build a general model) and 
then restrict it to a more "specific" one by testing for exclusion restrictions. The 
specification of the growth, savings and trade balance equations with the preliminary 
single equation OLS estimates are as follows: 
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8.2.1. Growth equation 
The growth equation is derived from a traditional production function: Y- f (K, L, T) 
where Y is output, K and L are capital and labour inputs and T is a measure of 
technology (see Deger and Smith, 1983, p. 341). Using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function this relation can be transformed to one that is linear in the growth rates. 
Thus, output growth rate is a function of capital growth, labour growth and variables 
which affect the growth in total factor productivity (technology). Capital growth is 
financed either through domestic savings (S) and/or foreign capital flows'. Lack of 
data normally means that population growth is used as a proxy for labour force 
growth, but this is not necessary for Greece as the relevant data are available (L). The 
share of military spending in GDP (M) is intended to pick up the hypothesised 
modernisation and resource mobilisation impacts of military spending. Similarly, 
GDP per capita (GDPC) should capture any "catch-up" effects from importing 
technology, since countries with higher income per head are probably reaching the 
upper limits of their growth potential (Deger and Smith, 1983). So, the growth 
equation should be a function of the following variables: 
Y= Y (S, M, GDPC, L, TB) 
where Y is real growth of GDP, S is the share of national savings in GDP, M is the 
share of military expenditure in GDP (military burden), GDPC is GDP per capita, L 
is labour force growth and TB is the share of trade balance in GDP. 
Scheetz (1991) uses a broader term than foreign capital flows, the current account share in GDP. 
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8.2.2. Savings equation 
The savings equation is derived from the output/expenditure relation: 
Y=C+I+M-TB 
where Y is total output, C is civilian consumption (public and private), I is total 
civilian investment, M is military expenditure and TB the trade balance. Adding 
some monetary factors and manipulating the above relation, it appears that the 
following variables should be included in the savings equation: 
S=S (M, Y, TB, INF, NG) 
where INF is the inflation rate and NG the share of non-military government 
expenditure in GDP. 
Inflation (INF) is included to take account of the inflationary effects on resource 
creation. Deger (1986) assumed that inflation leads to forced savings, and thus 
affects savings positively, but inflation could also retard savings, so the expected 
sign is ambiguous. Growth of output should affect savings positively while the 
expectation for non-military government spending is ambiguous. The coefficient of 
the share of military spending in this equation, should be negative if crowding out is 
taking place and the trade balance (TB) is expected to affect savings positively 
through income multipliers and trade taxes (Scheetz, 1991). 
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8.2.3. Trade Balance equation 
A country's trade balance can be affected by military burden if aggregate demand is 
increased and domestic supply is inelastic, leading to increased imports and/or 
reduced exports. This would suggest a negative sign on M, but Greece has received 
substantial military aid from NATO, so this effect may not be very strong. Deger 
(1986) argues that the growth of GDP will affect the trade balance positively, if the 
country in question promotes exports, or negatively, if it follows an import 
substitution policy. For Greece a positive effect is expected. The effect of inflation 
and previous year's trade balance is ambiguous and the real exchange rate is included 
to capture the effects of a change in the international purchasing power of the 
domestic currency with an expected positive sign. This gives a trade balance 
equation of the form: 
TB = TB (M, Y, INF, GDPC, EXC) 
where EXC is the exchange rate (US $ to Greek Drachma) 
The above functions represent the "general" form of the equations to be estimated. 
But prior to estimation, the integration properties of the series must be examined by 
employing the Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots. This is done in the next section 
which also presents the data sources and the description of the variables used (after 
the unit root tests). 
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8.3. Data and Variables Description 
Data for GDP, GDP per capita, national savings, government expenditure. trade 
balance, population and inflation were taken from the EUROSTAT database while 
data for the exchange rate and labour force from the OECD database. All figures 
were deflated to constant 1990 million drachmas and then converted to 1990 million 
US $ by means of exchange rates. Data for Greek military expenditure as well as for 
Turkish and NATO military expenditure were taken from SIPRI. The fact that SIPRI 
(and thus, NATO) definition of military spending does not include the value of 
military assistance2 received from abroad is recognised. The approach to measuring 
non-military government spending was to subtract military expenditure from 
government expenditure. 
All the series were tested for unit roots by using ADF tests of stationarity and were 
first differenced when non-stationary (See Table El in Appendix E). Specifically, 
the only variable that was stationary was GDP growth, but this is expected since it is 
already in a growth form. But on the other hand, labour force growth did not appear 
as stationary (although in a growth form) and it had to be differenced. 
2 The main assistance programmes through which the US provided weapons, training and other 
defence-related services to Greece (as well as to Turkey) were: the Foreign Military Sales Program 
(FMS), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the International Military Assistance Program (MAP) and 
the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), (Balfoussias and Stavrinos, 
1996) 
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8.3.1. Description of Variables 
Y: real growth rate of GDP 
DS: share of national savings in GDP (first difference) 
DTB: current account balance (exports of goods and services less imports of goods 
and services) as a share of GDP (first difference) 
DM: share of military expenditure in GDP (first difference) 
DEXC: real exchange rate (first difference) 
DNG: share of government spending (excluding military expenditure) in GDP (first 
difference) 
DTM: share of Turkish military expenditure in GDP (first difference) 
DNATO: share of NATO's defence spending (excluding Greece and Turkey) in GDP 
(first difference) 
DINF: inflation rate (first difference) 
DL: labour force growth (first difference) 
DGDPC: GDP per capita in constant 1990 mn US $ (first difference) 
DPOP: Greek population (first difference) 
D74: dummy to capture the threat of war after 1974 (takes the value of 1 for the 
years 1974-96) 
CYP: impulse dummy to capture the effect of 1974 invasion of Cyprus (1974=1,0 
elsewhere) 
D74: dummy to capture the deterioration in trade balance after 1974 (1974-96=1,0 
elsewhere) 
T: linear trend 
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8.4. Empirical Results 
This section starts by presenting empirical results using OLS method for each 
individual equation, and later all four equations (including the military burden 
equation estimated in Chapter 5) are combined to form a system of equations that 
will be estimated by system method (3 SLS) . 
8.4.1. Growth Equation 
All variables should be positively related to growth. Estimating this equation by OLS 
for Greece over 1960-96, the following results were obtained with the addition of a 
time-trend: 
DY = 0.09 + 0.003DS(-1) - 0.02DM+ 0.09 DGDPC + 0.003 DL -0.001 DTB- 0.002 T 
(16.32) (3.27) (3.85) (7.45) (1.85) (0.42) (9.60) 
R2=0.88, DW= 1.42 
The overall performance of the estimated equation is satisfactory, apart from some 
evidence of serial correlation. The coefficient on the military burden is negative and 
significant; this implies that the argument that military spending has a positive 
impact through modernisation and resource mobilisation is not valid for the case of 
Greece. All the other variables are positively related to growth - except for the trend 
and the trade balance, which is also the only insignificant variable. 
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8.4.2. Savings Equation 
Estimating the savings equation by OLS over the period 1960-1996, gave the 
following results: 
DS =-1.30 - 2.07 DM + 0.30 DTB(-1) - 0.23 DINF + 31.61 DY - 0.87 DNG 
(1.72) (2.23) (0.81) (1.91) (2.27) (1.04) 
R2=0.52, DW=2.00 
Military burden has a negative effect on savings, in accord with the resource 
reallocation argument, real growth of output has a positive impact on savings, as 
expected, while non-military government spending and previous year's trade balance 
are insignificant. 
8.4.3. Trade Balance Equation 
Estimating this equation, after introducing some lags and a dummy to capture the 
deterioration of trade balance after 1974, gave the following results: 
DTB=3.85- 0.90DM- 43.6DY_, - 0.13DINF_2 - 0.32DTB_1 -0.04DEXC -3.07DGDPC -1.9D74 
(2.66) (1.53) (2.47) (1.78) (1.77) (1.44) (1.57) (1.75) 
' R=0.35, DW= 1.94 
The trade balance equation is poorly defined in terms of R2 either when it is 
estimated by OLS or by the instrumental variables method (IV). The effect of 
military burden on trade balance is negative but not significant. 
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8.4.4. Military Expenditure Equation 
Recall from the military expenditure equation and its OLS estimates from Chapter 5: 
DM=0.12-0.56DGPC_, -0.44DNG-0.15DTB_1+0.27DTM_1+0.50NATO+2.42CYP-0.14DM_, 
(1.83) (2.11) (4.31) (3.98) (2.50) (1.42) (6.58) (1.22) 
R2=0.73, DW = 2.00 
Combining all the four equations together, the system of equations will be defined 
next. 
8.4.5. System of Equations Results 
The single equation estimates reported above generally give satisfactory results - 
except for the trade balance equation - and almost all coefficients have the expected 
signs. But there are problems with these single equation OLS estimates as they do 
not take into account the likely interrelationships between the variables. Simultaneity 
and high covariances between variables can lead to biased estimates. To overcome 
this problem it is necessary to use either some form of instrumental variables 
technique or simultaneous equations methods. In this case the system of equations is 
estimated using the 3SLS (three Stage Least Squares) method. Single equation 2SLS 
(Two Stage Least Squares) estimates are also presented. 
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The simultaneous equation model consists of the following four equations and the 
results are reported in Table 8.1., together with the OLS estimates3. 
DY = ao + a1 DS-1 + a2 DM + a3 DGDPC + a4 DL + a5 DTB_2 +T 
DS=ßo+ßlDM+ß2DTB_1 + ß3 DINF + ß4 DY + ß5 DNG 
D TB = yo + y1 DM+ y2 DY_1 + y3 DINF_2 + y4 DTB_1 +ys DEXC+ y6 DGDPC + y, D74 
DM=äo+b1 DTB_1 +, 52 DGDPC_1 +i53 DNG+94 DTM_1 +g5 DNATO+(S6 DM-1 +g2CYP 
The 2SLS and 3SLS results are in general consistent with the OLS results. There are 
no differences in sign and the growth equation results are almost identical. There are 
some differences in using the systems estimation method for the trade balance model, 
where the significance of a number of variables improves, and for the savings and 
military expenditure equations, but none are particularly significant. 
' The models may seem at variance to the previous results. But 
in this case a general to specific 
methodology was used to determine dynamic structure 
in this case. 
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Table 8.1. Estimation Results of the Demand and Supply Model for Greece 
Exogenous Estimation Method 
variables OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
intercept 0.09 (16.32)*** 0.10 (14.29)*** 0.10 (17.05)*** 
DS_, 0.003 (3.27)*** 0.002 (2.51)*** 0.002 (3.45)*** 
Growth DM -0.02 (3.85)*** -0.02 (3.90)*** -0.02 (4.85)*** 
Equation DGDPC 0.09 (7.45)*** 0.08 (6.30)*** 0.08 (7.27)*** 
DL 0.003 (1.85)* 0.003 (1.60) 0.001 (1.22) 
DTB_2 -0.001 (0.42) 0.001 (0.11) -0.001 (0.24) 
T -0.002 (9.60)*** -0.003 (9.04)*** -0.003 (10.88)*** 
R-squared 0.88 0.85 0.85 
DW 1.42 1.15 1.30 
intercept -1.30 (1.72)* -1.30 (1.72)* -1.46 (2.15)** 
DM -2.07 (2.23)** -2.07 (2.23)** -2.04 (2.43)*** 
Savings DTB_1 0.30 (0.81) 0.30 (0.81) 0.33 (1.02) 
Equation DY 31.61 (2.27)** 31.61 (2.27)** 34.42 (2.75)*** 
DINFL -0.23 (1.91)* -0.23 (1.91)* -0.17 (1.63)* 
DNG -0.87 (1.04) -0.87 (1.04) -0.44 (0.61) 
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.51 
DW 2.00 2.00 1.91 
intercept 3.85 (2.66)*** 3.85 (2.66)*** 4.51 (4.34)*** 
DM -0.90 (1.53) -0.90 (1.53) -1.26 (2.60)*** 
DY_1 -43.6 (2.47)*** -43.6 (2.47)*** -51.5 (3.95)*** 
DTB_, -0.32 (1.77)* -0.32 (1.77)* -0.30 (2.27)** 
Trade Balance DINFL_2 -0.13 (1.78)* -0.13 (1.78)* -0.10 (1.98)** 
Equation DEXCH -0.04 (1.44) -0.04 (1.44) -0.04 (1.96)* 
DGDPC -3.07 (1.57) -3.07 (1.57) -4.37 (2.83)*** 
D74 -1.90 (1.75)* -1.90 (1.75)* -2.45 (3.20)*** 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.33 
PW 1.94 1.94 2.04 
intercept 0.12 (1.83)* 0.14 (1.44) 0.13 (2.00)** 
DTB_, -0.15 (3,98)*** -0.24 (3.37)*** -0.21 (4.49)*** 
Military DGDPC., -0.56 (2.11)** -1.30 (1.35) -1.02 (1.62) 
Expenditure DNG -0.44 (4.31)*** -0.36 (2.61)*** -0.36 (3.87)*** 
Equation DTM_1 0.27 (2.50)*** 0.74 (1.27) 0.43 (1.14) 
DNATO 0.50 (1.42) 0.42 (0.88) 0.49 (1.58) 
DM_, -0.14 (1.22) -0.30 (1.28) -0.25 
(1.61) 
CYP 2.42 (6.58)*** 2.46 (5.22)*** 2.49 (7.82)*** 
R-squared 0.73 0.60 0.74 
DW 2.00 1.75 1.78 
*** : 1% level of significance, **: 5% level of significance, 
* 10% level of significance 
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The simultaneous equation results serve to underline the findings and suggest that 
both the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth and the indirect 
effects through savings and trade balance are negative and significant (at 1% 
significance level). When we take into account both the direct and indirect effects of 
military burden we get dG/dM = -0.026, dS/dM = -3.21, dTB/dM = -0.136. So 
military burden has a negative impact on growth, savings and the trade balance. 
Demand and supply models for Greece have been employed by Antonakis (1997a), 
whose simultaneous equation model consisted of three equations (a growth equation, 
a savings and a military burden one). He found a negative direct effect of defence on 
growth and a positive indirect effect through savings over the period 1960-1990, 
with the net effect being negative. In contrast, Sezgin (1998a, b) using more or less 
the same system of equations found a positive direct effect and a negative indirect 
effect through savings, with the net effect, however, being positive for the period 
1958-1994. 
Although these models provide a more complete picture of the defence-growth 
relationship by accounting for the interrelationships between the variables and the 
endogeneity of military expenditure, they have been criticised (Ram, 1995) for not 
being strongly based on theory and thus, relying on more ad-hoc justifications. But 
this is more than compensated for by the advantages that these models have to offer 
as they overcome problems of exogeneity, simultaneity and causality that may 
influence the defence-growth relationship if analysed in a single equation 
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8.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the effects of defence spending on economic growth by a 
demand and supply SEM over the period 1960-96. A four-equation system was 
estimated using both single-equation methods (OLS, 2SLS) and system-equation 
methods (3SLS) to account for the interrelations between the variables. Findings 
suggest that both the direct effect of defence spending on economic growth and the 
indirect effects through savings and trade balance are significantly negative. 
The negative direct effect of defence on growth implies that there are no positive 
spin-offs or externalities from the defence sector to the economy. The negative 
indirect effect of defence through savings supports the crowding out argument, that 
resources are misallocated through the growth of military burden. The negative 
indirect effect of military burden through the trade balance seems reasonable for a 
country like Greece which is a big importer of military equipment and only has a 
very small and underdeveloped defence industry. 
Overall, the results suggest that the high military burden in Greece has been harmful 
to economic performance and has made a significant contribution to the 
backwardness of the economy and the huge problems it faces. The implications are 
that cuts in defence budgets in Greece would lead to improved economic 
performance and that if these resources were reallocated to other more productive 
sectors of the economy there is likely to be a "peace dividend". The problem is that 
military burden also appears to be determined by security concerns and if there is no 
improvement in relations with Turkey it seems unlikely that significant cuts will be 
on the agenda. The recognition that there are clear economic, as well as security, 
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benefits to be gained by settling the disputes could hopefully provide a much needed 
incentive to move forward. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: BACKGROUND ANALYSIS 
OF THEIR ECONOMIES AND DEFENCE SPENDING 
9.1. Introduction 
Having analysed the economic effects of military expenditure in Greece, it would be 
interesting to know whether defence spending has similar effects on economic 
growth in the other peripheral economies of the EU that share common 
characteristics with Greece. The most suitable candidate countries for this analysis 
seem to be Spain and Portugal. All three countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) 
have emerged from dictatorial rule, which in the case of the two Iberian countries, 
lasted for several decades and as Tsoukalis (1981) has observed "had turned the 
three countries into observers of the international system" (Tsoukalis, 1981, p. 96). 
After more than a decade of uninterrupted growth in Western Europe, the recession 
of the mid-seventies also saw the collapse of the dictatorships in the three 
Mediterranean countries (mid-1970s). The transition towards parliamentary 
democracy led to internal political and economic changes and the desire for 
international recognition. Starting with Greece, the countries came to see 
membership of the European Community as a means of strengthening their economic 
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and political situation. When they did join their relative economic backwardness 
made them the poorest countries in the EU. 
One important aspect of the economic development of these countries that has not 
attracted much interest from researchers is defence spending. This may bear some 
responsibility for the delayed progress of these economies, as was shown for the case 
of Greece. Before undertaking an empirical investigation of the defence-growth 
relationship in the two countries it is necessary to have some knowledge of their 
economic performance, their defence spending and their security concerns. A brief 
analysis of the Spanish and Portuguese economies as well as a descriptive 
comparison with Greece is presented in the rest of the chapter. 
9.2. Portugal 
9.2.1. Economic and Political background 
Portugal was not among the group of Western countries that faced rapid 
industrialisation and economic growth in the 1950s. It started to open up its 
economy in the mid-1960s but progress was disrupted by the collapse of the Salazar 
and Caetano dictatorship in 1974. "A period of austerity was broken in 1985 and the 
economy began to expand", (Cox and Furlong, 1992, p. 99). The dictatorships of 
Salazar and his successor's (1926-1974) were supported by the Armed Forces, the 
Catholic Church and the traditional bureaucracy. In contrast to Franco's dictatorship 
in Spain, that completely isolated the country from the international events, Salazar- 
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Caetano's regime was more opened to the outside world. In 1949 Portugal became a 
member of the NATO alliance and its priority, during the 1950s and the 1960s, was 
to protect its colonies against independence movements. Economic growth during 
the 1950s was based on import substitution and heavy protection, but this changed 
gradually during the 1960s as a result of the integration movement in Western 
Europe, international economic changes and developments in Africa (Tsoukalis, 
1981). 
Figure 9.1. Real Growth of Portuguese Military Expenditure and GDP* 
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During the 1960s, Portugal achieved a high rate of economic growth (as most of the 
industrialised countries of the West did) averaging 6.4% per annum with a very low 
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inflation rate (2.9%). During the same period, concern over losing its colonies' 
forced Portugal to keep military expenditure high at 6% of GDP with annual growth 
of 13.2% (see Figures 9.1. and 9.2. ). When Salazar was succeeded by Caetano in 
1968, further attempts to liberalise the economy and to integrate into Europe were 
made, but the process was very slow and the opening to Europe was not seen as a 
substitute for the African colonies. During this decade (the 1960s) an estimated 
785,000 people left the country in search of work abroad, (Solsten, 1993). 
Figure 9.2. Portuguese Military Burden and GDP Growth 
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The dictatorship collapsed in 1974 after the revolt of junior and middle ranking 
officers who formed a movement in favour of peaceful decolonisation2. The coup 
ended a dictatorial regime established by Antonio De Oliveira Salazar in the late 
! In the 1960s, guerrilla movements emerged in the Portuguese African colonies of Angola (1961-75), 
Mozambique (1964-1975) and Guinea-Bissau (1963-74) that aimed at liberating those territories from 
the last "colonial empire". 
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1920s and early 1930s and carried on by his successor Marcello Jodi Das Neves 
Caetano after 1968. A long period of social and political instability followed, with 
many reforms that culminated in the establishment of a Parliamentary. Democracy in 
February 1976. An economic crisis followed, as reforms of the economy and the 
international crises of 1973 and 1979 impacted on the economy. Growth of GDP 
dropped to an average of 4.7% for the decade (which was still high) while inflation 
went up to 16.1 % from 2.9% during the previous decade, (see Figures 9.2. and 9.3. ). 
At the same time military burden started to decline, averaging at 4.7% of GDP for 
the whole decade with an average decline in military expenditure of 1.23 (see Figures 
9.1. and 9.2. ). 
Figure 9.3. Portuguese Inflation and Unemployment Rates* 
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2 Portugal had been fighting in its African colonies since the early 1960s. The wars ended and the 
colonies were granted independence in 1975 after the revolution. 
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Table 9.1. that follows gives the main economic indicators for Portugal over the 
period 1961-1997. Figures are presented as averages for the decades and annually 
for the years 1992 to 1997. 
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In the 1980s, the Portuguese economy (similarly to the Greek and Spanish economies) 
started to deteriorate. Accession to the EC, in 1986, provided structural funds and 
foreign investment and helped the country deal with some of the problems. Average 
annual growth for this decade was 2.9% but inflation increased to 17.5%. Economic 
pressures saw the military burden drop to 2.9% of GDP. 
At the beginning of the 1990s Portuguese economy was characterised by the World 
Bank as an upper-middle-income economy. The 1990s saw Portugal attempting to 
achieve the required criteria for joining the EMU (as did Greece and Spain). In April 
1992, Portugal's currency - escudo - was strong enough to be placed in the ERM of 
EMS. Growth rate during the period 1991-96 was only 1.45% but inflation was 
dramatically brought down from 17.5% during the last decade to 7.1%. This reduction 
in inflation was accompanied by a slight increase in unemployment (see Figure 9.3. on 
page 176). At the same time military burden seems to have stabilised at around 2.7% of 
GDP. 
9.2.2. National Security Concerns and Defence Industries 
Historically, Portugal has had two essential security objectives, the protection of its 
colonial empire and the maintenance of its status as a distinctive national entity on the 
Iberian Peninsula. Although a founding member of NATO in 1949, its material 
contribution to the alliance was only marginal for more than two decades. The main 
reason for this was that the armed forces were preoccupied with the fighting in Africa 
and the efforts to maintain the colonial empire alienated the country from the other 
members of the alliance. After 1974, Portugal showed more activity in NATO and the 
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defence of the West in response to the perceived threat represented by the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact. 
Portugal's defence industry is small, similar in size to that of Greece. Its expansion 
started during the 1960s to meet the specialised requirements of the anti-guerrilla 
operations in Africa. However, since the end of the fighting in 1974 and the scaling 
back of the armed forces that followed, production capabilities have exceeded the 
country's needs, (Solsten, 1993). A modest level of sales abroad have helped the 
Ministry of Defence to keep production lines open for artillery, mortar, and small arms 
ammunition. But, as in Greece, private companies in Portugal are not permitted to 
engage in research, planning, testing, manufacturing or overhaul of equipment 
exclusively intended for military purposes. Only state-owned enterprises are involved in 
the production of bombs, missiles, torpedoes, mines, hand grenades, propellant powders 
and other explosives. The construction of combat aircraft, helicopters and warships was 
also limited to nationally owned companies, although component manufacture could be 
sub-contracted to private firms. 
The main state defence companies include OGFE (production of uniforms and 
equipment), OGME (overhaul of military vehicles) and OGMA (for maintenance and 
repair of all aircraft, avionics, engines, communications and radar equipment of the 
Portuguese air force. OGMA also had some maintenance contracts for the US air force 
and navy equipment and to supply components to several European aircraft 
manufacturers. The main ordnance factory is INDEP producing mortars, artillery and 
mortar munitions, small arms ammunition, machine guns. Portugal's naval base, 
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Arsenal do Alfeite, near Lisbon has the facilities to build patrol craft, auxiliary ships and 
corvettes but not large modern vessels which are constructed abroad. 
9.3. Spain 
9.3.1. Economic and Political background 
Spain's transition from a long period of dictatorship (the Franco regime) to 
parliamentary democracy (monarchy) took place in 1975, after Franco's death. The 
international isolation, autarky and stagnation that characterised Spain during the 
dictatorship dramatically changed after Spain acceded to the EC in 1986 (Story, 1995). 
In particular, as Salmon (1995) notes "membership of the EC altered the pattern of 
external relationships and redefined the position of Spain in the world from a protected 
national economy to an economy embedded in one of the world's core trading regions 
and within the corporate space of multinational companies " (Salmon, 1995, p. 67). 
In the post-war period, Franco had continued the traditional Spanish strategy of seeking 
to protect domestic employment and profits behind high tariff walls both for 
manufactured goods and agriculture. During the 1940s and 1950s the Spanish economy 
grew only fitfully, and suffered from the constraints of a shortage of raw materials, a 
lack of technological innovation, and the persistence of a large, backward, agricultural 
sector. From 1951, Spain's importance for American military strategy in Europe led to 
gradual improvement in its international relations. Before 1960s, Spanish economy was 
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one of the most underdeveloped in Western Europe and it was sometimes characterised 
as a Third World economy. 
Economic strategy radically changed in 1959 when Spain adopted the Stabilisation Plan 
supported by the IMF and the US, which marked the beginning of an outward-looking 
industrialisation policy. The main objectives of this Plan were economic growth 
through encouragement for foreign investment, limited deregulation of capital markets 
and a steady increase in raw materials. The period 1961 to 1970 was characterised by 
high economic growth, averaging 7.3% (see Table 9.2. on page 184 and Figure 9.4. 
below), with inflation at 6.5% per annum (more than Greece and Portugal). 
Figure 9.4. Real Growth of Spanish Military Expenditure and GDP* 
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The political transition of the 1970s coincided with the international energy crisis to 
which Spain was particularly vulnerable because of its dependence on imported fuels 
(Cox and Furlong, 1992). Also, the transition from Franco's rule to the constitutional 
monarchy (1978) saw a decision phase (1975-1978) during which the domestic 
dimension of politics played a primordial role , as the `forces of freedom in Spain" 
negotiated the new constitutional compromise (Eaton, 1981). During the 1970s 
economic expansion was replaced by recession, stagnation, high unemployment and 
inflation (See Figure 9.5). Growth was less than half the growth of the previous decade 
at 3.5% with a period of stagnation in 1979 and 1980. 
Military expenditure during this period was growing at an average annual rate of 5.4% 
while military burden was kept at low levels (1.7% of GDP) compared to the high levels 
of Greece and Portugal. The Socialist government of Gonzalez Marquez that came to 
power in 1982 (the first government after Franco with absolute parliamentary majority) 
lowered inflation and promoted economic modernisation. While in power (1982-1986) 
this government faced three imperatives relating to economic policy: to win over 
business confidence while retaining the government's autonomy to impose unpopular 
measures, to restructure loss-making industries and to shift to export-led growth. This 
required assiduous cultivation of leading Western governments and welcoming Foreign 
Direct Investment as Solsten & Meditz (1998) mention. 
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Figure 9.5. Spanish Inflation and Unemployment Rates* 
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Figure 9.6. Spanish Military Burden and GDP Growth 
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When Spain became a member of the EC in 1986, it did not experience any marked 
deterioration in its economic performance, as Greece and Portugal did. Actually, in the 
second half of the 1980s, the economy experienced growth and foreign capital 
investment that were the highest in Europe. But unemployment was still very high and 
the underground economy was very developed. In 1985 an estimated 18% of the labour 
force was working in the shadow economy. Growth for the decade averaged 3% (0.5% 
less than the previous decade) and inflation instead of increasing (as with Greece and 
Portugal) fell to 9.4%, almost 6% less than the previous decade. Military burden 
increased slightly to 2.2%, which was still considerably lower than that of the two other 
countries. In June 1989, the Spanish peseta joined the EC Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in a move designed to hold down the peseta and thereby set the measure for 
future wage negotiations (Story, 1995, p. 47). The period 1991-96 saw 
lower growth 
(1.5%), lower inflation (5.3%) and a lower military burden (1.6% of GDP) but higher 
184 
unemployment. Growth petered out in the early 1990s as Spain accompanied its 
European neighbours into recession slowly emerging from it in 1994. Table 9.2. 
presents the main economic indicators for Spain as averages for the decades and 
annually for the years 1992-1997. 
9.3.2. National Security Concerns and Defence Industry 
One of Spain's major foreign policy objectives since the advent of democracy has been 
to increase its influence in Latin America. Spain has a special interest in this area 
because of historical ties and a common linguistic, cultural and religious heritage. In the 
post-Franco years, economic investment and diplomatic initiatives were added to the 
more nostalgic links between Spain and its former colonies (Solsten & Meditz, 1998). 
When war broke out between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland islands 
(Malvinas) in the spring 1982, Spain supported Argentina's claim to the islands. Also, 
Spain took active part in the Contadora group, an association of Latin American 
republics seeking peaceful solutions to the bloody struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua. Spain's long-established policy of neutrality ended with its conditional 
accession to NATO in 1982 which was confirmed by referendum in 1986. Defence 
spending remained well below the average for the alliance since then. 
As far as the Spanish defence industry is concerned it is of an average technological 
content, however, definitely more advanced and developed than the defence industries 
in Greece and Portugal. The Spanish military industry became progressively more open 
to foreign influence after the 1953 Spanish-US Treaty that broke the political isolation 
of the country. Breaking the isolation under the Franco regime meant that 
Spanish 
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companies could absorb new foreign technology and eventually participate in 
international arms projects. But this Treaty (1953) on the one hand was beneficial to 
Spain, through the presence of foreign capital and the participation in transnational arms 
programmes, but on the other hand, was harmful for the development of an indigenous 
arms industry as Spain relied on the large number of American military equipment given 
to Spain either as grants or as subsidised sales. Reliance on American equipment and 
lack of effort to develop a domestic defence industry continued throughout the 1960s 
and until the late 1970s after which the situation changed. Starting from the late 1970s 
until the first half of the 1980s, defence production in Spain was highly developed due 
to three important production programmes3 that gave life to the almost dying firms. 
In the 1980s, five companies (all part of the public holding Instituto Nacional de 
Industria) were responsible for most of the military production which was carried out by 
public firms. The Instituto Nacional de Industria also includes a `Defence Division' 
consisting of three firms: 
a) Construcciones Aeronauticas, SA (aerospace firm) 
b) Empresa Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares (military shipyards) 
c) Empresa Nacional Santa Barbara de Construcciones Militares (arms conglomerate for 
all sort of munitions, firearms and artillery). 
Two other public firms which are, however, outside the Defence Division are ENASA 
(lorry and trucks manufacturer) and INISEL (electronics). 
The three production programmes were: a) in aeronautics (the construction under licence of 70 
Northrop's F-5 contracted to CASA in 1965), b) in shipbuilding (the construction of five frigates under 
American licence and two submarines under French licence) and c) in land weapons (the construction of 
280 tanks under French licence), Mollas-Gallard, (1992) 
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Figure 9.7. Spanish Exports of Major Weapons to Third World* 
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As in the case of Greece and Portugal, the private sector plays a secondary role in 
military production, manufacturing mostly light weaponry, ammunition, sub-systems 
and components. In the early 1980s, Spanish defence industries were very successful in 
arms exports (see Figure 9.7. ) mainly because of the relatively small scale of Spain's 
own military orders. By 1987, it had risen to eighth rank as a world exporter with a 
number of clients in the Middle East and Latin America. But this optimistic sign 
changed after the changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. After 1988, Spain 
enforced sales embargoes against countries accused of human rights violations 
(S. Africa, Chile, Paraguay), Warsaw Pact and other communist countries as well as 
active belligerents (Iran, Iraq), (Mollas-Gallard, 1992). However, Solsten & Meditz 
(1998) point out that the Spanish press has often reported violations of these controls. 
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9.4. A Comparison between Greece, Portugal and Spain 
After the brief analysis of the Portuguese and Spanish economies, one can easily note 
many similarities with Greece as far as their economic performance is concerned but, at 
the same time some differences as far as the pattern of their military expenditure is 
concerned. Looking at Figure 9.8. that presents the real growth of GDP for the three 
countries, it is obvious that Greece and Portugal move in a more similar pattern than 
that of Spain which performed slightly better during the period examined. 
Figure 9.8. Real Growth of GDP for Greece, Portugal and Spain* 
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The depression of the early 1970s which coincided with the collapse of the dictatorships 
in all three countries (for Greece these coincided with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as 
well) is reflected in the negative growth of GDP, reaching at around -4% for Greece and 
Portugal in 1974 and 1975, respectively, while Spain managed to avoid the "below 
zero" rate. The Greek economy was in crisis more often than the two other countries 
(in 
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1981-83,1987 and 1990) while all three countries reached a crisis in 1993. Among the 
three economies, Spain seems to have performed better. In terms of social indicators, 
for example, GDP per capita is higher in Spain with Greece and Portugal following, if 
GDP per capita is taken in constant 1990 mn US $ (see Figure 9.9. ). But as it can be 
seen from Figure 9.10., if GDP per capita is taken in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 
then the Portuguese GDP per capita is higher than Greek after 1990. 
As far as inflation is concerned (see Figure 9.11), one could say that the pattern is quite 
similar for the three economies which all faced low inflation rates until the early 1970s, 
but high rates since then, with Spain having the lowest inflation rate among the three 
after the early 1980s. But this is not the case as far as the unemployment rate is 
concerned with Spain having the highest rates of unemployment from the beginning of 
the 1980s (see Figure 9.12). 
Figure 9.9. GDP per capita in 1990 US $ 
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Figure 9.10. GDP per capita in PPP (EUR15=100) 
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Figure 9.11. Inflation Rate for Greece, Portugal, Spain 
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Figure 9.12. Unemployment Rate for Greece, Portugal and Spain* 
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Looking at the pattern of investment as a percentage of GDP (Figure 9.13. ) one can note 
a very similar behaviour for all three countries with only Spain having a relatively 
smaller share than that of Greece and Portugal for the period starting at mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s. In terms of growth rates of investment (Figure 9.14. ), 1974 was a bad year 
for Greece as the annual percentage change in investment dropped by 30% during that 
year, while this drop was less dramatic for Portugal and Spain a year later (1975). 
Investment had negative growth rates in all countries in 1984 and 1993. 
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Figure 9.13. Investment as a percentage of GDP for Greece, Portugal, Spain 
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Figure 9.14. Growth rate of Investment in Greece, Portugal, Spain* 
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Another important economic characteristic to be considered is the gross national debt of 
the three countries (see Figure 9.15). In the early 1970s it was quite low for all three 
countries at around 20% of GDP. After 1975, slight increases are observed only in the 
case of Greece and Portugal while, after the early 1980s, for all three countries. What is 
most interesting though, is the dramatic increase in the Greek debt after 1988 which 
reached very high levels that remained high until 1997 (above 100% of GDP). Portugal, 
on the other hand, used to have higher debt than Greece prior to 1988 but managed to 
reduce it substantially, achieving in 1995 a lower debt than Spain, which had the lowest 
debt among the three for the period prior to 1995. 
Figure 9.15. Consolidated Gross Debt for Greece, Portugal and Spain* 
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Although economic indicators seem to move quite closely in all three countries, this 
is 
not the case for their military expenditure. Spain had throughout the period the 
lowest 
military burden among the three countries, and it remained stable at around 
2% of GDP, 
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with a slight increase in the 1980s (due to the development of the arms industry and the 
expansion of production). But when it comes to Portugal and Greece, things are quite 
different. Setting 1974 as the critical year for both countries, as can be seen from Figure 
9.16., Portugal had a high military burden (higher than Greece) for the years prior to 
1974 and after that a dramatically decreased one. Exactly the opposite pattern is 
observed for Greece that before 1974 had a lower military burden compared to the years 
after 1974. The reduction of the Portuguese military burden after 1974 was attributed to 
the end of the dictatorship but most importantly to the end of the Colonian Empire. For 
Greece the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 marked a huge increase in military 
burden which has remained high since then due to continuous disagreements and 
conflicts with the neighbouring country. 
Figure 9.16. Military Burden for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
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Looking at figure 9.17., an increased level of per capita military expenditure is 
observed for Greece after 1974. In contrast, Portugal after 1974 experienced a reduced 
level of per capita spending for the same reasons reported previously, when the military 
burden was under pressure (Portugal did not have to fight colonian wars anymore while 
Greece was facing the Turkish threat). Spain, on the other hand, has had the highest 
level of military expenditure among the three (see Figure 9.18. that presents military 
expenditure in 1990 mn US $). With a population four times bigger than Greece's and 
Portugal's, per capita spending is much lower than Greece and a slightly higher than 
Portugal only after 1974 (the year after which dramatically reduced its defence spending, 
see Figure 9.19. ). Data on disaggregated military expenditure data can be found on 
Table Fl in Appendix F. Also see Figures Fl, F2 and F3 for a comparison between 
military personnel and military equipment expenditure in the three countries. 
Figure 9.17. Military Expenditure per capita in Greece, Portugal, Spain* 
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Figure 9.18. Military Expenditure for Greece, Portugal and Spain in 1990 mn US S 
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Figure 9.19. Real Growth of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese Miltary Expenditure* 
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9.5. Conclusions 
This Chapter has provided a background analysis of the two Iberian economies, Portugal 
and Spain, over the last three and a half decades. Under no circumstances should this 
analysis be considered exhaustive. This would be an enormous task that could justify a 
separate thesis. The intention was simply to provide some background information of 
their economic performance and the evolution of their military expenditure prior to 
empirical analysis. 
During 1960-1973 all three countries enjoyed higher rates of growth than the rest of the 
EC or even any individual member country (Tsoukalis, 1981). In the same period all 
three countries had low inflation and unemployment rates but this situation was soon 
followed by a period of both high inflation and unemployment. High unemployment 
constitutes a more severe problem in Spain. Also the crisis of the mid-1970s led to a 
huge drop in investment for all the countries. Government debt has also risen a lot after 
1975 and has become a serious economic problem during the last two decades, 
especially for Greece. 
High rates of economic growth have been observed in both periods of high and low 
military expenditure for all countries. Portugal was a big defence spender during the 
1960s and early 1970s mainly because of the need to keep its colonies. But after the 
colonial wars ended, Portugal reduced its military burden which is kept at quite low 
levels since then. Greece on the other hand, started to be a big defence spender after 
1974, the year of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Since then, the continuous 
disagreements and conflicts with Turkey have left Greece with no alternative but to keep 
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a high military burden. Spain throughout the period examined has maintained a low 
military burden, mainly because it lost its colonies at an early, stage. 
Having in mind the aforementioned features of the three economies will be particularly 
important and useful when analysing empirically the defence-growth relationship. 
Knowledge of the specific economic, political and strategic features of each country will 
be taken into account when the empirical estimation takes place. In this way, the 
empirical analysis can be particularly valuable and informative as it does not miss out 
important structural changes as is usually the case with cross-sectional studies of large 
groups of countries. 
The next Chapter, reconsiders the models developed for Greece and employs them to 
analyse the defence-growth relationship for Portugal and Spain adjusting them only to 
account for the country-specific information. Once the models are estimated for 
Portugal and Spain, a comparative analysis on the defence-growth relationship for the 
three countries follows. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP IN 
PORTUGAL AND SPAIN: 
A COMPARISON WITH GREECE 
10.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether defence spending in Portugal 
and Spain has similar economic effects to those found in the case of Greece. As 
discussed previously, the three countries followed a common pattern of development 
during the period examined (1960-1996), sharing many economic characteristics, and 
being characterised as "the peripheral countries of the EU". As such, one would 
expect defence spending to have similar economic effects in all three countries. 
However, given that only Greece among the three has important security 
considerations (the Turkish threat) that necessitate high defence spending which is 
primarily financed by imports, it is possible that the negative effects of defence found 
for Greece, will not apply to Portugal' and Spain. This may be particularly true for 
Spain as it is an arms exporter. But these are just some speculations that must be 
tested via empirical analysis. 
Portugal was a big defence spender during the 1960s and 1970s mainly because of the need to keep 
its colonies but since then it gradually reduced its military burden. As for Spain and because it lost its 
colonies earlier than Portugal military burden is much lower than Greece's and Portugal's 
during the 
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For consistency, the method and empirical analysis for Portugal and Spain will be the 
same as those undertaken in the case of Greece. Specifically, the same models that 
were developed for Greece (with only minor necessary changes) will be applied to 
Portuguese and Spanish data. In this way, possible differences in the results will not 
be attributed to different theoretical frameworks and model specifications. 
Furthermore, the sample period for the two countries will be the same as that of 
Greece (1960-1996) and the data will come from the same sources (SIPRI and 
EUROSTAT). So, leaving aside differences in methodologies employed, time 
periods and data sources chosen, which tend to constitute the main reasons for the 
diversity in results, but, at the same time, taking into account the socioeconomic 
development of each country, the empirical analysis can provide unbiased and 
consistent results for an inter-country comparison. 
The Chapter starts with the Granger causality approach, followed by the supply side 
and the demand and supply model for Portugal and Spain. Once this is done, a 
comparison with Greece is undertaken both in terms of the results obtained from the 
different models employed and in terms of general economic effects of defence 
spending in the three countries. 
period examined (1960-1996). For more information, see Solsten (1993) and Solsten & Meditz 
(1998). 
200 
10.2. Statistical Causality for Portugal and Spain 
Following exactly the methodology employed for Greece in Chapter 6, the statistical 
causality between GDP growth and military burden is now investigated for Portugal 
and Spain. Prior to anything else the integration properties of the two series are 
established by applying the Dickey-Fuller (1979) tests for unit roots. In case the two 
series are integrated of the same order the existence of a long-run relationship 
between them is investigated by testing for cointegration within the Johansen (1988) 
framework. The existence of a cointegrating relationship will have important 
consequences when the short-run Granger causality between the two series is 
investigated. Also, the existence of structural breaks in the data is taken into 
consideration by allowing for certain dummies to capture significant changes due to 
specific incidents in each country. Recalling (from Chapter 6) the standard Granger 
causality test which can only be applied on stationary data and postulates that the 
information for the prediction of the variables Xt and Zt is contained only in the time- 
series data of these variables. The test involves estimating the following regressions: 
kk 
xt= Ya1 Zt-i +y 
, )6j 
x, 
-.; 
+uit ý1) 
ý-ý j-ý 
m 
Zt _ 
i=l 
m 
Zt-i +ýS 
/_ý 
Xtj+u2c (2) 
And as in the case of Greece, for both Portugal and Spain three specifications of the 
Granger causality model are presented: the standard Granger causality (eq. 3,4), the 
one augmented by the Error Correction Term (ECT) (eq. 5,6), and finally the one 
augmented by both the ECT and the country-specific dummy variables (eq. 7.8). 
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Using the same notation as that used for the case of Greece, the three specifications 
are: 
AY = ao + a, AY(-1) + a2 DY(-2) + a3 ASM(-1) + a4 ASM(-2) +u (3) 
ASM = ßo +ßi ASM(-1) + ß2 ASM(-2) +P3 AY(-1) + ß4 AY(-2) +6 (4) 
AY = ao + a, AY(-1) + a2 AY(-2) + a3 OSM(-1) + a4 ASM(-2) + ECT(-1) +u (5) 
OSM = PO +ß1 OSM(-1) +P2 OSM(-2) +P3 AY(-1) + ß4 AY(-2) + ECT(-1) +E (6) 
AY = a. o + al AY(-1) + a2 AY(-2) + a3 ASM(-1) + a4 ASM(-2) + ECT(-1) +D+u (7) 
OSM = ßo +ßi OSM(-1)+ ß2 OSM(-2)+ ß3 AY(-1)+ ß4 AY(-2)+ ECT(-1)+ D+E (8) 
The null hypothesis in equations 3,5 and 7 is that ASM(-1) and ASM(-2) do not 
Granger cause AY (Ho: a3 = a4 = 0) and in equations 4,6 and 8 that AY(-1) and AY(- 
2) do not Granger cause OSM (Ho: ß3 = ß4 = 0). 
10.2.1. Empirical Results for Portugal 
Starting with Portugal, the integration properties of the logarithm of Portuguese GDP 
(Y) and of the Portuguese military burden (SM), are examined by the DF and ADF 
tests for unit roots (see Appendix G, Tables G1, G2, G3). When only an intercept is 
included (Table G1 in Appendix G) the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for 
the GDP variable but it is not rejected for the military burden variable which seems 
to be l(l) (integrated of order one). But before concluding about the integration 
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properties of the series, the DF tests with an intercept and a linear trend must also be 
examined. According to these results (Table G2 in Appendix G) both series are non- 
stationary or integrated of order one. To justify this, DF tests for the differenced 
series are also presented on Table G3 in Appendix G. According to the tests the 
differenced series are proved to be stationary, and by induction, the level series must 
be I(1) - integrated of order one. So, the two series (Y and SM) are treated as non- 
stationary. 
Table 10.1. Cointegration Tests for Portuguese GDP and Military Burden 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
36 observations from 1961 to 1996. Order of VAR =I 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: Y, SM, Trend 
List of e genvalues in descending order: . 
37236 
. 
24021 0.0000 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0 r= 1 16.7681 19.2200 17.1800 
r <= 1r=29.8896 12.3900 10.5500 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r >= 1 26.6578 25.7700 23.0800 
r <= 1r=29.8896 12.3900 10.5500 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 206.1652 204.1652 202.5816 203.6125 
r=1 214.5492 208.5492 203.7987 206.8912 
r=2 219.4940 211.4940 205.1600 209.2833 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
Given that the two series are integrated of the same order, the existence of a long-run 
relationship among them is a possibility. Testing for cointegration in a VAR(l) 
model (see Table G4 in Appendix G for the selection criteria for the order of the 
VAR) within the Johansen framework, the LR test based on the Eigenvalues of the 
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stochastic matrix does not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of 
the alternative while the LR test based on the trace of the stochastic matrix clearly 
rejects the null of no cointegration in favour of one cointegrating vector. 
Furthermore, the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria2 also indicate the existence of 
one cointegrating vector. 
As such, the conclusion is that there is a cointegrating vector or a long-run 
relationship between the two variables which must be taken into consideration when 
the short-run causality is examined by including the Error Correction Term (ECT) 
from this long-run relationship. The ECT is nothing more than the lagged value of 
the estimated residuals from the following cointegrating relationship: 
Yt = 11.56 - 22.74 SMt + E; t (9) 
(8 8.9) (7.7) 
Having these in mind, the cointegrating series can be modelled under a VAR(1) 
specification. Starting with the standard Granger causality test, the null hypothesis in 
equation 3 is that ASM(-1) does not Granger cause AY (Ho: a3 = a4 = 0) and in 
equation 4 that AY(-1) does not Granger cause ASM (Ho: ß3 = 34 = 0). The results in 
Table 10.2. for equation 3, show that the lagged value of the change in military 
burden is negatively related to growth but its effect is insignificant. Furthermore, the 
LR, LM and F tests indicate absence of any causal relationship from SM to Y. But 
results for the military burden equation (equation 4) indicate a positive and 
2 It is very commonly observed that different tests and selection criteria give conflicting results. 
It is 
very uncommon for all tests to point to the same conclusion 
(Pesaran & Pesaran. 1997) 
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significant effect of growth on military burden and the LR, LM and F tests support 
the existence of causality. So, the standard test suggests that growth Granger causes 
defence with the effect being positive while there is no evidence of defence causing 
growth. Moving on to the next specification which includes the ECT (equations 5, 
6), results on the same Table (Table 10.2. ) show that the models are better specified 
now, the direction of causality continues to be the same while the ECT is significant 
in both the military burden and the growth equation. 
Finally, the third specification considers important structural changes that the 
Portuguese economy underwent by including a shock dummy (D74) to capture the 
instability that the collapse of the military government brought about in Portugal. 
The inclusion of this dummy significantly alters the results (see Table 10.2., 
equations 7,8). Growth is not causally prior to defence anylonger. But what is more 
interesting is that the negative effect of the military burden in the growth equation, 
now becomes significant. The LM, LR and F tests suggest that military burden 
Granger causes growth with the effect being negative. There is some evidence of 
serial correlation in the military burden equation which is sustained even if more lags 
are introduced. But in the context of the formulated model, no remedies for serial 
correlation are satisfactory, and as such, results are presented with this caveat. 
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Table 10.2. Granger Causality Results for Portugal 
Dependent AY Dependent ASM 
Eq. 3 Eq. 5 Eq. 7 Eq. 4 Eq. 6 Eq. 8 
AY(-1) 0.41 0.39 0.54 0.05 0.04 0.01 
(2.50)** (2.44)** (3.28)*** (1.79)* (1.70)* (0.37) 
ASM(-1) -0.93 -0.98 -1.55 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 
(1.08) (1.18) (1.89)* (0.42) (0.51) (0.48) 
Intercept 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
(2.68)** (2.98)*** (2.48)** (1.99)* (1.82)* (1.15) 
ECT(-1) -0.04 -0.03 -0.008 -0.01 
(1.86)* (1.44) (2.07)** (3.03)*** 
D74 -0.07 0.02 
(2.21)** (3.26)*** 
R2 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.09 0.20 0.41 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.005 0.005 0.004 
DW 1.86 1.89 2.05 2.16 2.01 1.17 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial X2(1)=0.3 5 X2(1)=0.47 X2(1)=0.27 X2(1)=1.33 X2(1)=0.15 X2 (1)=15.8 
Correl. [. 552] [. 492] [. 605] [. 249] [. 699] [. 000] 
F(1,3 1)=0.3 F(1,30)=0.4 F(1,29)=0.2 F(1,31)=1.2 F(1,30)=0.1 F(1,29)=24 
[. 578] [. 527] [. 640] [. 277] [. 722] [. 000] 
Funct. X2(1)=6.69 X2(1)=6.08 X2(1)=5.42 X2(1)=0.09 X2(1)=8.17 X2(1)=8.64 
Form [. 010] [. 014] [. 020] [. 761] [. 004] [. 003] 
F(1,3 1)=7.3 F(1,30)=6.3 F(1,29)=5.3 F(1,31)=0.1 F(1,30)=9.1 F(1,29)=9.5 
[. 011] [. 018] [. 028] [. 776] [. 005] [. 004] 
Normal. X2(2)=0.77 X2(2)=0.72 X2(2)=1.25 X2(2)=8.25 X2(2)=0.70 X2(2)=8.68 
[. 682] [. 698] [. 534] [. 016] [. 706] [. 013] 
Heterosk X2(1)=0.72 X2(1)=0.11 X2(1)=0.02 X2(1)=3.63 X2(1)=8.02 X2(1)=0.28 
[. 397] [. 737] [. 882] [. 057] [. 005] [. 594] 
F(1, )3)=0.7 F(1,33)=0.1 F(1,33)=0.0 F(1,33)=3.8 F(1,33)=9.8 F(1,33)=0.3 
[. 412] [. 746] [. 886] [. 059] [. 004] [. 607] 
Causality Tests 
LM X2(1)=1.24 X2(1)=1.51 X2(1)=3.72 X2(1)=3.18 X2( 1)=2.99 X2(1)=0.16 
[. 266] [. 219] [. 054]* [. 075]* [. 0841* [. 686] 
LR X2(1)=1.26 X2(1)=1.54 X2(1)=3.93 X2(1)=3.3 3 X`(1)=3.12 X2(1)=0.16 
[. 262] [. 214] [. 047]** [. 068]* [. 077]* [. 686] 
F F(1,32)=1.2 F(1,31)=1.4 F(1,30)=3.5 F(1,32)=3.2 F(1,31)=2.8 F(1,30)=0.1 
[. 287] [. 246] [. 069]* [. 083]* [. 099]* [. 710] 
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10% 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
Figures in square brackets are probabilities 
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10.2.2. Empirical Results for Spain 
Moving on to Spain, the integration properties of the logarithm of Spanish GDP (Y) 
and those of the Spanish military burden (SM), are examined by the DF and ADF 
tests for unit roots (see Appendix G, Tables G5, G6 and G7). When only an 
intercept is included (Table G5 in the Appendix) the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected for the GDP variable but it is not rejected for the military burden variable 
which seems to be I(1) (integrated of order one). But before concluding about the 
integration properties of the series, the DF tests with an intercept and a linear trend 
must be examined. According to these results (Table G6 in the Appendix) the null 
hypothesis of no unit roots is rejected for both series. To justify whether the two 
series are integrated of order one or of a higher order, DF tests for the differenced 
series are also presented on Table G7 in Appendix G. According to the tests the 
differenced series are still non-stationary, and they only become stationary when they 
are differenced twice suggesting that the level series are 1(2) - integrated of order 
two. This is very uncommon particularly for the GDP series. It seems unlikely that a 
rate of change of GDP would exhibit a unit root, because once disturbed, the 
probability of returning to the initial growth rate would be zero. "All empirical 
evidence of GDP growth, however, suggests that these series do revert to mean 
growth rate ", (Macnair et al, 1995, p. 853). As for the military burden (the share of 
military expenditure in GDP) the results are equally strange suggesting it is 1(2). 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the coefficients is completely lost if the series are 
differenced twice. Given the large literature3 questioning the ability of the ADF tests 
to distinguish between unit roots and stationarity in finite samples, one might 
consider that in the - case of the Spanish variables the ADF tests give invalid 
conclusions. Having a sample size of 36 observations and losing 3 due to the lag 
structure justifies a finite sample argument. Therefore, the probability of committing 
a type II error (accepting the unit root hypothesis when it is false) is high. Following 
this, the two series (Y and SM) are treated as non-stationary, integrated of order one. 
Table 10.3. Cointegration Tests for Spanish GDP and Military Burden 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
35 observations from 1962 to 1996. Order of VAR =2 
List of variables included in the cointegrated vector: Y, SM, Trend 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: . 38237 . 053673 0.0000 
Cointegration LR test based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0 r= 1 16.8656 15.8700 13.8100 
r <= 1r=21.9309 9.1600 7.5300 
Cointegration LR test based on Trace of the stochastic matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value 
r=0r >= 1 18.7964 20.1800 17.8800 
r <= 1r=21.9309 9.1600 7.5300 
Choice of r using Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Max. LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 276.1553 272.1553 269.0446 271.0814 
r=1 284.5880 276.5880 270.3667 274.4404 
r=2 285.5535 275.5535 267.7767 272.8689 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
Given that the two series are integrated of the same order, the existence of a long-run 
relationship among them is a possibility. Testing for cointegration in a VAR(2) 
model (see Table G8 in the Appendix the selection criteria for the order of the VAR) 
within the Johansen framework (see Table 10.3), the LR test based on the 
Eigenvalues of the stochastic matrix does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in favour of the alternative while the LR test based on the trace of the 
3 See Campbell, J. Y. & Perron, P. (1991) and Cochran, J. H. (1991) 
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stochastic matrix rejects the null of no cointegration in favour of one cointegrating 
vector at 10% level of significance. Furthermore, this is also supported by the 
Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria4. 
As such, the conclusion is that there is a cointegrating, vector or a long-run 
relationship between the two variables which must be taken into consideration when 
the short-run causality is examined by including the Error Correction Term (ECT) 
from this long-run relationship. The ECT is nothing more than the lagged value of 
the estimated residuals from the following cointegrating relationship: 
Yt = 12.42 + 13.90 SM, + st (10) 
(25.56) (0.5) 
Having these in mind, the cointegrating series can be modelled under a VAR 
specification. The selection criteria for the order of the VAR point to a VAR(2) 
model (see Table G8 in Appendix G). Starting with the standard Granger causality 
test, the null hypothesis in equation 3 is that ASM(-1) does not Granger cause AY 
(Ho: a3 = a4 = 0) and in equation 4 that AY(-1) does not Granger cause ASM (Ho: ß3 
= ß4 = 0). Results on Table 10.4. show that the lagged value of the change in 
military burden is positively related to growth but that its effect is insignificant. 
Furthermore, the LR, LM and F tests indicate the absence of any causal relationship 
from SM to Y. Results for the military burden equation (equation 4), also indicate 
absence of any significant relationship from growth to military burden and the LR, 
a It is very commonly observed that different tests and selection criteria give conflicting results. It is 
very uncommon for all tests to point to the same conclusion (Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997) 
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LM and F tests reject the existence of causality. So, the standard test suggests that 
there is absolutely no causal relationship between growth and defence in Spain5. 
Table 10.4. Granger Causality Results for Spain 
Dependent AY Dependent ASM 
E. 3 E. 5 E. 7 E. 4 E. 6 E. 8 
AY(-1) 0.64 0.47 0.50 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
(3.44)*** (2.52)** (2.78)*** (1.24) (1.73)* (1.85)* 
AY(-2) 0.05 -0.20 -0.06 0.006 -0.004 -0.01 
(0.28) (1.03) (0.28) (0.57) (0.32) (0.78) 
ASM(-1) 0.95 -2.73 -0.98 -0.01 -0.15 -0.23 
(0.33) (0.88) (0.32) (0.09) (0.83) (1.18) 
ASM(-2) 0.51 -2.56 -1.04 0.43 0.31 0.25 
(0.18) (0.87) (0.36) (2.67)** (1.78)* (1.38) 
Intercept 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.72)* (2.97)*** (2.28)** (0.60) (1.54) (1.88)* 
ECT(-1) -0.04 -0.03 -0.001 -0.002 
(2.33)** (1.55) (1.47) (1.84)* 
D75 -0.04 0.001 
(1.89)* (1.24) 
R2 0.51 0.59 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.35 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.001 
DW 2.03 1.93 1.82 1.91 1.99 1.97 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial X2(1)=3.04 X2(1)=0.25 X2(1)=1.41 X2(1)=0.28 X2(1)=0.47 X2(1)=0.02 
Correl. [. 081] [. 617] [. 235] [. 595] [. 491] [. 890] 
F(1,28)=2.7 F(1,27)=0.2 F(1,26)=1.1 F(1,28)=0.2 F(1,27)=0.4 F(1,26)=0.0 
[. 109] [. 658] [. 299] [. 631] [. 542] [. 904] 
Funct. X2(1)=0.28 X2(1)=0.31 X2(1)=1.26 X2(1)=2.19 X2(1)=0.45 X2(1)=0.02 
Form [. 598] [. 578] [. 262] [. 139] [. 503] [. 889] 
F(1,28)=0.2 F(1,27)=0.2 F(1,26)=1.0 F(1,28)=1.9 F(1,27)=0.4 F(1,26)=0.0 
[. 635] [. 623] [. 326] [. 176] [. 553] [. 904] 
Normal. X (2)=0.21 X2(2)=1.64 X2(2)=0.73 X2(2)=1.43 X2(2)=1.72 X2(2)=1.18 
[. 901] [. 441] [. 695] [. 490] [. 423] [. 554] 
Heterosk X2(1)=1.11 X2(1)=1.28 X2(1)=2.29 X2(1)=0.001 X2(1)=0.18 X2(1)=0.02 
[. 293] [. 258] [. 131] [. 970] [. 670] [. 897] 
F(1,32)=1.1 F(1, )2)=1.2 F(1,32)=2.3 F(1,32)=0.0 F(1,32)=0.2 F(1,32)=0.0 
[. 307] [. 2711 [. 139] [. 971] [. 681] [. 900] 
Causality Tests 
LM X2(2)=0.16 X2(2)=1.39 X2(2)=0.2 X2(2)=1.98 X2(2)=4.27 X2(2)=5.6 
[. 924] [. 499] [. 900] [. 3711 [. 118] [. 060] * 
LR X2(2)=0.16 X2(2)=1.42 X2(2)=0.2 X2(2)=2.04 X2(2)=4.57 X2(2)=6.1 
[. 924] [. 492] [. 899] [. 360] [. 102] [. 046]** 
F F(2,29)=0.1 F(2,28)=0.6 F(2,27)=0.1 F(2,29)=0.9 F(2,28)=2 F(2,27)=2.7 
[. 935] [. 558] [. 919] [. 418] [. 153] [. 087]* 
s For Spain, no cointegration could be suggested, in which case equations 3 and 4 are correct. 
210 
Moving on to the next specification which includes the ECT (equations 5,6), results 
on Table 10.4. show that the models are better specified now but there is still no 
causality running from defence to growth. The ECT is significant in both the 
military burden and the growth equation and furthermore there is evidence of some 
causality running from growth to defence, with the effect being negative. Finally, 
the third specification considers important structural changes that the Spanish 
economy underwent by including a shock dummy (D75) to capture the instability 
that the collapse of the military government brought about in Spain. The inclusion of 
this dummy does have a negative effect in the growth equation and now the ECT is 
no longer significant. In the military burden equation, growth continues to be 
causally prior to defence and its significance increases. The LM, LR and F tests 
suggest that growth Granger causes defence with the effect being negative. The 
ECT is significant but only at the 10% level. 
10.2.3. Comparison with Greece 
Following the extended approach to the standard Granger causality testing (by taking 
into account the long-run information that might exist between the military burden 
and growth variables as well as the possible structural breaks in the data) empirical 
results for the defence-growth relationship appear to be quite different in each of the 
three countries. Table 10.5. summarises these results and also shows that the 
extended tests give different results to the standard tests for each country. Clearly, 
the simple Granger causality tests give misleading results. 
211 
Table 10.5. Granger Causality Tests for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Dependent AY Dependent ASM 
Greece Portu al Spain Greece Portu al Spain 
AY(-1) -0.02 0.54 0.50 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 
(0.10) (3.28)*** (2.78)*** (0.76) (0.37) (1.85)* 
AY(-2) -0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 
(0.47) (0.28) (0.47) (0.78) 
ASM(-1) 0.88 -0.98 -0.98 0.11 0.06 -0.23 
(0.96) (1.18) (0.32) (0.50) (0.48) (1.18) 
ASM(-2) -0.25 -1.04 0.03 0.25 
(0.27) (0.36) (0.16) (1.38) 
Intercept 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
(3.40)*** (2.48)** (2.28)** (0.58) (1.15) (1.88)* 
ECT(-1) -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.006 -0.01 -0.002 
(3.33)*** (1.44) (1.55) (1.36) (3.03)*** (1.84)* 
D75 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.003 0.02 0.001 
(2.71)** (2.21)** (1.89)* (0.81) (3.26)*** (1.24) 
R2 0.65 0.36 0.64 0.14 0.41 0.35 
SE 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.005 0.004 0.001 
DW 1.99 2.05 1.82 2.08 1.17 1.97 
Causality Tests 
LM X2(2)=1.20 X2(1)=3.72 X2 (2)=0.2 X2(2)=1.09 X2(1)=0.16 X2(2)=5.6 
[. 549] [. 054]* [. 900] [. 579] [. 686] [. 060]* 
LR X2(2)=1.22 X22(1)=3.93 X2(2)=0.2 X2(2)=1.11 X2(1)=0.16 X2(2)=6.1 
[. 543] [. 047]** [. 899] [. 574] [. 686] [. 046]** 
F F(2,27)=0.5 F(1,30)=3.5 F(2,27)=0.1 F(2,27)=0.4 F(1,30)=0.1 F(2,27)=2.7 
[. 615] [. 069]* [. 919] [. 643] [. 710] [. 087]* 
As can be seen from Table 10.5., in the case of Greece there is an absence of any 
causal relationship between military burden and economic growth, while for Portugal 
there is evidence of military burden Granger causing growth, with the effect being 
negative. As for Spain there is some evidence of causality from growth to defence 
with a negative effect. Overall, the results suggest that despite the similarities of the 
three countries in terms of their economic and political development, there is no 
common causal relationship between defence and growth. 
10.3. The Supply-Side Model for Portugal and Spain 
Reconsider the Feder-Ram model that was analysed in Chapter 7. Assuming only the 
size effects of each of the military, government and export sector on economic 
growth, the equation to be estimated is: 
.I. Y=aY+, 8 L+ (5K 
+ (5R 
+CG G(Y) + 
18x 
1+5, ) + cX XýYý+ 
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(11) 
But when the size effects are separated from the externality effects, the `augmented' 
model to be estimated is the following: 
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10.3.1. Empirical Results for Portugal 
Equations (11) and (12) were estimated by OLS using Microfit 4.0. As in the case of 
Greece, Table 10.6. gives results for the total (size) effects of each sector (equation 
11) and Table 10.7. also gives the externality effects and the productivity 
differentials (equation 12). In each case the first column gives results from the two- 
sector model (military and civilian), the second column from the three-sector model 
(civilian, military and government) and the third column gives results from the four- 
sector model (civilian, military, government and export). 
Table 10.6. OLS Results of the Feder Model for Portugal (1961-1996) 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 11 Eq. 11 Eq. 11 
Intercept -0.11 (2.81)*** -0.13 (3.36)*** -0.14 (3.63)*** 
1/Y, 0.52 ()'. 82)*** 0.53 (4.12)*** 0.52 (4.19)*** 
AL / L_, -0.18 (0.93) -0.33 (1.64) -0.31 (1.64) 
AM / M_, (M /Y 0.66 (1.10) -0.29 (0.39) -0.46 (0.64) 
AG / G_, (G / Y, 
) 
------ 2.53 (2.07)** 3.03 (2.52)** 
AX / X-1 (x / YI) ------ ------ 0.26 (1.89)* 
R2 0.41 0.48 0.54 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 
DW 1.68 1.92 2.19 
F-stat F(3,32)=7.4*** F(4,31)=7.21*** F(5,30)=6.96*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=0.77 [. 379] X2(1)=0.01 [. 967] X2(1)=0.64 [. 423] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.01 [. 937] X2(1)=0.60 [. 439] X2(1)=2.21 [. 137] 
Normality X2(2)=1.72 [. 423] X2(2)=1.89[. 389] X2(2)=0.24 [. 886] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=2.13 [. 144] X2(1)=0.08 [. 774] X2(1)=0.04 [. 844] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. 
Starting from equation 11, which describes the total (size) effects of each sector on 
economic growth, one can note that the overall performance of the model is not very 
satisfactory and it is quite similar to that of the Greek model. Starting from the two 
sector model (column I on Table 10.6. ), the total effect of the military sector is 
positive but insignificant. Investment is positive and highly significant while labour 
force growth -as in the case of Greece- is the only variable that 
has an unexpected 
negative sign but unlike in the case of Greece it is insignificant. The model passes 
all tests for serial correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedastisity. 
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On the second column of Table 10.6., the government sector (excluding the military) 
enters the equation with a positive sign (this was also the case for Greece) significant 
at 5%. As for the effect of the military sector, it became negative but still 
insignificant, while the signs and significance of the intercept, investment and labour 
force growth remain more or less the same. Finally, by adding the export sector (see 
column 3 of table 10.6. ), all of the variables' signs and significance remain the same 
but the model is now better specified. Non-nested tests clearly indicated that the 
four-sector model was preferred to the three and two-sector ones. The effect of the 
export sector is positive and significant at 10% which was not the case for Greece. 
Again there are no problems of serial correlation, functional form, normality and 
heteroscedastisity. 
Moving on to equation 12, which considers the externality and the relative 
productivity effects, results are slightly altered. The specification seems reasonable 
with no problems of serial correlation, structural form, normality and 
heteroscedastisity. The R2 suggests that the equation explains 43% in the two-sector 
case, 51 % in the three-sector case and 62% in the four-sector case of the variation in 
the dependent variable. Again, multicollinearity seems to be a problem especially in 
the two and three sector models given the high F statistic and the individual 
insignificance of the variables. But the problem is not as severe as in the case of 
Greece. 
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Table 10.7. OLS Results of the Augmented Feder Model for Portugal (1961-96) 
Dependent GDP Growth 
lndep. Var. Eq. 9 Eq. 9 Eq. 9 
Intercept -0.12 (2.92)*** -0.17 (3.28)*** -0.16 (). 90)*** 
1/Y 0.54 (3.92)*** 0.64 (3.85)*** 0.60 (4.45)*** 
AL / L_, -0.14 (0.70) -0.34 (1.58) -0.34 (1.71)* 
AM /M 1(M /Y 1) -2.24 
(0.72) -1.11 (0.25) 1.22 (0.36) 
AG/G_, (G/Y, ) 6.10 (1.41) 7.48(2.76)*** 
AX/X_, (X/Y, ) -0.66 (1.33) 
AM /M (C / Y) 0.17 (0.96) 0.08 (0.32) -0.08 (0.29) 
AG / G_, (C / Y, ) -0.49 (0.84) -0.82 (1.89)* 
AX / X_, (C l Y) 0.34 (1.87)* 
6M -0.67 -0.51 -8.14 
Sg -1.22 -1.18 
8x -0.24 
R2 0.43 0.51 0.62 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 
DW 1.74 2.09 2.38 
F-stat F(4,31)=5.78*** F(6929)=5.09*** F(8,27)=5.41 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=0.46 [. 496] X2(1)=0.24 [. 622] X2(1)=1.73 [. 189] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.01 [. 971] X2(1)=0.40 [. 528] X2(1)=3.12 [. 077] 
Normality X2(2)=1.39 [. 498] X2(2)=0.25[. 882] X2(2)=1.58[. 454] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=1.96 [. 161] X2(1)=0.40 [. 526] X2(1)=0.10 [. 756] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. 
Starting from the two-sector model (civilian and military) in column 1 of Table 10.7., 
the size effect of the defence sector is negative while its externality is positive, with 
both effects being insignificant. This means that, although we can calculate the 
productivity differential (which is -0.67) we should not rely on it as it comes from 
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insignificant estimates. The joint test of zero restrictions on the military coefficients 
cannot be rejected (Likelihood Ratio x2(2)-2.38) suggesting that the military sector 
cannot explain economic growth in Portugal. 
The inclusion of the government sector gives similar results as far as the effects of 
the military sector are concerned with the total effect of the non-military government 
sector positive and its externality negative, with both insignificant. The government 
coefficients are jointly significant (Likelihood Ratio )C 2(2)=6.01) while the military 
coefficients are again jointly insignificant (Likelihood Ratio x2(2)=0.26). The further 
addition of the export sector certainly improves the model in terms of R2 and unlike 
the case of Greece many of the variables are significant. Furthermore, non-nested 
tests clearly indicate that the four-sector model is preferred to the other ones. The 
overall effect of the government sector becomes positive and highly significant (at 
1%) with its externality negative at 10%, (Likelihood Ratio x2(2)=10.92). 
Calculation of the government sector's relative productivity suggests that the 
government sector is less productive than the civilian sector (6g -1.18). The signs 
of the size and externality effects of the military sector are insignificant, positive and 
negative, respectively, with the joint test of zero restrictions on these coefficients 
accepted again suggesting that military sector cannot explain economic growth 
(Likelihood Ratio x2(2)=0.24). As for the export sector, it gives negative and 
insignificant size effects but positive externalities significant at 10% and also, the 
export terms are jointly significant (Likelihood Ratio x2(2)=7.38). 
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10.3.2. Empirical Results for Spain 
Now models 11 and 12 are applied on Spanish data and are again estimated by OLS. 
Table 10.8. OLS Results of the Feder Model for Spain (1961-96) 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 11 Eq. 11 Eq. 11 
Intercept -0.04 (1.05) -0.05 (1.16) -0.05 (1.05) 
I/y 0.33 (1.74)* 0.33 (1.72)* 0.33 (1.68)* 
AL / L-1 1.26 (2.17)** 1.12 (1.84)* 1.12 (1.78)* 
AMI M_, (M / Y, ) 3.70 (0.98) 3.35 (0.87) 3.39 (0.84) 
AG/ G_, (G /Y) ------ 1.17 (0.80) 1.22 (0.67) 
AX / X_, (X / Y, ) ------ ------ 0.03 (0.04) 
R2 0.26 0.28 0.28 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.03 
DW 0.64 0.62 0.62 
F-stat F(3,32)=3.76*** F(4,31)=2.95*** F(5,30)=2.28* 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=, 1.57 [. 001] X2(1)=12.56[. 000] X2(1)=12.68[. 000] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.31 [. 577] X2(1)=1.28 [. 258] X2(1)=1.67 [. 196] 
Normality X2(2)=13.07 [. 001] X2(2)=8.12[. 017] X2(2)=8.20 [. 017] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=0.49 [. 484] X2(1)=0.03 [. 866] X2(1)=0.02 [. 878] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. For 
all estimations Microfit 4.0 was used. 
Unlike the models for Greece and Portugal, in the case of Spain the OLS estimation 
of the Feder-Ram model is very problematic. For a start, the results (see Table 10.8. ) 
suggest that economic growth can only partly be explained by the Feder-Ram model, 
given the very low R2 and the insignificance of all the variables apart from the 
investment and labour variable. Furthermore, there is evidence of serial correlation 
for all three specifications, something that did not appear in the case of Greece and 
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Portugal. Finally, signs of multicollinearity are evident, given the high F but the low 
R2 and individual significance of the variables. One possible reason for the 
unsatisfactory performance of the model is that it might not pick up the dynamics 
correctly. To allow for the dynamics6, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
method is considered which allows the data to determine the short-run dynamics (see 
Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997). Batchelor et al (1999) have used this method to deal with 
similar problems in a case study of South Africa. 
Moving on to equation 12, which considers the externality effects and the 
productivity differentials with respect to the civilian sector in addition to the size 
effects of each sector, again the OLS estimators suffer from serial correlation in the 
first two specifications (the two and three sector models) while in the third 
specification (the four-sector model) serial correlation can, be rejected at 5.6% (see 
Table 10.9, column 3). 
6 Results from the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation procedure are also presented in Appendix G (Tables 
G9 and G 10) as well as from an Autoregressive AR(l) model on Tables G11, G 12, G 13, G 14. 
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Table 10.9. OLS Results of the Augmented Feder Model for Spain (1961-96) 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 12 Eq. 12 Eq. 12 
Intercept -0.01 (0.29) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01) 
I/Y, 0.18 (0.90) 0.06 (0.28) -0.03 (0.16) 
AL / L_, 1.48 (2.58)** 1.52 (2.56)** 1.39 (2.71)** 
AM/ 11(M/ Y, ) -40.41 (1.68)* -32.85 (1.28) -34.85 (1.88)* 
AG / G_, (G / Y) ------ -4.12 (0.88) -1.49 (0.44) 
Ax / X_, (X / Y, ) ------ ------ -0.15 (0.20) 
AM/ M , 
(C/ Yj) 0.87 (1.85)* 0.77 (1.29) 0.94 (1.81)* 
L\G / G_, (C /Y ,) ------ 0.94 (1.29) 0.88 (1.51) 
DX /X , 
(C/ Y, ) ------ ------ 0.22 (2.13)** 
5,,, 
89 
6x ------ 
R2 0.33 0.41 0.61 
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 
DW 0.97 0.79 1.15 
F-stat F(4,31)=3.89** F(6,29)=3.36* * F(8,27)=5.36*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=6.71 [. 010] X2(1)=9.51 [. 002] X2(1)=3.66 [. 056] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.01 [. 973] X2(1)=0.93 [. 336] X2(1)=0.63 [. 428] 
Normality X2(2)=10.02 [. 007] X2(2)=4.18 [. 124] X2(2)=4.60[. 100] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=0.08 [. 776] X2(1)=0.17 [. 681] X2(1)=0.10 [. 751] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. 
Using equation 11 as the starting point, the ARDL results with the long-run 
coefficient estimates for the size effects of the military, government and export 
sectors are given on Tables 10.10., 10.11., and 10.12., respectively. ARDL estimates 
seem to give a much better specified model than the OLS estimates. For the two- 
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sector model (see Table 10.10. ) the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion selected an 
ARDL(1,2,0,1) meaning that one lag should be introduced for the dependent. two for 
investment, no lags for the labour variable and one lag for the military variable. The 
ARDL model has a much better fit than the OLS one (R2 = 0.84) which of course is 
expected given the inclusion of lags. No problem of serial correlation can be 
detected now. But in order to interpret the results, one should look at the long-run 
coefficients, according to which investment is positive and significant (as with 
Greece and Portugal), labour force growth positive but insignificant while the total 
effect of the military sector positive and significant at 5%. 
Table 10.10. ARDL Results of the Feder Model for Spain (2 sectors) 
ARDL(1,2,0,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y/ Y 0.52 (4.98)*** 
I/ y1 1.36 (6.77)*** 0.56 (2.76)*** 
(I / Y, )-1 -1.62 (5.24)*** 
(I/Y, )_2 0.53 (2.31)** 
AL /L 0.17 (0.52) 0.37 (0.53) 
A/M , 
(M/ Y) 1.99 (1.14) 11.34 (2.12)** 
(AM/ M-, (M/ Y, ))_1 3.39 (1.93)* 
Intercept -0.05 (2.00)** -0.10 (2.13)** 
R2 = 0.84; SER = 0.01; DW =2.05; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=1.33 [. 249]; Functional Form X2(l)=0.13 [. 716]; 
Normality X2(2)=2.54 [. 280]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.17 [. 279] 
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Table 10.11. ARDL Results of the Feder Model for Spain (3 sectors) 
ARDL(1,2,0,1,1) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y /Y 
1)-1 
0.55 (5.32)*** 
I/y 1.24 (6.09)*** 0.53 (2.58)** 
(I / Y, )-i -1.53 (5.06)*** 
(I /Y 
, 
)-2 0.53 (2.41)** 
AL / L_, 0.27 (0.82) 0.61 (0.82) 
AM/ M, (M / Y, ) 0.45 (0.24) 9.79 (1.80)* 
(AM! M--, (M! Y, ))_i 3.91 (2.24)** 
AG / G-, (G / Y, ) 0.80 (1.13) -1.66 
(0.90) 
(AG! G-, (G / Y, ))-i -1.54 (1.99)* 
Intercept -0.04 (1.59) -0.09 (1.73)* 
R2 = 0.87; SER = 0.01; DW =2.27; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=3.17 [. 075]; Functional Form X2(1)=0.52 [. 473]; 
Normality X2(2)=1.13 [. 567]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.09 [. 296] 
The inclusion of the government sector (with one lag) slightly improves the 
performance of the model. Looking again at the long-run coefficients there is a 
slight decrease in the significance of the investment and military variables (from 1% 
and 5% levels to 5% and 10%, respectively) while the insignificant effect of labour 
force growth remains unchanged. The non-military government sector in Spain does 
not affect growth in a significant way (unlike the case of Greece and Portugal, where 
the government sector had a significant positive effect on economic growth). 
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Table 10.12. ARDL Results of the Feder Model for Spain (4 sectors) 
ARDL(2,1,0,1,2,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y Y 0.27 (2.32)** 
(Y/ Y, )_, 0.28 (2.91)*** 
I/Y 1.22 (7.21)*** 0.42 (2.52)** 
(I/Y, )-1 -1.04 (6.55)*** 
AL / L-1 -0.21 (0.75) -0.47 (0.72) 
AM/ M_, (M/ Y1) 1.96 (1.19) 15.06 (2.65)** 
(AM/ M , 
(M/ Y))-1 4.73 (2.97)*** 
AG / G_I(G / Y, ) 2.52 (3.38)*** -0.24 (0.13) 
(AG/G_, (G/Y, ))-1 -1.25 (1.83)* 
(AG / G-1 (G / Y, ))-2 -1.38 (1.93)* 
Vii' / X_, (X / Y, ) 1.04 (3.75)*** 2.35 (2.82)*** 
Intercept -0.04 (1.92)* -0.09 (2.11)** 
R2=0.91; SER=0.01; DW=2.32; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=1.46 [. 227]; Functional Form X2(l)=4.69 [. 030]; 
Normality X2(2)=0.62 [. 733]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=0.80 [. 371] 
On Table 10.12., the final inclusion of the export sector (with no lags according to 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion) has a very significant positive effect on economic 
growth. Labour force growth and the government sector remain insignificant (as 
before) while investment continues to be significant with a positive effect. But now 
the military sector appears to have a positive and significant effect at 5% suggesting 
that the military sector in Spain is growth promoting. 
Considering equation 12 which separates the externality and relative productivity 
effects, the two-sector model gives insignificant total and externality effects of the 
defence sector (see Table 10.13. ). Although there are no problems with the 
diagnostic tests, the only significant variables are investment and the intercept term. 
Table 10.13. ARDL Results of the Augmented Feder Model for Spain (2 sectors) 
ARDL(1,2,0,1,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y /Y 0.54 (4.60)*** 
I/y1 1.37 (6.59)*** 0.58 (2.44)** 
(I / Y, )-1 -1.63 (5.14)*** 
(I / Y, )-2 0.53 (2.28)** 
AL / L_, 0.15 (0.43) 0.33 (0.44) 
AM/ M, (M / Y, ) 4.93 (0.40) 17.97 (0.62) 
(AM/ M , 
(M/ Y, )) 3.41 (1.91)* 
AM/ M, (C / Y) -0.06 (0.24) -0.12 (0.24) 
Intercept -0.05 (1.96)* -0.11 (1.92)* 
ö1_-1.06; R2=0.84; SER=0.01; DW=2.06; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=1.39 [. 239]; Functional Form X2(1)=0.36 [. 547]; 
Normality X2(2)=2.32 [. 313]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.20 [274] 
The three-sector augmented model (see Table 10.14. ) is clearly better specified in 
terms of R2 and now all the variables apart from labour force growth are significant. 
The inclusion of the government sector turned the total effect of the military sector 
into positive and significant with negative externalities and productivity differential. 
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As for the government sector itself, gave a negative overall effect but positive 
externality effect. 
Table 10.14. ARDL Results of the Augmented Feder Model for Spain (3 sectors) 
ARDL(2,1,1,2,0,2,0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y /Y 1) 1 
0.20 (1.46) 
(Y /Y 1) 2 
0.34 (3.19)*** 
_ 
I/y 1.64 (8.32)*** 1.10 (3.01)*** 
(I /Y 1)-1 -1.14 
(6.84)*** 
AL / L_1 0.41 (1.07) -1.60 (1.56) 
(AL / L_1)_1 -1.15 (2.89)*** 
AM/ M, (M/ Y1) 13.57 (1.14) 213.74 (2.51)** 
(AM/ M_1(M/ Y1))-1 46.96 (3.37)*** 
(AM/ M_1(M/ Y1))-2 38.56 (3.29)*** 
AG! G_1(G / Y, ) -7.38 (3.06)*** -15.92 (2.39)** 
AM/ M_1(C / Y) -0.26 (0.97) -4.60 (2.43)** 
(AM/ M 
1(C/ 
Y))-1 -0.96 (3.10)*** 
(AM/ M 
1(C/ 
Y1))_2 -0.91 (3.44)*** 
AG I G_1(C/ Y) 1.24 (3.26)*** 2.68 (2.54)** 
Intercept -0.10 (3.13)*** -0.22 (2.71)** 
6", =-1.01 6g0.93 
R2 =0.92; SER=0.01; DW=2.18; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=1.89 [. 169]; Functional Form X2(1)=0.15 [. 703]; 
Normality X2(2)=0.61 [. 737]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=10.98 [. 001] 
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Table 10.15. ARDL Results of the Augmented Feder Model for Spain (4 sectors) 
ARDL(2,2,0,1,2,2,0,0,2) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. ARDL Long Run Coefficients 
(Y/ Y 0.26 (1.77)* 
(Y/ Y, ) 
z 
0.32 (3.20)*** 
- 
I/Y 
-i 
1.09 (6.49)*** 0.59 (2.24)** 
(II Y, )-1 -1.29 (4.65)*** 
(I/Y 1 )-2 
0.45 (1.96)* 
0L / L_, 0.12 (0.43) 0.28 (0.43) 
OM/ M , 
(M/ Y, ) -26.73 (2.76)** -47.64 (1.62) 
(OM/ M-, (M/ Y, ))-1 6.70 (3.13)*** 
AG/ G_, (G / Y, ) 7.51 (3.18)*** 10.22 (1.69) 
(AG / G_, (G /Y) )-1 -0.93 (1.28) 
(AG! G_, (G / Y, ) )-2 -2.29 (2.94)*** 
OX / X_, (X / Y, ) 0.52 (1.15) 3.54 (2.43)** 
(AX / X_, (X /Y) )-1 0.10 (0.25) 
(AX / X_, (X / Y-1))-2 0.87 (1.87)* 
AM/ M , 
(C / Y, ) 0.90 (3.18)*** 2.14 (2.20)** 
0G / G_, (C/ Y, ) -0.80 (2.06)* -1.90 
(1.58) 
AX! X_, (C l Y, ) 0.17 (2.15)** -0.06 (0.28) 
(AX / X_, (C /Y) )-1 0.07 (1.08) 
(AX / X_, (C / Y, ) )-2 -0.27 (3.66)*** 
Intercept -0.06 (2.34)** -0.16 
(2.20)** 
-0.98 6a= -1.14 bX=-1.4 
R2 = 0.97; SER = 0.007; DW =2.05; 
Serial Correlation X2(1)=0.08 [. 776]; Functional Form X2(1)=0.84 [. 359]; 
Normality X2(2)=2.77 [251]; Heteroscedasticity X2(1)=1.61 [. 205] 
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Finally, as it can be seen on Table 10.15., the export sector enters the equation with a 
positive and significant overall effect but insignificant externalities. Now the 
military sector has a positive externality effect but an insignificant overall effect 
while the government sector is no longer significant. It is really obvious how 
sensitive the Feder-type model is to the inclusion of additional sectors. Preferring 
the less restrictive form of the model (four-sector) to the more restrictive (two- 
sector), a comparison with Greece follows in the next section. 
10.3.3. Comparison with Greece 
The Feder-type model, which was developed for Greece in Chapter 7, was 
successfully employed to Portugal but that was not the case for Spain. Both the 
"total effect" and the "augmented" models that worked relatively well for Greece and 
Portugal, did not "work" for Spain, with the OLS estimates being problematic, 
suffering from serial correlation and very low explanatory power. The unsatisfactory 
performance of the Feder-type model for Spain was attributed to possible failure to 
pick up the dynamics correctly. Following this, allowance for the dynamics was 
made by estimating the models for Spain under an ARDL methodology (see 
Batchelor et al, 1999). So, before even considering the actual results, the first thing 
to note is the inability of the Feder model to perform well for all the three countries. 
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Table 10.16. Feder Model Results for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Greece Portugal Spain 
Intercept -0.03 (1.29) -0.14 (3.63)*** -0.09 (2.11)** 
I/y1 0.26 (2.39)** 0.52 (4.19)*** 0.42 (2.52)** 
AL / L_, -0.83 (2.21)** -0.31 (1.64) -0.47 (0.72) 
AM/ M 1(M /y 1) 
0.37 (0.36) -0.46 (0.64) 15.06 (2.65)** 
AG / G_, (G / Y, ) 1.14 (2.05)** 3.03 (2.52)** -0.24 (0.13) 
AX / X_, (X / Y, ) 0.49 (0.90) 0.26 (1.89)* 2.35 (2.82)*** 
R2 0.48 0.54 0.91 
SE 0.03 0.02 0.01 
DW 1.54 2.19 2.32 
Note: Results for Greece and Portugal are OLS estimates while for Spain are the long run ARDL 
coefficients. 
The second thing to note that is common for all three countries - at least when the 
overall effects are considered - is that the less restrictive specification (the one that 
assumed four sectors in the economy) was preferred to the more restrictive ones (the 
two and three sector models). Moving on to the comparison of the actual results for 
the three countries (see Table 10.16. above) investment is positive and significant in 
all countries which is in accordance to the predictions of the economic theory about 
the growth promoting effect of investment. This is not the case for labour force 
growth, though, which doesn't seem to be growth promoting in any of the three 
Mediterranean countries. Specifically, labour force growth is insignificant for Spain 
and Portugal while it has a significantly negative effect on growth in the case of 
Greece. 
See discussion about the negative effect of labour force growth in Chapter 
7. 
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The military sector which is of the most interest here, does not explain economic 
growth in Greece and Portugal (as it is insignificant in both cases) but this is not the 
case for Spain, where it appears to be growth promoting (at least at the 10% level of 
significance). The opposite effect is observed for the non-military government sector 
which is growth promoting in Greece and Portugal but insignificant for Spain. 
Finally, the export sector is growth promoting in Portugal and Spain but insignificant 
in Greece. According to these results, it's obvious that the defence sector doesn't 
have any significant effect on Greek and Portuguese economic growth while the non- 
defence government sectors in these countries are growth promoting. On the 
contrary, in Spain it is the defence sector that promotes growth with the non-defence 
government sector having no significant effect. This could be explained by the fact 
that defence industries in Spain are quite developed and contribute to exports. 
For the augmented models8, results are less clearcut between the three and four 
sector specifications. However, they clearly indicate that the three sector 
specification should be preferred to the two sector one. Concentrating again on the 
four-sector augmented models for the three countries, one can note a better fit for 
Spain (compared to that for Greece and Portugal), but this should not be surprising 
given than the results for Spain come from ARDL estimates. In the case of Greece, 
the problem of multicollinearity is obvious given the high R2 and the insignificance 
of all the variables (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of multicollinearity, pp. 150-151). 
s The augmented models are not expected to perform well given the existence of multicollinearity 
which turn most of the estimates into insignificant. This is particularly the case for Greece. 
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Table 10.17. Augmented Feder Model Results for Greece, Portugal and Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. GREECE PORTUGAL SPAIN 
Intercept -0.01 (0.23) -0.16 (3,90)*** -0.16 (2.20)** 
1Y1 0.10 (0.89) 0.60 (4.45)*** 0.59 (2.24)** 
AL l L-1 -0.58 (1.60) -0.34 (1.71)* 0.28 (0.43) 
AM  1V1 ,(MY 1) -0.64 
(0.13) 1.22 (0.36) -47.64 (1.62) 
AG  G-1 (G / Y) -0.70 (0.5) ) 7.48 (2.76)*** 10.22 (1.69) 
AX / X_1(X /Y 1) -0.21 
(0.23) -0.66 (1.33) 3.54 (2.43)** 
AM  M-1 (C Y 1) 
0.03 (0.07) -0.08 (0.29) 2.14 (2.20)** 
AG / G_1(C/ Y1) 0.89 (1.36) -0.82 (1.89)* -1.90 (1.58) 
AX  X_1(C lY 1) 
0.18 (1.23) 0.34 (1.87)* -0.06 (0.28) 
Sm -0.38 -8.14 -0.98 
Sg 0.23 -1.18 -1.14 
SX -0.02 -0.24 -1,4 
R2 0.61 0.62 0.97 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.007 
DW 2.10 2.38 2.05 
It appears that the overall effect of the defence sector on economic growth is 
insignificant for all three countries. As for the externality effect of the defence 
sector, it is only in Spain that it is positive and significant. Possibly the indigenous 
arms production in Spain provides technologies and other spin-offs to the civilian 
sector. This is not the case for either Greece or Portugal. 
10.4. The Demand and Supply Model for Spain and Portugal 
The SEM developed for Greece in Chapter 8 will now be used (with minor changes) 
to investigate the defence-growth relationship in Spain and Portugal. Recalling the 
general four-equation model that was estimated for Greece: 
Y= Y(S, M, GDPC, L, TB) 
S= S(M, Y, TB, INF, NG) 
TB= TB(M, Y, INF, GDPC, EXCH, TB_ 
M= M(GDPC, POP, NG, TB, NATO, TM, M_1, CYP, POL) 
Making necessary changes (for example excluding the Turkish military burden which 
is irrelevant for both Portugal and Spain and using dummies unique to each 
country), the same process of "general to specific" specification search is followed. 
Again, special attention is paid to the integration properties of the data and to 
specific structural breaks. 
10.4.1. Empirical Results for Portugal 
All variables were tested for unit roots by Dickey-Fuller tests, were found to be non- 
stationary (apart from L and Y) while their first differences found no unit roots and 
so the differenced series are used for the estimations (the tests are reported in 
Appendix G, Table G 16). In estimating this model over the period 1960-96, the data 
were allowed to determine the particular short-run dynamic form using a general to 
specific methodology for testing exclusion restrictions. After extensive 
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specificational searches, the SEM to be estimated for Portugal consists of the 
following equations: 
Y=ao+a1S+a2DM+a3 DL +a4DTB_1 +T 
S=ßo +ß/DM+ß2DTB_1 +ß3DYi +ß4DINFL_2+ß5DNG_2+ß6 D7476 
DTB=yo +y1DM+y2DY_1+y3DINFL_1+y4DEX_1+ysD747b 
DM =So+91 DTB_1 +S2 DGDPC_1 +S3 DNG + 94 DNATO +S5 D7596+S6 DM_1 
Variables and their Description 
Y: real growth rate of GDP 
S: share of national savings in GDP 
DTB: trade balance (exports of goods and services less imports of goods and 
services) as a share of GDP (first difference) 
DM: share of military expenditure in GDP (first difference) 
DEX: real exchange rate, Portuguese escudo to US $ (first difference) 
DNG: share of government spending (excluding military) in GDP (first difference) 
DNATO: share of NATO's defence spending in GDP (first difference) 
DINF: inflation rate (first difference) 
DL: labour force growth (first difference) 
DGDPC: GDP per capita in constant 1990 mn US $ (first difference) 
T: linear trend 
D7476: dummy variable to capture the effect on savings and trade balance of the 
instability that followed the collapse of the dictatorship 
D7596: dummy variable to account for the peaceful period (after the end of the 
colonia wars and the collapse of the military government) 
Table 10.18. Estimation Results of the Demand and Supply Model for Por 
Exogenous Estimation Method 
variables OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
intercept -0.01 (0.47) -0.01 (0.47) 0.004 (0.22) 
DS 0.30 (3.78)*** 0.30 (3.78)*** 0.24 (3.45)*** 
Growth DM -0.0002 (0.03) -0.0002 (0.03) 0.004 (0.71) 
Equation L 0.005 (2.23)** 0.005 (2.23)** 0.006 (2.51)** 
TB_1 0.25 (1.96)** 0.25 (1.96)** 0.24 (2.15)** 
T -0.001 (3.16)*** -0.001 (3.16)*** -0.001 (3.68)*** 
R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.65 
DW 2.02 2.02 2.04 
intercept 0.22 (17.64)*** 0.22 (17.64)*** 0.22 (20.11)*** 
DM -0.005 (0.35) -0.005 (0.35) -0.004 (0.30) 
Savings TB-1 0.32 (1.01) 0.32 (1.01) 0.30 (1.07) 
Equation LY_1 0.97 (4.31)*** 0.97 (4.31)*** 0.98 (4.96)*** 
DINFL_2 0.001 (0.66) 0.001 (0.66) 0.001 (0.80) 
DNG_2 -0.02 (1.99)** -0.02 (1.99)** -0.02 (2.37)** 
D7476 -0.07 (2.43)** -0.07 (2.43)** -0.07 (2.76)*** 
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.60 
DW 1.70 1.70 1.74 
intercept 0.009 (1.42) 0.009 (1.42) 0.009 (1.62) 
DM -0.01 (1.69)* -0.01 (1.69)* -0.013 (2.10)** 
DY_1 -0.26 (2.31)** -0.26 (2.31)** -0.27 (2.65)*** 
Trade Balance DINFL_1 0.002 (2.81)*** 0.002 (2.81)*** 0.002 (2.77)*** 
Equation DEXCH_1 0.001 (2.32)** 0.001 (2.32)** 0.001 (2.49)** 
D7476 -0.03 (2.95)*** -0.03 (2.95)*** -0.04 (3.38)*** 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.58 
DW 2.25 2.25 2.22 
intercept -0.004 (0.04) -0.004 (0.04) 0.01 (0.12) 
TB_1 -1.48 (0.58) -1.48 (0.58) -2.01 (0.88) 
Military DGDPC_1 3.56 (1.91)* 3.56 (1.91)* 3.13 (1.90)* 
Expenditure DNG -0.13 (0.94) -0.13 (0.94) -0.14 (1.15) 
Equation DNATO 1.41 (3.67)*** 1.41 (3.67)*** 1.33 (3.91)*** 
D7596 -1.84 (3.36)*** -1.84 (3.36)*** -1.93 (3.97)*** 
DM-1 0.04 (0.39) 0.04 (0.39) 0.04 (0.47) 
R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.66 
DW 2.01 2.01 2.00 
*** :1% level of significance, ** : 5% level of significance, *: 10% level of significance 
DM/DY=0.0004, DM/DS= -0.0035, DM/DTB= -0.014 
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As it can be seen on Table 10.18. the OLS results (column 1) are identical with the 
2SLS results (column 2) as the equations are just identified. Starting with the single 
equation estimates we note that in the growth equation, the share of savings in GDP, 
labour force growth and trade balance are positively related to economic growth and 
they are all significant. In the savings equation, military burden has a negative but 
insignificant effect while previous year's growth of GDP has a significant and 
positive effect on savings. Trade balance and inflation have insignificant positive 
effects while non-military government expenditure as well as the dummy for 1974- 
76 crisis have a significant negative effect. In the trade balance equation, military 
burden has a negative effect significant at 10% level while inflation and exchange 
rate (both lagged) have a positive and significant effect. The dummy for 1974-76 has 
again a negative and significant effect and the same applies for previous year growth 
of GDP. The military burden equation is explained by GDP per capita (lagged once) 
which has a positive effect significant at 10% level. The trade balance and the non- 
military government expenditure have the expected negative sign but in both cases it 
is not significant. The inclusion of the NATO variable intended to capture whether 
Portugal follows the alliance line of spending and it seems that this is the case since 
it is positive and significantly related to military burden. The dummy for the years of 
democracy is significant and negatively related to military burden, suggesting that 
after the end of the dictatorship military burden is reduced. As for the lagged value 
of the dependent variable, it is positive but insignificant rejecting the argument of 
inertia. 
As already discussed, to avoid problems of simultaneity and high covariances one 
should rely on system equation estimates. Looking at the 3SLS estimates on Table 
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10.18. (column 3), it is obvious that the results are very similar with only minor 
differences compared to the single equation estimates. Those variables that were 
significant under the OLS and 2SLS estimation continue to be significant and in 
some cases their significance is increased. Calculation of the relevant multipliers 
gives the net effect of military burden on growth, savings and trade balance. These 
are: DM/DY=0.0004, DM/DS=-0.0035 and DM/DTB=-0.014, suggesting that the net 
effect of defence is positive on growth, while negative through savings and trade 
balance. 
10.4.2. Empirical Results for Spain 
Following the same process, the system of equations to be estimated for Spain is: 
Y= ao + a, DS + a2 DM + a3 DL + a., TB_, +T 
DS=ßf+ß, DM_, +ß2TB_, +ß3Yl +ßDINFL_, +ß5 DNG+ß< D7980 
TB = yo + Yi DM+ Y2 Y+ Y3 DINFL_, + ya DEX_, + y_; D7275+ y, TB_, 
DM=, 5(, +i5, TB+, 52 DGDPC+, 53 DNG+J4DNATO+rS, DPOP+ä() D7887+j, DM_ 
where D in front of a variable indicates first difference. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit 
roots are reported on Table G 16 in Appendix G. 
Variables and their Description 
Y: real growth rate of GDP 
DS: share of national savings in GDP (first difference) 
TB: trade balance (exports of goods and services less imports of goods and services) 
as a share of GDP 
DM: share of military expenditure in GDP (first difference) 
DEX: real exchange rate, Spanish peseta to US $ (first difference) 
DNG: share of government spending (excluding military) in GDP (first difference) 
DNATO: share of NATO's defence spending in GDP (first difference) 
DINF: inflation rate (first difference) 
DL: labour force growth (first difference) 
DPOP: population (first difference) 
DGDPC: GDP per capita in constant 1990 mn US $ (first difference) 
T: linear trend 
D7980: dummy variable to capture the effect on savings of the crisis in 1979-80, 
takes the value of 1 for the years 1979 and 1980,0 elsewhere 
D7275: dummy variable to capture the effect on trade balance, takes the value of 1 
for the years 1972-75 and 0 elsewhere 
D7887: dummy variable to capture the effect of the development of the arms industry 
during that period, takes the value of 1 for the years 1978-87 and 0 elsewhere 
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Table 10.19. Estimation Results of the Demand and Supply Model for Spain 
Exogenous Estimation Method 
variables OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
intercept 0.08 (15.13)*** 0.08 (12.90)*** 0.08 (14.77)*** 
DS 0.002 (0.82) 0.001 (0.68) 0.003 (1.75)* 
Growth DM -0.03 (1.49) -0.02 (0.95) -0.04 (2.21)** 
Equation L 0.73 (5.27)*** 0.78 (5.64)*** 0.70 (5.76)*** 
TB_1 0.32 (2.74)*** 0.25 (2.04)** 0.24 (2.22)** 
T -0.002 (9.39)*** -0.002 (8.18)*** -0.002 (9.46)*** 
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.80 
DW 1.76 1.90 2.08 
intercept 0.41 (1.45) 0.41 (1.45) 0.41 (1.70)* 
DM_j -1.83 (1.48) -1.83 (1.48) -1.78 (1.78)* 
Savings TB-1 -1.10 (0.14) -1.10 (0.14) 1.08 (0.16) 
Equation DY_, 3.60 (0.64) 3.60 (0.64) 2.34 (0.50) 
DINFLI -0.05 (0.85) -0.05 (0.85) -0.03 (0.54) 
DNG -2.45 (5.44)*** -2.45 (5.44)*** -2.15 (5.88)*** 
D7980 -0.81 (1.20) -0.81 (1.20) -0.79 (1.48) 
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.61 
DW 2.17 2.17 2.20 
intercept 0.005 (1.17) 0.005 (1.17) 0.005 (1.28) 
DM -0.025 (1.30) -0.025 (1.30) -0.035 (2.29)** 
DY -0.20 (2.25)** -0.20 (2.25)** -0.21 (2.78)*** 
Trade Balance DINFL_, 0.002 (1.91)* 0.002 (1.91)* 0.002 (2.21)** 
Equation DEXCH_, 0.001 (2.97)*** 0.001 (2.97)*** 0.001 (3.40)*** 
D7275 -0.01 (1.86)* -0.01 (1.86)* -0.01 (2.05)** 
TB-1 0.81 (7.56)*** 0.81 (7.56)*** 0.80 (8.42)*** 
R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 
DW 2.07 2.07 2.00 
intercept -0.06 (1.10) -0.06 (1.10) -0.07 (1.64)* 
TB -1.34 (1.12) -1.34 (1.12) -1.70 (1.76)* 
Military DGDPC -0.09 (0.90) -0.09 (0.90) -0.10 (1.18) 
Expenditure DNG -0.09 (1.47) -0.09 (1.47) -0.08 (1.69)* 
Equation DNATO 0.28 (2.37)** 0.28 (2.37)** 0.26 (2.70)*** 
DPOP 0.001 (1.77)* 0.001 (1.77)* 0.001 (2.10)** 
D7887 0.12 (2.34)** 0.12 (2.34)** 0.16 (3.72)*** 
DM_1 -0.38 (2.58)** -0.38 (2.58)** -0.39 (3.19)*** 
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.50 
DW 2.13 2.13 1.96 
*** : 1% level of significance, ** : 
5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance 
DM/DY= -0.053, DM/DS= -1.91, DM/DTB= -0.026 
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Again the OLS results are very similar to the 2SLS results. Concentrating on the 
3SLS estimates and starting with the growth equation, one can note that military 
burden has a significant negative effect on economic growth for Spain. All the other 
variables (with the exception of the trend) are positively related to growth. There are 
many problems with the savings equation as most of the variables are insignificant. 
Military burden has a negative effect on savings and the same applies for trade 
balance, inflation, non-military government expenditure and the dummy for 1979-80. 
Furthermore, there is a negative impact of the military burden on the trade balance. 
Spanish military expenditure is positively determined by population growth and by 
NATO's expenditure, indicating that Spain is a follower in the alliance. 
10.4.3. Comparison with Greece 
Comparing the empirical results obtained from the demand and supply model among 
the three countries, it is noticeable that all the different equations have a similar fit in 
terms of R2 with the exception of the trade balance equation which in the case of 
Greece was poorly defined. That was not the case for Spain and Portugal. 
Starting with the growth equation, the effect of military burden on economic growth 
is significantly negative only for Greece and Spain and the same applies when the 
savings equation is in question. Again military burden has a negative effect on 
savings only for Greece and Spain. For all three countries thought, the effect on 
trade balance is significantly negative. 
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Table 10.20. Estimation Results for Greece, Portugal, Spain (1960-1996) 
Exogenous Estimation Method: 3SLS 
variables GREECE PORTUGAL SPAIN 
intercept 0.10 (17.05)*** 0.004 (0.22) 0.08 (14.77)*** 
DS 0.002 (3.45)*** 0.24 (3.45)*** 0.003 (1.75)* 
Growth DM -0.02 (4.85)*** 0.004 (0.71) -0.04 (2.21)** 
Equation L 0.001 (1.22) 0.006 (2.51)** 0.70 (5.76)*** 
TB-1 -0.001 (0.24) 0.24 (2.15)** 0.24 (2.22)** 
GDPC 0.08 (7.27)*** 
T -0.003 (10.88)*** -0.001 (3.68)*** -0.002 (9.46)*** 
R-squared 0.85 0.65 0.80 
DW 1.30 2.04 2.08 
intercept -1.46 (2.15)** 0.22 (20.11)*** 0.41 (1.70)* 
DM_1 -2.04 (2.43)*** -0.004 (0.30) -1.78 (1.78)* 
Savings TB_1 0.33 (1.02) 0.30 (1.07) 1.08 (0.16) 
Equation DY_1 34.42 (2.75)*** 0.98 (4.96)*** 2.34 (0.50) 
DINFL_, -0.17 (1.63)* 0.001 (0.80) -0.03 (0.54) 
DNG -0.44 (0.61) -0.02 (2.37)** -2.15 (5.88)*** 
D7980 -0.07 (2.76)*** -0.79 (1.48) 
R-squared 0.51 0.60 0.61 
DW 1.91 1.74 2.20 
intercept 4.51 (4.34)*** 0.009 (1.62) 0.005 (1.28) 
DM -1.26 (2.60)*** -0.013 (2.10)** -0.035 (2.29)** 
DY -51.5 (). 95)*** -0.27 (2.65)*** -0.21 (2.78)*** 
Trade Balance DINFL_1 -0.10 (1.98)* 0.002 (2.77)*** 0.002 (2.21)** 
Equation DEXCH_, -0.04 (1.96)* 0.001 (2.49)** 0,001 (3.40)*** 
DGDPC -4.37 (2.83)*** 
D7275 -2.45 (3.20)*** -0.04 (3.38)*** -0.01 (2.05)** 
TB-1 -0.30 (2.27)** 0.80 (8.42)*** 
R2 0.33 0.58 0.73 
DW 2.04 2.22 2.00 
intercept 0.13 (2.00)** 0.01 (0.12) -0.07 (1.64)* 
TB -0.21 (4.49)*** -2.01 (0.88) -1.70 (1.76)* 
Military DGDPC -1.02 (1.62) 3.13 (1.90)* -0.10 (1.18) 
Expenditure DNG -0.36 (3.87)*** -0.14 (1.15) -0.08 (1.69)* 
Equation DNATO 0.49 (1.58) 1.33 (3.91)*** 0.26 (2.70)*** 
DPOP 0.001 (2.10)** 
D7887 2.49 (7.82)*** -1.93 (3.97)*** 0.16 (3.72)*** 
DTM 0.43 (1.14) 
DM_1 -0.25 (1.61) 0.04 (0.47) -0.39 (3.19)*** 
R-squared 0.74 0.66 0.50 
DW 1.78 2.00 1.96 f 
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10.5. Conclusions 
This Chapter has empirically investigated the defence-growth relationship in 
Portugal and Spain, applying the models that were developed for Greece. Table 
10.21 below, summarises the findings as far as the economic effects of military 
expenditures are concerned, for Greece, Portugal and Spain, under the three 
empirical approaches. 
Table 10.21. Summary of the Empirical Results for the Defence-Growth 
Relationship 
GRANGER FEDER-TYPE DEMAND AND 
CAUSALITY MODEL SUPPLY MODEL 
GREECE No Granger No significant `total' Growth eq.: (-) effect 
Causality effect Savings eq.: (-) effect 
No significant TB eq.: (-) effect 
externality effect Net effect: Negative 
PORTUGAL No Granger No significant `total' Growth eq.: No effect 
Causality effect Savings eq.: No effect 
No significant TB eq.: (-) effect 
externality effect Net effect: Negative 
SPAIN Granger Positive `total' effect Growth eq.: (-) effect 
Causality from Insignificant size Savings eq.: (-) effect 
growth to effect but positive TB eq.: (-) effect 
military burden externalities Net effect: Negative 
Firstly, it has used Granger causality analysis. As with Greece, it has extended the 
standard methodology by testing for cointegration among the military burden and 
economic growth variables. A long-run relationship was found among the two 
variables for both Portugal and Spain (as it was the case for Greece) and was taken 
into consideration when examining the short-run causality. Furthermore, structural 
breaks in the data were accounted for by including some country specific dummies. 
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Comparing the findings of the extended Granger causality approach, (See Table 
10.21., first column), one can note a similar pattern for the defence-growth 
relationship only for Greece and Portugal. That is, there is an absence of any causal 
relationship between the two variables. In contrast, for Spain, there is evidence of 
Granger causality running from economic growth to military burden with the effect 
being negative. This suggests that economic growth in Spain has preceded declines 
in the military burden, but that there is no evidence of military burden having causal 
effect on growth. Given the similarities of the three countries, lack of a common 
pattern of the defence-growth relationship, points to the fact that the effects of 
military spending on economic growth cannot be generalised among countries even 
if countries are similar. 
Secondly, this Chapter has used a commonly employed supply-side model (the 
Feder-type) extending it to include government and export sectors. As in the case of 
Greece, special attention was given to the sensitivity of the model to the inclusion of 
additional sectors, either when the "overall" or the "augmented" model was 
considered. Although both the "overall" and the "augmented" models worked 
relatively well for Portugal, that was not the case for Spain where the OLS estimates 
were problematic, suffering from serial correlation and very low explanatory power. 
This unsatisfactory performance of the Feder-type model for Spain was attributed to 
a possible failure to pick up the dynamics correctly. To allow for the dynamics, the 
model for Spain was reestimated using an ARDL procedure. Another important 
issue that was pointed out in this Chapter was that for all three countries the less 
restrictive specification (the four-sector model) was preferred to the most restrictive 
one (the two-sector model). Concentrating on the results from the four-sector 
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overall" model, (see Table 10.21., second column), it is obvious that only for Spain 
is the "total" effect of the defence sector significantly positive; for Portugal and 
Greece there is absence of any significant effect. As for the "augmented" models, 
the existence of multicollinearity constitutes an additional problem (see Chapter 7, 
pp. 150-151 for a discussion on multicollinearity). Again, for Greece and Portugal 
there is absence of any significant "total" and "externality" effect while in the case of 
Spain the defence sector has significant positive externalities. 
Finally, this Chapter has also used the demand and supply model (specified for 
Greece in Chapter 8) to investigate the defence-growth relationship in Portugal and 
Spain. This model allowed the specification of both demand and supply-side 
influences, took into account country specific dummies and gave both the direct and 
the indirect effects (through savings and the trade balance) of defence spending on 
economic growth. The fit of each of the four equations in the SEM was similar for 
all three countries with the exception of the Greek trade balance equation which was 
poorly defined. Looking at Table 10.21. (third column) that summarises the results 
of the demand and supply model for the three countries, one can note that in the case 
of Greece and Spain, military burden has a clear negative effect on growth, savings 
and trade balance with the net effect being negative. Results are less clear for 
Portugal, where there is no significant effect on growth and savings but there 
is a 
negative effect on trade balance. 
Overall, the findings suggest that when the supply-side model is employed results 
for 
Spain and Portugal are very similar - that is there 
is no significant effect of defence 
on growth, while for Spain there is some evidence of a positive effect. 
On the other 
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hand, when the demand and supply model is employed, there is strong evidence of a 
negative effect for Greece and Spain and some evidence of a negative effect for 
Portugal. As for the direction of causality, the findings suggested absence of a causal 
relation between defence and growth for Greece and Portugal, and the existence of a 
unidirectional causality from growth to defence for Spain. Clearly then, based on the 
causal analysis and the supply-side model, the economic effects of defence are quite 
similar for Greece and Portugal while Spain seems to be different. But based on the 
demand and supply model, Greece and Spain give similar results and Portugal is 
different. In none of the cases though, there exists strong evidence of a positive 
effect defence on growth. Furthermore, the findings support the widely held view 
that different model specifications lead to different results. 
CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1. Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis has undertaken a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics of 
military expenditure in Greece and a comparison with two very similar countries, 
Spain and Portugal. The focus of the analysis has been Greece as this country - even 
after the end of the Cold War - continues to allocate a significant share of its GDP 
for defence (in 1996 military burden for Greece was 4.5% compared to 2.8% for 
Portugal, 1.5% for Spain, and 2.9% for NATO for the same year). Furthermore, 
Greece faces important security considerations, the long-term hostility and turmoil 
with its neighbouring country Turkey, not to mention the unstable environment of the 
Balkans where it is situated. What makes the Greek security considerations even 
more complicated is the fact that both Greece and its adversary, Turkey, are members 
of the same alliance (NATO). Being the poorest member of the EU and struggling to 
improve its economic condition, high defence spending would seem irrational if it 
were not for these security considerations. The fact that Greece has followed a quite 
similar pattern of development to that of Spain and Portugal throughout the period 
examined (1960-1996), intrigued the author of the thesis to investigate whether 
defence spending had something to do with this. 
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As is commonly the case, prior to empirical analysis, one must know what are the 
theoretical and the empirical approaches to the economics of military spending. A 
review of the theoretical approaches was carried out in Chapter 2. It was argued that 
defence could be growth promoting in the Keynesian context since it could boost 
aggregate demand, when it was relatively low compared to aggregate supply, or fight 
underconsumption in the Marxist sense. Furthermore, in the Neoclassical 
framework, defence spending could stimulate growth through modernisation (due to 
advanced technologies that arise from defence) and other spin-off effects. On the 
other hand, it was argued that it would be equally possible for defence to crowd-out 
resources that could be more growth promoting if used by other sectors or that the 
technologies developed would not find applications in other sectors. In these cases, 
defence spending would retard growth. 
Following this, a distinction was made between developed and less developed or 
developing countries as far as the economic effects of defence spending were 
concerned. In developed countries, where aggregate demand is usually lower than 
the potential aggregate supply, military expenditure could have the Keynesian effect 
of boosting aggregate demand and leading to higher economic growth or according 
to the Marxist theory, military spending could fight underconsumption and again 
promote growth. But in less developed countries insufficient demand rarely 
constitutes a problem. Rather, it is constraints on the supply-side that impose 
problems in these economies. LDCs, it was argued, might benefit from the 
infrastructure and advanced technologies that arise from defence, but only if the 
infrastructure created by defence was beneficial for civilian uses and the technologies 
could be applied outside the military sector. Finally, in countries with developed 
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indigenous arms industries and arms exports, defence was supposed to have a growth 
promoting effect in contrast to those countries that rely on huge military imports, 
which retards their growth through adverse effects on the trade balance. 
The aforementioned theories only point to the ways and channels through which 
defence spending could affect economic growth. Clearly, the only way to determine 
the economic effects of military expenditure is through empirical analysis. Chapter 3 
provided a review of the empirical studies on the defence-growth relationship, 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of previous work and considering some 
methodological issues that arose from them. The Chapter concluded that the 
economic impact of defence spending depends on the relative importance of each of 
the channels through which defence spending operates in the economy. Despite the 
huge controversy in the empirical results and the lack of a general conclusion on the 
relationship between defence spending and economic growth, one could observe that 
supply-side models tended to support a positive effect of defence on growth (through 
modernisation, and other spin-offs), while demand-side models tended to support a 
negative effect (via crowding-out of investment, exports). Studies using a 
combination of the two types of models (demand and supply), most commonly found 
positive direct effects of defence on growth and negative indirect effects, through 
savings and trade balance, with a most commonly negative net effect. On the other 
hand, when it came to the more "atheoretic" Granger causality approach, empirical 
evidence was almost equally divided between interdependence, mutual dependence 
and one-sided dependence between defence spending and growth. It was not 
possible to specify a common finding. 
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What also became apparent from reviewing the studies was that in developed 
countries the economic effects of military spending on growth were quite different to 
those in LDCs. It was pointed out that developed countries might benefit from 
military expenditure, through increases in aggregate demand and increased utilisation 
of capital and labour, or they might be worse off if defence spending crowds-out 
investment from other sectors that are potentially more productive than the military. 
Also, if a country has domestic arms production and arms exports it is more likely to 
be positively affected by military expenditure than those countries that have high 
arms imports. 
Lack of clear results from cross-country studies point to the need for studying 
individual countries. A researcher must have good knowledge of a country's 
background to be able to build a complete model that is not only consistent with a 
certain theory but most importantly takes into account those specific characteristics 
that are unique to the country. If these unique characteristics are not taken into 
account, there is a great possibility for mis-specification of the model (failing to 
account for structural changes, political or strategic factors) leading to 
misinterpretation of the results obtained. 
Chapter 4 provided a background analysis of the Greek politics, economy, military 
spending and defence industries. It became clear that Greece is a country with many 
economic and security problems, with no developed defence industry, but with a 
large military burden. The absence of a developed indigenous arms industry and the 
existence of huge economic problems, made high defence spending seem irrational 
or unjustifiable by pure economic reasoning. But what did appear to 
force Greece to 
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spend a lot on defence were security concerns, mainly the perceived threat from 
Turkey and the instability of the Balkans. Certainly policy makers have used these 
threats to justify the substantial share of GDP that is allocated to defence each year, 
without considering the possible economic consequences of such spending. This 
thesis hypothesised that defence spending bears considerable responsibility for the 
delayed progress of the Greek economy and this hypothesis was thoroughly 
investigated empirically in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
Prior to this, it seemed useful to empirically examine the determinants of Greek 
military expenditure to assess the relative importance of economic and security 
considerations. This issue was empirically investigated in Chapter 5, using two 
different models: an arms race model and a general model of aggregate defence 
spending. 
The long-term animosity between Greece and Turkey has led historians and political 
commentators to argue that there exists an arms race between the two countries, 
which explains the high levels of their military expenditures. Although a widely held 
view, it was not fully supported by the empirical evidence provided by previous 
studies and by that provided in this thesis. The deficiencies of the classical 
Richardson arms race model were to be blamed for the poor empirical performance 
and the inconclusive results. Recent econometric techniques (unit root tests and 
cointegration) were applied to deal with most of the deficiencies that arose from the 
Richardson model. The analysis provided evidence of a long-run relationship 
between Greek and Turkish military burdens (suggesting that income variables were 
important) but not in the form of a long-run Richardson type arms race. So, although 
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it could be said that there was something going on between the two countries this 
was definitely not an arms race in the classical Richardson form. This might be due 
to the fact that both countries are in a more complex environment, especially Turkey 
with a number of conflicts and potential conflicts. Also, another important factor 
that might affect the spending patterns of the two countries is that they are both 
members of the NATO alliance. One implication of this could be that both 
countries, before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, had a common threat (the 
containment of communism) and that this was affecting their procurement decisions. 
When the general model of aggregate defence spending was considered, the 
empirical findings suggested that strategic factors and not economic ones played an 
important role in determining Greek military burden. Specifically, the Greek 
military burden was determined by the Turkish military burden and the threat of war 
after 1974 (which was captured by a dummy variable). 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 investigated the defence-growth relationship in Greece using 
three different empirical specifications. First, Chapter 6 empirically investigated the 
existence of a causal relation between defence spending and economic growth in 
Greece over the period 1960-1996. It systematically analysed the presence and 
direction of the causal relationship between defence and growth, paying attention to 
the integration properties of the series and using the vector autoregression (VAR) 
approach. In this way it extended the methodology commonly employed and showed 
that the standard approach could lead to spurious findings of Granger causality. This 
was the case for Greece, since a positive effect of military burden on growth was 
found for the standard Granger causality test, but did not survive the introduction of 
long run information, nor a dummy to allow for the impact of the Cyprus invasion. 
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Granger causality tests have been widely criticised (Jacobs et al, 1979) for being 
sensitive to a wide variety of factors, including structural changes over the period 
examined, stationarity of and cointegration across the variables. But the methodology 
employed here has overcome many of the shortcomings that the standard Granger 
causality may have - especially when applied to a group of countries, in which case 
many of the unique characteristics of each country are ignored. Testing for Granger 
causality between growth and military burden is still useful prior to developing the 
structural models which followed in the next two Chapters. 
Chapter 7, investigated the economic effects of military spending in Greece, using a 
supply-side model. The approach taken was to estimate the commonly used multi- 
sectoral Neoclassical model - the Feder-type - model with special attention given to 
the sensitivity of the model to the number of sectors included and to the specification 
of the externalities and the productivity differentials. Starting with the two-sector 
model, a positive effect of the defence sector on economic growth (significant at the 
10% level) was found. However, this positive effect changed into a negative and 
insignificant one when either the government sector alone or both the government 
and the export sectors were introduced'. Furthermore, the general performance and 
the explanatory power of the three and four-sector models was higher than that of the 
two-sector model and this was also supported by non-nested tests, suggesting that 
one should rely on estimates from these models rather than the more restrictive two 
sector ones which can lead to misspecification. The same story was repeated when 
The overall effect of the non-military government sector was positive and significant in both the 
three and four-sector model, while the export sector had a positive but insignificant effect on growth. 
The signs and significance of the intercept, the investment and the labour 
force variables remained 
unchanged. 
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the augmented models that gave separate estimates for the total and the externality 
effects of each sector were considered. Again, the two-sector augmented model was 
poorly defined compared to the three and four-sector ones, but this time it also gave 
insignificant total and externality effects of the military sector and most of the 
variables were insignificant. The four-sector model in particular showed absence of 
any statistical significance of the coefficients and as it is common with this type of 
model the problem of multicollinearity could not be avoided. 
So, first of all the analysis provided in this Chapter pointed to the observation that 
the Feder-type model was very sensitive to the inclusion of additional sectors of the 
economy, especially when the size effects of the sectors were separated from their 
externalities in which case one got insignificant estimates. The results for Greece 
fully supported Biswas and Ram (1986) findings for a cross-section of countries. 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the Feder-type model, the empirical evidence for 
Greece over the period 1961-96 indicated that the overall effect of the defence sector 
on growth was neither significantly positive nor negative, although the defence 
sector seemed to be less productive that the civilian sector. This suggested that shifts 
of resources (spending or investment) out of the military sector into the private sector 
were likely to bring about higher productivity. Given that the Feder-type model 
concentrates on the supply-side only, consideration of the demand-side seemed to 
be 
beneficial in assessing the economic effects of military spending 
in a more 
complete" way. 
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This was carried out in Chapter 8 which analysed the effects of defence spending on 
economic growth using a demand and supply, simultaneous equation model (SEM) 
over the period 1960-96. A four-equation system was estimated using both single- 
equation methods (OLS, 2SLS) and system-equation methods (3SLS) to account for 
the interrelations between the variables. Findings suggested that both the direct 
effect of defence spending on economic growth and the indirect effects through 
savings and trade balance were significantly negative. The negative direct effect of 
defence on growth implied that there were no positive spin-offs or externalities from 
the defence sector to the economy. The negative indirect effect of defence through 
savings supported the crowding-out argument, that resources were misallocated 
through the growth of military burden. The negative indirect effect of military 
burden through the trade balance seemed reasonable for a country like Greece which 
is a big importer of military equipment and only has a very small and 
underdeveloped defence industry. Overall, the results suggested that the high 
military burden in Greece had been harmful to economic performance and had made 
a significant contribution to the backwardness of the economy and the huge problems 
it is facing. 
Having completed the empirical investigation for the defence-growth relationship in 
Greece, Chapters 9 and 10 were dedicated to analysing two similar economies, 
Portugal and Spain. Specifically Chapter 9 provided a background analysis of the 
two Iberian economies and a comparison with Greece while Chapter 10 empirically 
investigated the economic effects of military spending in these countries applying the 
models already employed for Greece. 
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It became evident in Chapter 9 that the three countries faced a very similar pattern of 
development during the period examined (1960-1996). All of them enjoyed higher 
rates of growth than the rest of the EC or even any individual member country until 
the mid-1970s (Tsoukalis, 1981). In the same period all three countries had low 
inflation and unemployment rates but this situation was soon followed by a period of 
both high inflation and unemployment. High unemployment constituted a more 
severe problem in Spain. Also the crisis of the mid-1970s led to a huge drop in 
investment for all of the countries. Government debt had also risen markedly after 
1975 and has become a serious economic problem during the last two decades, 
especially for Greece. 
High rates of economic growth were observed in both periods of high and low 
military expenditure for all three countries. Portugal was a big defence spender 
during the 1960s and early 1970s mainly because of the need to keep its colonies. 
But after the colonial wars ended, Portugal reduced its military burden which was 
kept at quite low levels since then. Greece on the other hand, started to be a big 
defence spender after 1974, the year of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Since then, 
the continuous disagreements and conflicts with Turkey had left Greece with no 
alternative but to keep a high military burden. Spain throughout the period examined 
had maintained a low military burden, mainly because it lost its colonies at an early 
stage. 
Knowledge of the specific economic, political and strategic features of each country 
was taken into account when the empirical estimation took place in Chapter 10. The 
Chapter, reconsidered the models developed for Greece and employed them to 
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analyse the defence-growth relationship for Portugal and Spain adjusting them only 
to account for the country-specific information. Once the models were estimated for 
Portugal and Spain, a comparative analysis on the defence-growth relationship for 
the three countries followed. 
Comparing the findings of the Granger causality approach, one could note a similar 
pattern for the defence-growth relationship for Greece and Portugal. That is, the 
absence of any causal relationship between the two variables. As for Spain, there 
was evidence of Granger causality running from economic growth to military burden 
with the effect being negative. Given the similarities of the three countries, lack of a 
common pattern of the defence-growth relationship, pointed to the fact that the 
effects of military spending on economic growth cannot be generalised among 
countries even if countries are similar. 
The same conclusion arose when the supply-side (Feder-type) model was used. 
Again, Greece and Portugal seemed to follow a common pattern in terms of 
empirical results with both countries having insignificant externality effects when the 
augmented model were in question. Again, Spain differed, having a positive `total' 
effect and positive externalities. Moving to the third empirical approach, which 
could be considered more complete to the other two approaches, as it contains both 
demand and supply influences, the empirical results supported the existence of an 
overall negative effect of defence spending on growth for all countries. 
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11.2. Limitations of the Study 
Although this thesis has provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the 
economic effects of defence spending in Greece through a detailed case study, it still 
has a number of problems and limitations in terms of theory, data, levels of analysis 
and interpretation, most of which are shared with other empirical studies in the area. 
In terms of applied work, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, there is no theoretical 
approach that considers military expenditure as a fundamental concept. As a result, 
researchers on the economic effects of military spending tend to develop ad hoc 
models or simply add in military expenditure to other theoretical models. In 
addition, different theories have different foci. Some might be demand-focused 
while others supply-focused. This leads to a wide range of empirical models in the 
literature. While little could be done about the first issue within the scope of the 
thesis, an attempt was made to address the second issue by undertaking a 
comprehensive analysis employing three different models. This provided a range of 
results upon which to base any empirical evaluation. 
A second limitation of this study results from the data employed. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, despite the efforts of international organisations in recent years to provide 
reliable military data, there are still many problems as far as its quality is concerned. 
There was, however, little that could be done apart from using the most reliable 
sources. Thirdly, in terms of levels of analysis, the economics of military 
expenditure could be examined at either the microeconomic or at the macroeconomic 
level and there are important issues at both levels. The present study focused at the 
macroeconomic level, and hence cannot deal with the important issues of 
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restructuring and conversion in any consistent manner. Focusing the analysis does. 
however, allow a detailed macroeconomic case study that is a valuable contribution 
to the literature. 
Despite these limitations, the overall finding of the study that cuts in defence budgets 
in Greece would most likely lead to improved economic performance (especially if 
these resources were reallocated to other more productive sectors of the economy), 
does seem to be relatively robust. It would be very likely that a `peace dividend' 
could exist. The problem is that military burden also appears to be determined by 
security concerns and if there is no improvement in relations with Turkey it seems 
unlikely that significant cuts will be on the agenda. The recognition that there are 
clear economic, as well as security, benefits to be gained by settling the disputes 
could hopefully provide a much needed incentive to move forward. 
11.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
These problems point to the need for further consideration of certain issues and 
suggest useful areas for future research. Given the poor performance and the number 
of problems associated with the Feder-type model, some consideration should be 
given to developing other models such as those based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, new growth theory models and public choice models for application in this 
area. 
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As mentioned earlier, there are possible problems with the quality of data. Future 
work might consider an assessment of the different sources - national and 
international. This would allow a better understanding of the problem and point to 
ways in which the data may be improved. Another important issue is the limitations 
of focusing on aggregate data. Consideration should be given to the use of 
disaggregated military data in empirical analysis, since the different components of 
military expenditure (i. e. military spending on equipment and personnel) might have 
different economic effects. As data sets improve this should become a more feasible 
research topic. 
In the thesis Portugal and Spain were not covered in depth as they were used only for 
comparative purposes, yet they represent important case studies in the development 
of the literature. More detailed case studies of these two countries would be of 
considerable interest. A further avenue of potential value to the debate is the use of 
panel data methods to provide cross-country analyses. Future work should consider 
treating the three countries studied here as a panel and seek to identify general 
relationships and country specific effects. In the same spirit, an expansion of the 
sample of countries to include other small industrialised economies such as Turkey, 
South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, would be a valuable development of the research. 
Finally, the study has focused on the development of military expenditure and 
economic growth over the last thirty years. European security issues, such as the 
development of the EU and the expansion of NATO, are likely to 
have important 
implications for the European peripheral economies. Studying these changes should 
be an important part of any future research agenda. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table Al. Greek Main Economic Indicators 
Imports'_ Ex ortsa Savin sa Investmenta Unem lo mentb 
1960 14.2 7.1 15.9 20.4 6.1 
1961 14.0 7.2 21.0 21.4 5.9 
1962 14.4 7.6 22.0 21.9 5.1 
1963 15.3 7.8 25.3 22.1 5.0 
1964 16.2 7.1 25.4 23.7 4.6 
1965 17.3 7.0 26.2 24.9 4.8 
1966 16.0 8.8 26.7 25.1 5.0 
1967 15.4 8.3 24.7 25.2 5.4 
1968 15.6 7.5 25.5 25.6 5.6 
1969 15.9 7.6 28.9 26.0 5.2 
1970 15.7 7.8 29.3 26.0 4.2 
1971 15.7 8.0 32.7 23.8 3.1 
1972 17.1 9.1 36.5 24.9 2.1 
1973 21.5 11.1 40.4 26.4 2.0 
1974 21.8 12.5 31.6 27.9 2.1 
1975 22.9 13.1 29.5 26.4 2.3 
1976 22.0 13.7 31.9 24.9 1.9 
1977 21.5 13.1 30.8 23.9 1.7 
1978 21.0 13.7 30.8 22.6 1.8 
1979 21.5 13.6 32.8 21.5 1.9 
1980 22.3 16.3 31.2 22.2 2.7 
1981 23.1 16.0 25.4 21.9 4.0 
1982 24.4 14.3 25.3 21.6 5.8 
1983 25.6 15.4 24.7 20.8 7.1 
1984 25.5 16.9 25.1 18.7 7.2 
1985 27.9 16.5 21.9 19.2 7.0 
1986 26.3 17.4 20.6 19.5 6.6 
1987 27.0 19.1 19.1 20.8 6.7 
1988 25.7 18.5 20.3 22.6 6.8 
1989 27.5 18.2 18.0 24. 6.7 
1990 28.1 16.8 18.0 24.5 6.4 
1991 27.0 16.1 19.6 23.8 7.0 
1992 27.0 16.7 19.1 21.8 7.9 
1993 26.3 16.2 19.8 19.8 8.6 
1994 26.4 16.8 19.8 19.7 8.9 
1995 26.9 16.5 19.1 20.6 9.1 
1996 26.5 15.8 19.5 20.3 9.0 
continue 
Table Al. Greek Main Economic Indicators (continued) 
GDP 
Growth' 
Inflation 
Rated 
Industrial 
Production` 
Employment 
Growth` 
Investment 
Growth' 
1961 11.1 1.5 0.4 8.1 
1962 1.5 4.6 -1.0 8.4 
1963 10.1 1.4 9.7 -1.4 5.5 
1964 8.3 3.7 11.3 -1.3 20.7 
1965 9.4 4.0 8.7 -0.7 12.8 
1966 6.1 4.9 16.0 -0.9 3.2 
1967 5.5 2.4 4.5 -1.2 -1.6 
1968 6.7 1.7 7.7 -1.2 21.4 
1969 9.9 3.4 12.0 -0.3 18.6 
1970 8.0 3.9 10.2 -0.1 -1.4 
1971 7.1 3.2 11.4 0.3 14.0 
1972 8.9 5.0 14.1 0.5 15.4 
1973 7.3 19.4 15.3 1.0 7.7 
1974 -3.6 20.9 -1.5 0.1 -25.6 
1975 6.1 12.3 4.3 0.1 0.2 
1976 6.4 15.4 10.6 1.2 6.8 
1977 3.4 13.0 1.9 0.8 7.8 
1978 6.7 12.9 7.6 0.4 6.0 
1979 3.7 18.6 6.0 1.1 8.8 
1980 1.8 17.7 1.0 1.4 -6.5 
1981 0.1 19.8 0.9 5.2 -7.5 
1982 0.4 25.1 0.9 -0.8 -1.9 
1983 0.4 19.1 -0.3 1.1 -1.3 
1984 2.8 20.3 2.3 0.4 -5.7 
1985 3.1 17.7 4.2 1.0 5.2 
1986 1.6 17.5 -1.0 0.4 -6.2 
1987 -0.5 14.3 -1.5 -0.1 -5.1 
1988 4.5 15.6 5.1 1.6 8.9 
1989 3.8 14.4 1.8 0.3 7.1 
1990 0 20.6 -2.3 1.3 5.0 
1991 3.0 19.9 -1.4 -1.8 4.8 
1992 0.5 14.5 -1.2 1.4 -1.0 
1993 0.2 12.7 -2.1 0.8 -1.8 
1994 2.2 10.1 0.9 1.9 1.2 
1995 2.0 9.3 2.3 0.9 5.9 
1996 2.6 8.9 1.3 1.0 11.8 
a: Percentage of gross domestic product at market prices 
b: Percentage of civilian labour force 
`: Real growth rates calculated from figures in 1990 mn US $ 
d: Real growth of GDP deflator (base year 1990) 
'able A2. Greek and Turkish Military Figures 
Share 
. 
960 4.9 
[961 4.2 
[962 4 
[963 3.9 
[964 3.6 
1965 3.5 
1966 3.6 
1967 4.3 
1968 4.7 
1969 4.8 
1970 4.8 
1971 4.7 
1972 4.6 
1973 4.1 
1974 4.3 
1975 6.5 
1976 6.9 
1977 7.0 
1978 6.7 
1979 6.3 
1980 5.7 
1981 7.0 
1982 6.9 
1983 6.3 
1984 7.2 
1985 7.1 
1986 6.1 
1987 6.3 
1988 5.2 
1989 4.6 
1990 4.7 
1991 4.. 3 
1992 4.5 
1993 4.4 
1994 4.4 
1995 4.4 
1996 4.5 
Source: SIPRI 
GREECE 
ME ME rý Share 
861 
836 
810 
843 
852 
913 
992 
1269 
1461 
1639 
1756 
1855 
1964 
1898 
1906 
3088 
3471 
3655 
3719 
3615 
3318 
4081 
4025 
3707 
4334 
4358 
3901 
3965 
4118 
3834 
3863 
3708 
3895 
3815 
3880 
3952 
4170 
-2.90 
-3.11 
4.07 
1.07 
7.16 
8.65 
27.92 
15.13 
12.18 
7.14 
5.64 
5.88 
-3.36 
0.42 
62.01 
12.40 
5.30 
1.75 
-2.80 
-8.22 
23.00 
-1.37 
-7.90 
16.91 
0.55 
-10.49 
1.64 
3.86 
-6.90 
0.76 
-4.01 
5.04 
-2.05 
1.70 
1.86 
5.52 
5.1 
5.5 
5.1 
4.7 
4.8 
5.0 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.4 
4.3 
4.5 
4.3 
4.1 
3.9 
6.1 
6.2 
5.8 
5.4 
4.5 
4.9 
5.0 
5.6 
5.2 
4.9 
4.5 
4.8 
3.3 
3.0 
3.3 
3.5 
3.7 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
3.8 
4.3 
TURKEY 
ME1 
1015 
1094 
1151 
1171 
1265 
1343 
1304 
1315 
1391 
1364 
1460 
1709 
1776 
1865 
2040 
3380 
4143 
3991 
3655 
3242 
3071 
3792 
4145 
3991 
3812 
4046 
4548 
4343 
3787 
4382 
5296 
5463 
5747 
6355 
6213 
6200 
6306 
ME 
_growth 
7.78 
5.21 
1.74 
8.03 
6.17 
-2.90 
0.84 
5.78 
-1.94 
7.04 
17.05 
3.92 
5.01 
9.38 
65.69 
22.57 
-3.67 
-8.42 
-11.30 
-5.27 
23.48 
9.31 
-3.71 
-4.48 
6.13 
12.41 
-4.51 
-12.80 
15.71 
20.86 
3.15 
5.20 
10.58 
-2.23 
-0.21 
1.71 
' Military expenditure (ME) in 1990 million 
US dollars. 
APPENDIX B 
Table B1. DF and ADF tests with an Intercept for MG, MT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable MGt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.1201 -233.1923 -235.1923 -236.6888 -235.6958 
ADF(1) -2.1251 -233.0056 -236.0056 -238.2504 -236.7609 
ADF(2) -2.2625 -231.7780 -235.7780 -238.7710 -236.7851 
ADF(3) -2,1098 -230.4298 -235.4298 -239.1711 -236.6886 
Unit root tests for variable MGt in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -3.2232 36.1711 34.1711 32.6746 33.6676 
ADF(1) -3.0718 36.1717 33.1717 30.9270 32.4164 
ADF(2) -3.1028 36.3905 32.3905 29.3975 31.3834 
ADF(3) -2.9548 37.8448 32.8448 29.1035 31.5859 
Unit root tests for variable MTt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -0.29530 -243.9543 -245.9543 -247.4508 -246.4579 
ADF(1) -0.63693 -242.5504 -245.5504 -247.7951 -246.3057 
ADF(2) 0.13453 -237.7392 -241.7392 -244.7322 -242.7463 
ADF(3) -0.048004 -237.5583 -242.5583 -246.2996 -243.8172 
Unit root tests for variable MTt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.0612 24.3415 22.3415 20.8450 21.8380 
ADF(1) -1.1783 25.8565 22.8565 20.6118 22.1012 
ADF(2) -0.96865 28.9171 24.9171 21.9241 23.9101 
ADF(3) -0.95836 28.9274 23.9274 20.1862 
22.6686 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9528 
MG=Greek military expenditure in 1990 mn US $ 
MT=Turkish military expenditure in 1990 mn US $ 
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Table B2. DF and ADF tests with an Intercept and a Linear Trend for MG, MT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept and a linear trend 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable MG, (in levels 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.5837 -233.0865 -236.0865 -238.3312 -236.8418 
ADF(1) -1.3785 -232.9732 -236.9732 -239.9662 -237.9803 
ADF(2) -0.90203 -231.7016 -236.7016 -240.4429 -237.9604 
ADF(3) -1.3447 -230.3692 -236.3692 -240.8587 -237.8798 
Unit root tests for variable MGt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.7618 36.1898 33.1898 30.9451 32.4345 
ADF(1) -1.7012 36.1964 32.1964 29.2034 31.1893 
ADF(2) -1.5000 36.5276 31.5276 27.7863 30.2687 
ADF(3) -1.8763 37.8636 31.8636 27.3740 30.3530 
Unit root tests for variable MTt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.5428 -240.6886 -243.6886 -245.9334 -244.4439 
ADF(1) -3.9214 -235.7109 -239.7109 -242.7039 -240.7179 
ADF(2) -2.4121 -234.3705 -239.3705 -243.1118 -240.6293 
ADF(3) -2.9610 -232.7359 -238.7359 -243.2255 -240.2465 
Unit root tests for variable MTr (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.8233 25.6303 22.6303 20.3855 21.8750 
ADF(1) -2.7885 29.1320 25.1320 22.1389 24.1249 
ADF(2) -1.7927 30.3412 25.3412 21.5999 24.0824 
ADF(3) -1.9134 30.6485 24.6485 20.1590 23.1379 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -3.5514 
Table B3. DF and ADF tests for the Differenced Series MG, MT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1965-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable AMG, 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC :: I HQC 
DF -5.9273 -228.6682 -230.6682 -232.1339 -231.1540 
ADF(1) -4.9800 -227.8244 -230.8244 -233.0203 -231.5532 
ADF(2) -2.6371 -226.2963 -230.2963 -233.2278 -231.2680 
ADF(3) -2.5868 -226.1103 -231.1103 -234.7747 -232.3250 
Unit root tests for variable AMGt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.8300 30.2081 28.2081 26.7424 27.7223 
ADF(1) -3.5938 30.2093 27.2093 25.0107 26.4806 
ADF(2) -2.1190 31.8967 27.8967 24.9653 26.9250 
ADF(3) -2.1533 32.0840 27.0840 23.4197 25.8694 
Unit root tests for variable AMTt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.1677 -235.9052 -237.9052 -239.3710 -238.3911 
ADF(1) -5.7467 -231.0214 -234.0214 -236.2200 -234.7501 
ADF(2) -3.4401 -230.8431 -234.8431 -237.7746 -235.8148 
ADF(3) -3.6619 -229.8070 -234.8070 -238.4714 -236.0216 
Unit root tests for variable AMTt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.0889 23.9068 21.9068 20.4411 21.4210 
ADF(1) -5.0751 27.1116 24.1116 21.9130 23.3828 
ADF(2) -3.5458 27.1144 23.1144 20.1829 22.1427 
ADF(3) -3.1868 27.2685 22.2685 18.6041 21.0538 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9558 
AMGt = First difference of the Greek military expenditure series 
AMTt = First difference of the Turkish military expenditure series 
288 
Table B4. DF and ADF tests with an Intercept for YG, YT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable YGr (in levels 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.2309 -321.8380 -323.8380 -325.3346 -324.3416 
ADF(1) -1.2692 -321.3776 -324.3776 -326.6224 -325.1329 
ADF(2) -1.1667 -320.3790 -324.3790 -327.3721 -325.3861 
ADF(3) -1.1453 -320.3739 -325.3739 -329.1152 -326.6327 
Unit root tests for variable YGt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.5697 44.2102 42.2102 40.7137 41.7067 
ADF(1) -2.3346 44.8286 41.8286 39.5839 41.0733 
ADF(2) -2.4739 45.6959 41.6959 38.7028 40.6888 
ADF(3) -2.3696 45.6984 40.6984 36.9571 39.4396 
Unit root tests for variable YTt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL -1 AIC SBC HQC 
DF -0.32093 -347.2530 -349.2530 -350.7495 -349.7565 
ADF(1) 0.080340 -346.0352 -349.0352 -351.2800 -349.7905 
ADF(2) -0.17132 -345.7020 -349.7020 -352.6950 -350.7090 
ADF(3) -0.93721 -344.1349 -349.1349 -352.8762 -350.3937 
Unit root tests for variable YTt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.0799 33.9229 31.9229 30.4264 31.4194 
ADF(1) -1.1050 35.1972 32.1972 29.9525 31.4419 
ADF(2) -1.0375 35.8684 31.8684 28.8754 30.8614 
ADF(3) -1.0771 36.2942 31.2942 27.5530 
30.0354 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9528 
YG = Greek GDP in 1990 mn US $ 
YT = Turkish GDP in 1990 mn US $ 
Both calculated from SIPRI estimates for shares and military expenditure 
Table B5. DF and ADF tests with an Intercept and a Linear Trend for YG, YT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept and a linear trend 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable YGr (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.2409 -319.9842 -322.9842 -325.2290 -323.7395 
ADF(1) -2.7129 -318.4467 -322.4467 -325.4397 -323.4537 
ADF(2) -2.2562 -318.2716 -323.2716 -327.0129 -324.5305 
ADF(3) -2.2847 -318.0986 -324.0986 -328.5881 -325.6092 
Unit root tests for variable YGt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.7961 45.9324 42.9324 40.6876 42.1771 
ADF(1) -3.0360 47.3071 43.3071 40.3140 42.3000 
ADF(2) -2.7867 47.6087 42.6087 38.8674 41.3499 
ADF(3) -2.7513 47.6547 41.6547 37.1651 40.1441 
Unit root tests for variable YTt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.2719 -344.6433 -347.6433 -349.8881 -348.3986 
ADF(1) -1.9000 -343.8940 -347.8940 -350.8870 -348.9011 
ADF(2) -2.0368 -343.3426 -348.3426 -352.0839 -349.6014 
ADF(3) -2.5450 -341.0769 -347.0769 -351.5664 -348.5875 
Unit root tests for variable YTt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.9232 35.5710 32.5710 30.3262 
31.8157 
ADF(1) -1.2867 35.9332 31.9332 28.9402 
30.9262 
ADF(2) -1.9634 37.7647 32.7647 29.0234 
31.5059 
ADF(3) -2.7299 40.0241 34.0241 29.5346 
32.5135 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -3.5514 
Table B6. DF and ADF tests for the Differenced Series YG, YT 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1965-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable AYGt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.7002 -312.8660 -314.8660 -316.3318 -315.3519 
ADF(1) -4.5539 -311.7877 -314.7877 -316.9863 -315.5165 
ADF(2) -3.5012 -311.7787 -315.7787 -318.7102 -316.7504 
ADF(3) -3.3135 -311.4487 -316.4487 -320.1130 -317.6633 
Unit root tests for variable AYGt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.3897 41.0697 39.0697 37.6039 38.5838 
ADF(1) -4.0932 41.6305 38.6305 36.4319 37.9017 
ADF(2) -3.1081 41.6699 37.6699 34.7385 36.6982 
ADF(3) -2.7053 41.6700 36.6700 33.0057 35.4554 
Unit root tests for variable AYTt (in levels) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -6.7969 -335.9921 -337.9921 -339.4578 -338.4779 
ADF(1) -3.3948 -335.6922 -338.6922 -340.8908 -339.4210 
ADF(2) -1.8155 -334.6838 -338.6838 -341.6153 -339.6555 
ADF(3) -1.7296 -334.6595 -339.6595 -343.3238 -340.8741 
Unit root tests for variable AYTt (in logs) 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -6.9135 33.0126 31.0126 29.5468 30.5267 
ADF(1) -3.1659 33.7067 30.7067 28.5081 29.9779 
ADF(2) -2.0649 34.0544 30.0544 27.1229 
29.0827 
ADF(3) -2.0828 34.2587 29.2587 25.5944 
28.0441 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9558 
AYGt and AYtt are the first differences of Greek and Turkish GDP respectively 
Table B7. Diagnostic Tests for the Military Equations in the VECM 
F 
Greek Equation zMGt Turkish E quation tMTt 
Serial Correlation X2(1)= 0.03 [. 869] X2(1)= 0.19 [. 659] 
Functional Form X2(1)= 1.17 [. 278] X2(1 )= 7.68 [. 006] 
Normality X2(2)= 1.30 [. 522] X2(2)= 0.001 [1.00] 
Heteroscedasticity X2(1)= 0.49 [. 482] X2(1)= 3.62 [. 057] 
Serial Correlation: Lagrance multiplier test on residuals 
Functional Form: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
Normality: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
Heteroscedasticity: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted 
values 
Table B8. VECM Results for Greek and Turkish GDP Equations 
AYGt AYTt 
Intercept -0.41 (0.69) 1.67 (2.10)** 
©MGt-1 0.31 (2.62)** -0.30 (1.93)* 
AMTt-1 -0.07 (0.59) 0.47 (3.18)*** 
DYGt-1 0.21 (1.15) 0.08 (0.35) 
AYTt-1 0.37 (2.85)*** -0.49 (2.83)*** 
Zt-1 -0.02 (0.71) 0.07 (2.03)** 
CD -0.09 (2.26)* * 0.05 (1.08) 
R2 0.43 0.38 
S. E. R. 0.06 0.08 
DW 2.06 1.90 
F-stat 6,28 3.56*** 2.87** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Correlation X2(1) = 0.28 [. 598] X2(1) == 0.03 [. 870] 
Functional Form X2(1) = 0.77 [. 381] X2(1) = 1.93 [. 165] 
Normality X2(2) = 0.06 [. 969] X2(2) = 4.56 [. 102] 
Heteroscedasticity X2(1) = 6.08 [. 014] X2 (1) = 0.001 [. 978] 
t-ratios in parentheses and probabilities for the diagnostic tests in nracxets 
***: 1% level of significance, **: 5% level of significance, *: 10% 
level of significance 
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Table B9. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots 
Test Statistics 
Variable Levels First Differences 
Intercept Intercept & trend Intercept Intercept & trend 
m -1.69 -1.60 -4.67 -4.73 
TB 1.05 0.08 -4.08 -4.57 
TM -3.32 -3.35 -4.88 -4.80 
NATO -1.09 -2.26 -4.43 -4.40 
NG -0.78 -1.85 -4.29 -4.40 
POP -0.11 -3.54 -2.96 -2.70 
GDPC -2.58 -0.42 -3.19 -4.73 
Critical Values (5%) 
-2.95 -3.54 
-- F--2.95 
-3.55 
For all the estimations Microfit 4.0 (Pesaran & Pesaran) and Eviews 1.0 (Micro TSP) were used 
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Figure B5. Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals 
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Figure B8. Generalized Impulse Response to one S. E. shock in the eq. for MG 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1. DF and ADF tests for Greek GDP and Military Burden 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -6.1440 78.5373 76.5373 75.0408 76.0338 
ADF(1) -4.2924 78.5425 75.5425 73.2978 74.7872 
ADF(2) -4.1798 78.8932 74.8932 71.9002 73.8862 
ADF(3) -3.3270 79.0174 74.0174 70.2761 72.7585 
Unit root tests for variable SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.8475 128.6736 126.6736 125.1771 126.1701 
ADF(1) -1.8618 128.7559 125.7559 123.5112 125.0007 
ADF(2) -1.6754 128.9879 124.9879 121.9949 123.9809 
ADF(3) -1.8951 129.7788 124.7785 121.0372 123.5197 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9528 
Table C2. DF and ADF tests for Greek GDP and Military burden 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept and a linear trend 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC T SBC HQC 
DF -1.7747 78.5540 75.5540 
73.3092 74.7987 
ADF(1) -1.7486 78.5645 74.5645 71.5715 
73.5575 
ADF(2) -1.6676 79.0296 74.0296 
70.2883 72.7708 
ADF(3) -1.6397 79.0882 73.0882 
68.5987 71.5776 
Unit root tests for variable SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.5007 128.6762 125.6762 
123.4315 124.9209 
ADF(1) -1.5376 128.7817 124.7817 
121.7887 123.7747 
ADF(2) -1.1960 128.9879 
123.9879 120.2467 122.7291 
ADF(3) -1.5541 129.8568 123.8568 
119.3673 122.3462 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -3. 
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Table C3. DF and ADF tests for Greek GDP and Military burden (differenced) 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1965 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable AYt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -3.3006 68.1697 66.1697 64.7040 65.6838 
ADF(1) -2.3934 68.8647 65.8647 63.6661 65.1359 
ADF(2) -1.4795 70.8430 66.8430 63.9115 65.8713 
ADF(3) -1.2713 70.9933 65.9933 62.3290 64.7787 
Unit root tests for variable ASMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -5.4916 122.9183 120.9183 119.4526 120.4325 
ADF(1) -4.6316 123.4909 120.4909 118.2923 119.7621 
ADF(2) -3.1333 123.6937 119.6937 116.7622 118.7220 
ADF(3) -3.4694 124.8042 119.8042 116.1399 118.5896 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9558 
Table C4. Determination of the order of the VAR model for Greece 
1965-96. Order of VAR=5, Variables included: Y, SM Exogenous: Constant 
Order LL AIC SBC LR LR Adjusted 
5 207.95 185.95 169.83 ----- ----- 
4 202.23 184.23 171.04 X2 (4)= 11.44 [. 022] 7.51 [. 111] 
3 201.29 187.29 177.03 X2 ( 8)= 13.31 [. 101 ] 8.74 [. 365] 
2 199.76 189.76 182.44 X2 ( 12)=16.38 [. 175] 10.75 [. 551] 
1 194.39 188.39 183.99 X2 ( 16)=27.12 [. 040] 17,80 [. 3361 
0 101.00 99.00 97.54 X2 (20)=213.90[. 000] 140.37 [. 000] 
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APPENDIX D 
DERIVATION OF THE FEDER-TYPE MODEL 
The form of the model used here assumes the economy consists of four sectors 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive: the civilian sector (C), the non-military 
government sector (G) , the export sector 
(X) and the military sector (M) so that total 
output of the economy is the sum of the civilian output, the non-military government 
output, the export output and the military output. That is: 
Y=C+G+X+M (1) 
Capital and labour are allocated among the four sectors at each point 
in time. So, 
that: 
K=Kc+KG+Kx+KM and L=Lc+LG+Lx+LM 
(2a, b) 
where uppercase subscripts denote the civilian sector 
(C), the non-military 
government sector (G), the export sector (X), and the 
defence sector (M). 
I 
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Each of the M, G and X sectors has an externality effect on the civilian (C) sector. 
For this approach the production functions for the four sectors are: 
G=G(KG, LG) 
M=M(KM, LM) 
X=X(Kx, Lx) 
C=C (Kc, Lc, G, X, M) 
where subscripts C, M, G, X denote sectoral inputs. 
(3a, b, c, d) 
Allowing for relative productivity differences between the "base" sector (civilian) 
and the other three sectors, ie by (1+6), the ratios of the marginal productivities for 
the sectors are : 
ML /CL=MK /CK=(l+bm) 
GL /CL = GK/ CK -( l+ bb) 
XL/CL-XK/CK-(l+bX) 
(4a, b, c) 
where the uppercase subscripts on M, G, X, C denote partial derivatives (or marginal 
products) of labour and capital (ie. ML=9M/6Lm and MK = 6M/OKm). Also, the size 
of M, G, X may act as "externality" factors for the civilian sector (C). In other 
words, the model also identifies marginal externality effects of each of the three 
sectors (M, G, X) on the civilian sector (C). So, we will have: 
3of 
GK =(1 +bg) CK and GL = (1+ Sg) CL 
XK= 0 +6X) CK and XL (I +6X) CL 
NIK=(1 +Sm)CK and ML =(l +Sm)CL 
where 
(5a, b, c) 
is the relative factor productivity between the "base" sector and the other 
three sectors. If for example the productivity index for defence 8,, is positive then 
the defence sector is more productive than the civilian sector. A zero value for b,,, 
would indicate the absence of a productivity difference while a negative value for 6,, 
would indicate that the civilian sector is more productive. 
Due to unavailability of sectoral input data the model is reformulated in terms of 
aggregate inputs. 
Differentiating with respect to time (indicated by a prime) equation 1 becomes: 
Y'=M'+G'+X'+C'=: > 
Y'= MKIm + MLL'm + GKI-, + GLL'. + XKIX + XLL', + CKIc + CLL'c + 
+CMM'+CGG'+CXX' 
where I; =K'; , 
investment in sector I (i=m, g, x, c) 
Using the fact that productivities may vary across sectors 
(5a, b, c), it follows: 
30? 
Y'-(l+bm) CKIm + (1+bm) CLL'm + (I+bg) CKIg + (l+Sg) CKIx + (1+bx) CKI\ + 
0 +bX) CLL'X+ CKIc + CLL', + CMM' + CGG'+CXX' => 
CK(Im+Ig+Ix +Ic)+CL (L'm+L'g+L'x+L'c)+8m(CKIm+CLL'm)+ 
bg (CKIg + CLL'g) + bx (CKIx + CLI-'x) + CMM'+CGG'+CXX' 
Using (2a, b) and (5a, b, c): 
Y'= CKI + CL L' + 
sn' (MKIm + MLL'm) + 45 ¬, (GKIg + GLL'g) + 
1+Sn7 1+C59 
cSX (XKIx + XLL, x) + CMM, + CGG, + CXX, z* 1+Sx 
Y, -CKI+CLL, +( 
Jm 
+CM)M' +( 
sý: 
+Cc)G, +( 
s. r +Cx)X, 
1 +CSn, 1+, 5g 1 +SX 
Dividing by Y, gives: 
--CK 
Y l 
+C 
LLY1 +'5n, 
x 
ý 
+CX 
X/ 
X-x 
I+5x xY 
and using (8a, b, c), it becomes: 
x Y+ +CM 
M' 
X 
M+ g+CG 
MY +C5 
G 
9 
ýU-, 
Y, 
__ C CII +L+ Sn, YKYL 1+8 
+9. _CIXr xX ý1+6Y .' X) XY 
-I- A C1 M'vM, I 15g .,, C) G' G 
m 
.vmIT -- *- 
This is equation 7 in the text. 
\ 
ýA-I-Y-1 
Mý MY U+(Sg 'VgG) G" 
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APPENDIX E 
Table El. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots 
Test Statistics 
Variable Levels First Differences 
Intercept Intercept & trend Intercept Intercept & trend 
Y -1.57 -1.00 -4.09 -4.73 
M -1.69 -1.60 -4.67 -4.73 
S -1.50 -2.30 -4.06 -4.01 
TB 1.05 0.08 -4.08 -4.57 
L -2.42 -3.08 -6.11 -6.00 
INFL -1.71 -1.39 -4.91 -5.21 
EX 1.60 -1.03 -2.84 -3.82 
TSM -3.32 -3.35 -4.88 -4.80 
NATO -1.09 -2.26 -4.43 -4.40 
NG -0.78 -1.85 -4.29 -4.40 
GDPC -2.58 -0.42 -3.19 -4.73 
Critical Critical value(5%) Critical Critical value(5%) 
-2.95 -3.54 -2.95 -3.55 
For all the estimations Microfit 4.0 (Pesaran & Pesaran) and Eviews 1.0 (Micro 
TSP) were used 
APPENDIX F 
Table Fl. Disaggregated Military Expenditure for Greece, Portugal and Spain* 
Personnel Ex enditure Equip ment Expenditure 
Greece Portu al Spain Greece Portugal Spain 
1987 3116 1370 5223 868 211 2597 
1988 3108 1538 5354 1244 244 2034 
1989 3076 1739 5824 1095 290 1860 
1990 3243 1830 5901 1083 258 1209 
1991 3089 1924 5968 974 218 1190 
1992 3062 2125 5928 1167 58 930 
1993 3027 2032 5778 1202 183 1252 
1994 3119 1955 5526 1208 104 1018 
1995 3201 2077 5684 1001 158 1177 
1996 3280 2076 5687 1131 162 1132 
1997 3547 2094 5606 1106 411 1151 
* in constant 1990 mn US $ 
Source: SIPRI 
Table F2. Disaggregated Military Expenditure for Greece and Turkey* 
Personnel xpenditure Equipment Expenditure 
Greece Turkey Greece Turkey 
1987 3116 1550 868 943 
1988 3108 1401 1244 886 
1989 3076 2098 1095 783 
1990 3243 2657 1083 1100 
1991 3089 2743 974 1284 
1992 3062 2897 1167 1475 
1993 3027 3585 1202 1506 
1994 3119 3280 1208 1884 
1995 3201 3363 1001 1962 
1996 3280 3417 1131 2278 
1997 3547 3260 1106 2432 
* in constant 1990 mn US $ 
Source: SIPRI 
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Table F3. Imports of Major Conventional Weapons in 1990 mit US S* 
1988-92 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1991-95 
Turkey 6167 954 1640 2288 2089 1125 8096 
Greece 6197 559 2632 891 1185 489 5756 
Spain 3747 126 261 580 863 359 2189 
Portugal 1374 1062 3 300 500 5 1870 
* For the years 1991-95, Turkey was ranked first among the major recipients for conventional 
weapons, Greece fifth, Spain twentieth and Portugal twentythird 
Source: SIPRI 
Figure Fl. Military Personnel Expenditure for Greece, Portugal and Spain* 
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Figure F2. Military Equipment Expenditure for Greece, Spain and Portugal * 
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Figure F4. Military Personnel and Equipment Expenditure for Portugal* 
*Figures in constant 1990 mn US $ 
Source: SIPRI 
IQIM=W 
Figure F5. Military Personnel and Equipment Expenditure for Spain* 
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APPENDIX G 
Table G1. DF and ADF tests for Portuguese variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -3.3954 71.1871 69.1871 67.6906 68.6836 
ADF(1) -2.6072 71.7189 68.7189 66.4741 67.9636 
ADF(2) -2.9237 72.6698 68.6698 65.6768 67.6627 
ADF(3) -2.4151 73.0978 68.0978 64.3565 66.8389 
Unit root tests for variable SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.1033 127.6275 125.6275 124.1310 125.1240 
ADF(1) -0.99999 127.8603 124.8603 122.6155 124.1050 
ADF(2) -0.90726 127.9598 123.9598 120.9667 122.9527 
ADF(3) -1.1534 128.7527 123.7527 120.0114 122.4938 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9528 
Table G2. DF and ADF tests for Portuguese variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept and a linear trend 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.5712 71.5994 68.5994 66.3546 
67.8441 
ADF(1) -1.7173 72.4323 68.4323 
65.4392 67.4252 
ADF(2) -1.4791 73.0359 68.0359 
64.2947 66.7771 
ADF(3) -1.6378 73.7557 67.7557 
63.2662 66.2451 
Unit root tests for variable SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -1.8386 128.7877 125.7877 
123.5429 125.0324 
ADF(1) -1.6202 128.7989 
124.7989 121.8058 123.7918 
ADF(2) -1.4891 128.8023 
123.8023 120.0610 122.5434 
ADF(3) -1.6655 129.7255 
123.7255 119.2360 122.2150 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -3. 
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Table G3. DF and ADF tests for Portuguese variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1965-1996) 
Unit root tests for variable AYt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -3.7778 65.9746 63.9746 62.5089 63.4888 
ADF(1) -3.2928 66.0555 63.0555 60.8569 62.3267 
ADF(2) -2.0135 67.5752 63.5752 60.6437 62.6035 
ADF(3) -2.6488 69.4159 64.4159 60.7516 63.2013 
Unit root tests for variable ASMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -6.2443 123.0944 121.0944 119.6286 120.6085 
ADF(1) -4.5549 123.3420 120.3420 118.1434 119.6132 
ADF(2) -2.9931 123.6223 119.6223 116.6908 118.6506 
ADF(3) -2.6633 123.63 81 118.63 81 114.9738 117.4235 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9558 
Table G4. Determining the order of the VAR model for Portugal 
1965-96. Order of VAR=5, Variables included: Y, SM Exogenous: Constant 
Order LL AIC SBC LR 
5 207.95 185.95 169.83 
4 202.23 184.23 171.04 
3 201.29 187.29 177.03 
2 199.76 189.76 182.44 
1 194.39 188.39 183.99 
0 101.00 99.00 97.54 
X2 (4)= 11.44 [. 022] 
X2(8)=13.31 [. 101] 
X2 ( 12)=16.38 [. 175] 
X2 ( 16)=27.12[. 040] 
X2 ( 20)213.90'[. 000] 
LR Adjusted 
7.51 [. 1111 
8.74 [. 365] 
10.75 [. 551] 
17.80[. 336] 
140.37[. 0001 
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Table G5. DF and ADF tests for Spanish variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -4.1375 83.3399 81.3399 79.8434 80.8364 
ADF(1) -1.7906 87.4969 84.4969 82.2521 83.7416 
ADF(2) -1.9297 87.8147 83. '8147 80.8217 82.8077 
ADF(3) -1.4945 88.0038 83.0038 79.2625 81.7450 
Unit root tests for variab le SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -0.94351 175.7395 173.7395 172.2430 173.2360 
ADF(1) -0.98938 175.8056 172.8056 170.5609 172.0503 
ADF(2) -2.0475 181.1221 177.1221 174.1291 176.1150 
ADF(3) -1.8489 181.1227 176.1227 172.3 814 174.8639 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9528 
Table G6. DF and ADF tests for Spanish variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept and a linear trend 
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1964 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable Yt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.1541 84.0889 
81.0889 78.8441 80.3336 
ADF(1) -1.8718 88.5514 
84.5514 81.5584 83.5444 
ADF(2) -1.8579 88.7598 
83.7598 80.0185 82.5010 
ADF(3) -1.7497 88.9909 
82.9909 78.5013 81.4803 
Unit root tests for variable SMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -0.68116 176.0889 
173.0889 170.8441 172.3336 
ADF(1) -0.69436 176.1085 
172.1085 169.1155 171.1014 
ADF(2) -1.8941 181.1291 
176.1291 172.3 878 174.8702 
ADF(3) -1.6998 181.1293 
175.1293 170.6397 173.6187 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -3. 
Table G7. DF and ADF tests for Spanish variables 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions with an intercept 
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions (1965 -1996) 
Unit root tests for variable AYt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -2.4665 83.2731 81.2731 79.8073 80.7872 
ADF(1) -2.2422 83.2839 80.2839 78.0853 79.5551 
ADF(2) -1.7790 84.6578 80.6578 77.7263 79.6861 
ADF(3) -1.7451 84.6607 79.6607 75.9964 78.4461 
Unit root tests for variable ASMt 
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC 
DF -5.4253 169.5225 167.5225 166.0568 167.0366 
ADF(1) -2.3571 173.3084 170.3084 168.1098 169.5796 
ADF(2) -2.5327 173.8125 169.8125 166.8811 168.8408 
ADF(3) -2.0522 173.9910 168.9910 165.3266 167.7764 
95% critical value for the ADF statistic= -2.9558 
Table G8. Determining the order of the VAR model for Spain 
1965-96. Order of VAR=5, Variables included: Y, SM Exogenous: Constant 
Order LL AIC SBC LR LR Adjusted 
5 269.53 247.53 231.40 ----- ----- 
4 266.43 248.43 235.23 X2 (4)= 6.20 [. 185] 4.07 [. 397] 
3 265.72 251.72 241.46 X2 ( 8)= 7.62 [. 472] 5.00 [. 758] 
2 260.92 250.92 243.59 X2 ( 12)=17.21 [. 142] 11.29 [. 504] 
1 253.63 247.63 243.23 X2 ( 16)=31.80[. 011 ] 20.87[. 184] 
0 138.26 136.26 134.79 X2 (20)=262.53[. 000] 172.29[. 000] 
Table G9. Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation Results (1961-1996) for Spain 
AR(1) converged after 5 iterations 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. 
Intercept 
I /Y, 
dL/L-, 
01VI/M-, (M/Y, ) 
OG/G-, (G/Y, ) 
OX / X-, (X /Y, ) 
R2 
SE 
DW 
F-stat 
Eq. 7 
-0.15 (3.13)*** 
0.79 (3.82)*** 
0.29 (0.64) 
0.99 (0.56) 
0.73 
0.02 
2.16 
F(4,30)=20.08*** 
Eq. 7 
-0.14 (2.98)*** 
0.74 (3. S0)*** 
0.25 (0.56) 
0.08 (0.04) 
1.10 (1.17) 
0.74 
0.02 
2.06 
F(5,29)=16.54*** 
Eq. 7 
-0.16 (3.49)*** 
0.75 (3.70)*** 
0.13 (0.32) 
-0.36 (0.21) 
2.27 (2.22)** 
0.79 (2.21)** 
0.78 
0.01 
2.12 
F(6,28)=16.40*** 
Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification: U=a*U (-1) +E 
a 0.69 (7.51)*** 0.69 (7.43)*** 0.72 
(8.42)*** 
T-ratios in parenthesis 
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Table G10. Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation Results (1961-1996) for Spain 
AR(1) converged after 5 iterations 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 9 Eq. 9 Eq. 9 
Intercept -0.15 (3.11)*** -0.12 (2.65)** -0.14 (3.00)*** 
I/Y1 0.80 (3.80)*** 0.66 (3.07)*** 0.64 (3.08)*** 
AL / L_1 0.24 (0.51) 0.32 (0.70) 0.37 (0.81) 
AM/ M_1(M /Y 1) 
6.70 (0.58) 5.62 (0.45) -6.88 (0.58) 
AG / G_, (G /Y 1) ------ -6.53 
(1.48) -2.82 (0.78) 
AX I X_, (X /Y 1) ------ ------ 
0.88 (1.35) 
AM/ M 1(C 
/Y 
1) -0.12 
(0.50) -0.11 (0.40) 0.21 (0.65) 
AG / G_1(C/ Y1) ------ 1.18 (1.77)* 0.95(l. 58) 
OX / X_, (C /Y 1) ------ ------ -0.01 
(0.10) 
R2 0.73 0.77 0.81 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.01 
DW 2.11 1.99 2.06 
F-stat F(5,29)=15.72*** F(7,27)=12.73*** F(9,25)=12.05*** 
Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification: U=a*U (-1) +E 
a 0.70 (7.46)*** 0.69 (7.04)*** 0.68 (6.34) 
Table G11. AR(1) Estimation Results (1963-1996) for Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 7 Eq. 7 Eq. 7 
Intercept -0.04 (1.42) -0.04 (1.38) -0.06 (1.71)* 
1/Y, 0.25 (1.70)* 0.25 (1.67) 0.25 (1.65) 
AL / L_, 0.65 (1.61) 0.66 (1.54) 0.50 (1.14) 
AM/ M-1 (M 2.41 (0.92) 2.42 (0.90) 3.52 (1.26) 
AG / G_, (G /Y ------ -0.02 (0.03) 0.86 (0.72) 
AX / X-, (X / Y, ) ------ ------ 0.63 (1.28) 
(vi Y) 0.47 (3.40)*** 0.47 (3.33)*** 0.52 (3.59)*** 
R2 0.60 0.60 0.62 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.02 
DW 2.00 2.00 2.05 
F-stat F(4,29)=10.97*** F(5,28)=8.47*** F(6,27)=7.49*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=0.28 [. 598] X2(1)=0.32[. 572] X2(1)=0.38[. 539] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.42 [. 517] X2(1)=0.42 [. 518] X2(1)=0.07 [. 794] 
Normality X2(2)=0.14 [. 931 ] X2(2)=0.13[. 935] X`(2)=0.29 [. 864] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=0.62 [. 431 ] X2(1)=0.62[. 433] X2(1)=1.12 [. 290] 
Table G12. Long Run AR(1) Estimation Results (1963-1996) for Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 11 Eq. 11 Eq. 11 
Intercept -0.08 (1.55) -0.08 (1.50) -0.12 (1.73)* 
1/y 0.48 (1.97)* 0.48 (1.94)* 0.52 (1.90)* 
OL / L-1 1.23 (1.71)* 1.24 (1.62) 1.05 (1.22) 
OM/ M, (M/ Y) 4.56 (0.88) 4.57 (0.86) 7.41 (1.12) 
AG I G_, (G l Y) ------ -0.05 (0.03) 1.80 
(0.69) 
AX/ X, (X/Y, ) ------ ------ 
1.33 (1.09) 
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Table G13. AR(1) Estimation Results (1963-1996) for Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 9 Eq. 9 Eq. 9 
Intercept -0.04 (1.29) -0.04 (1.04) -0.04 (1.27) 
I/Y1 0.25 (1.59) 0.21 (1.31) 0-19(1.24) 
AL / L_1 0.68 (1.55) 0.89 (1.84)* 1.28 (3.04)*** 
AM/ M_1(M/ Y) -1.20 (0.06) 1.50 (0.08) -22.29 (1.30) 
AG / G_, (G /Y ,) ------ -3.47 (1.00) -2.03 (0.69) 
AX / X_1(X / Y1) ------ ------ 0.04 (0.07) 
AM/ M 1(C/ Y) 0.07 (0.20) -0.01 (0.03) 0.61 (1.23) 
AG/ G_, (C/ Y1) ------ 0.59 (1.07) 0.81 (1.65) 
AX/ X_1(C /Y) ------ ------ 0.16 (1.84) * 
(Y/ Y 0.46 (2.96)*** 0.39 (2.33)** 
R2 0.60 0.62 0.67 
SE 0.02 0.02 0.02 
DW 2.01 1.88 1.34 
F-stat F(5,28)=8.49*** F(7,26)=6.08*** F(8,25)=6.24*** 
Diagnostic Tests 
Serial Cor. X2(1)=0.35 [. 555] X2(1)=0.01 [. 914] X2(1)=2.65 [. 104] 
Funct. Form X2(1)=0.50 [. 477] X2(1)=0.38 [. 538] X2(1)=0.54 [. 463] 
Normality X2(2)=0.10 [. 950] X2(2)=0.23 [. 893] X2(2)=0.20[. 906] 
Heterosc. X2(1)=0.50 [. 478] X2(1)=2.01 [. 156] X2(1)=0.23 [. 630] 
The top columns give the coefficients estimates followed by the t-ratios (in parentheses) while the 
bottom columns give the X2 tests for Serial Correlation, Functional Form, Normality and 
Heteroskedasticity followed by the probabilities. (in brackets). ***: significant at 1% level of 
significance, **: significant at 5% level of significance, *: significant at 10% level of significance. 
For all estimations Microfit 4.0 was used. 
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Table G14. Long Run AR(1) Estimation Results (1963-1996) for Spain 
Dependent GDP Growth 
Indep. Var. Eq. 9 Eq. 9 Eq. 9 
Intercept -0.08 (1.31) -0.06 (1.04) -0.04 (1.27) 
I/y1 0.45 (1.70)* 0.34 (1.34) 0.19 (1.24) 
AL / L_1 1.26 (1.73)* 1.46 (2.08)** 1.28 (3.04)*** 
AMI M_1( M/ Y 1) -2.21 
(0.07) 2.46 (0.07) -22.29 (1.30) 
OG / G_, (G /Y 1) -°--- -5.68 
(1.02) -2.03 (0.69) 
AX/ X_1(X /Y 1) ------ ------ 0.04 (0.07) 
AMI M 1(C/ Y1) 
0.13 (0.20) -0.02 (0.03) 0.61 (1.23) 
OG / G_1(C/ Y1) ------ 0.97 (1.12) 0.81 (1.65) 
OX / X_1(C / Y1) ------ ------ 0.16 (1.84) * 
Sm 
-0.675 -1.69 -0.95 
gg -0.82 -0.55 
Sx ------ 0.25 
Table G15. ADF Tests for unit roots for Portugal 
Variable Intercept 
Critical -2.95 
Intercept & trend 
Critical -3.54 
Ist diff (no trend) 
Critical -2.95 
INV -2.58 -2.58 -4.55 
EXCH -0.60 -2.21 -3.62 
GDPC -0.74 -2.97 -4.11 
INFL -1.47 -0.71 -4.38 
LAB -3.21 -3.15 
NGSH 0.67 -2.60 -3.68 
POP -1.37 -2.27 -2.77 
SAV -4.23 -4.54 
TB -2.34 -2.52 -4.66 
NATOE -1.37 -1.71 -4.70 
GDP -0.56 -3.53 -4.1 
Y -3.27 -4.44 
SM -1.02 -2.02 -5.64 
318 
Table G16. ADF Tests for unit roots for Spain 
Variable Intercept 
Critical -2.95 
Intercept & trend 
Critical -3.54 
1St diff (no trend) 
Critical -2.95 
2"d diff (no trend) 
Critical -2.95 
INV -2.26 -3.06 -3.77 
EXCH -1.66 -2.95 -3.33 
GDPC -0.48 -2.56 -2.94 
INFL -1.40 -1.51 -3.97 
LAB -3.40 -3.35 
NGSH -0.21 -2.99 -3.43 
POP -2.08 -0.91 -0.31 -3.25 
SAV -1.45 -2.18 -3.56 
TB -3.19 -3.64 
NATOE -1.46 -1.84 -4.57 
GDP -0.34 -2.75 -3.05 
Y -2.74 -2.92 -5.64 
SM -0.96 -0.69 -2.43 -5.31 
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APPENDIX H 
EXOGENEITY AND CAUSALITY 
Definition of Exogeneity 
Whether a variable is exogenous depends upon whether that variable can be taken as 
"given" without losing information for the purpose at hand. The distinct purposes of 
statistical inference, forecasting and policy analysis define the three concepts of 
weak, strong and super exogeneity (analysed later in this Appendix). 
As Ericsson & Irons (1994) claim: "Valid exogeneity assumptions may permit 
simpler modelling strategies, reduce computational expense and help isolate 
invariants of the economic mechanism. Invalid exogeneity assumptions may lead to 
inefficient or inconsistent inferences and result in misleading forecasts and policy 
simulations", (Ericsson & Irons, 1994, p. 7). 
Arguments about the division of a model's variables into endogenous and exogenous 
can be summarised as follows: 
The Cowles Foundation approach or the structural econometrics was developed 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. According to this approach, the data are 
assumed to have been generated by a system of simultaneous equations. The 
classification of variables into "exogenous" and "endogenous" and the causal 
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structure of the model are both given a priori and are untestable. Generally. but not 
very precisely, the endogenous variables are those which are explained by the 
structure of the model and all the remaining variables are the exogenous variables. 
This approach, however, has been criticised in recent years on the following 
grounds: 
a) The classification of variables into endogenous and exogenous is sometimes 
arbitrary 
b) Sometimes variables that should be included in an equation, are excluded in 
order to achieve identification. This was the argument made by Liu in 1960 and 
is known as the Liu critique. 
c) Then, there is the argument put forward by Lucas in 1976 (known as the Lucas 
critique). According to the Lucas critique, the coefficients in the simultaneous 
equations models cannot be assumed to be independent of changes in the 
exogenous variables. One solution to the Lucas critique is to make the 
coefficient of the simultaneous equation system depend on the exogenous policy 
variables. 
d) Learner (1985) suggests redefining the concept of exogeneity. He suggests 
defining the variable x as exogenous if the conditional distribution of y given x is 
invariant to modifications that alter the process generating x. Or, in other words, 
a variable is defined as exogenous if the Lucas critique does not apply to it. It 
has been claimed that it is not clear whether such a redefinition solves the 
problem raised by Lucas. There are two concepts of exogeneity that are usually 
distinguished: 
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i) Pre determinedness: A variable is predetermined in a particular 
equation if it is independent of the contemporaneous and future errors 
in that equation and 
ii) Strict exogeneity: A variable is strictly exogenous if it is independent 
of he contemporaneous future and past errors in the relevant equation. 
e) But Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) are not satisfied with these two 
definitions of exogeneity and suggest the concepts of weak, strong and super 
exogeneity. 
i) Weak exo eneity: A variable xt is said to be weakly exogenous for 
estimating a set of parameters k if inference on k conditional on xt 
involves no loss of information. In other words, the concept of weak 
exogeneity is related to the problem of static inference in an 
econometric model. 
ii) Super exo eg neity: This concept is related to the Lucas critique. If xt is 
weakly exogenous and the parameters in f(yt/xt) remain invariant to 
changes in the marginal distribution of xt, then xt is said to be super 
exogenous. Learner finds it unnecessary to require weak exogeneity 
as a condition for super exogeneity. He argues that this confounds the 
problem of efficient estimation with that of policy analysis. His 
definition of exogeneity is the same as the definition of super 
exogeneity by Engle, Hendry and Richard without the requirement for 
weak exogeneity. 
iii) Strong exo eg neity: This concept is linked to Granger causality. If xt 
is weakly exogenous and xt is not preceded by any of the endogenous 
variables, xt is defined to be strongly exogenous. This definition 
is 
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according to Learner. The definition by Engle, Hendry and Richard 
uses the concept of Granger causality. If xt is weakly exogenous and 
xt is not caused in the sense of Granger by any of the endogenous 
variables in the system, then xt is defined to be strongly exogenous. 
In simple words, the term "Granger causality" means "precedence". 
Granger Causality and Exogeneity 
So, according to the definition given by Engle, Hendry and Richard, Granger 
noncausality is necessary for strong exogeneity. However, as Cooley and LeRoy 
(1985) claim, Granger noncausality is neither necessary nor sufficient for exogeneity 
as understood in the simultaneous equations literature. 
Thus, a test for Granger noncausality is not useful as a test for exogeneity. Despite 
that, some argue that it is still useful as a descriptive device for time-series data. 
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